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INTRODUCTION
We all crave simple elegance. Physicists since Einstein have
been searching for a grand unified theory that will tie everything
together in a simple model. Law professors have their own grand
theories - law and economics's Coase Theorem and constitutional
law's Originalism immediately spring to mind. Criminal law is no
different, for the analogue is our faith in deterrence - the belief
that increasing the penalty on an activity will mean that fewer peo-
ple will perform it. This theory has much to commend it. After all,
economists and shoppers have known for ages that a price increase
in a good means that people will consume less of it. But sometimes
the consumption picture is more complicated than this simple eco-
nomic account. Indeed, the leap from ordinary goods to criminal
behavior is a large one, and one that presents complications of its
own.
This article sketches out several possible outcomes that arise
from the criminalization of behavior. Incorporating recent work in
economics, sociology, and psychology, it explains the ways in which
the deterrence question is more difficult than many of us have as-
sumed and illustrates how criminalization can create unintended,
and sometimes perverse, incentives.
The first part of this article introduces (or reintroduces) criminal
lawyers to the idea of substitutes and complements in economic
theory. Briefly, two products are substitutes when they compete
with each other and are complements when they "go together."'
Consumers will tend to use more of a good - to substitute in favor
of the good - when its relative price falls, and to use less of it - to
substitute away from the good - when its relative price increases.
If the price of tea increases, for example, substitution theory
predicts that the demand for coffee would increase. But the de-
mand for other products that go with tea, such as lemons, may drop
because tea and lemons are complementary products. An increase
in tea prices will not, however, directly affect the use of foot pow-
der. Because tea and foot powder do not have much to do with
1. Put a different way, two goods are substitutes if an increase in the price of one causes
an increase in demand for the other. They are complements if an increase in the price of one
causes a decrease in demand for the other. For explanations of these concepts, see WALTER
NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 98 (4th ed. 1987);
PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAus, ECONOMICS 411 (12th ed. 1985).
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each other - the consumption of one is not affected by the con-
sumption of the other - they are considered "independent goods."
Consumption is also affected by what economists term the "in-
come effect." The income effect predicts that an increase in the
price of a good reduces the real income of a consumer of that good.
This reduction in real income means that consumption of virtually
all other goods may decrease. To continue our simple example, a
drastic increase in the price of tea may indirectly decrease the con-
sumption of foot powder because tea consumers will not have as
much money to spend on foot powder. And here again, substitu-
tion is at work - a high price on tea will not have a strong income
effect if consumers are willing to shift to coffee. The substitution
effect, therefore, tempers the income effect of a price increase.
What do tea and lemons have to do with criminal law? The
criminal law can be seen as setting prices for crimes, and these price
effects may cause substitution. (Indeed, standard deterrence mod-
els implicitly assume substitution by holding as a central tenet that a
penalty on activity X will lead people to substitute the legal behav-
ior of refraining from X.) Just as a reduction in the price of tea may
lead to an increase in the demand for coffee, an increase in the
price of one crime may induce consumers and dealers to find a sub-
stitute. That is, a penalty on crime Xmay lead to behavior Y and Z.
Y and Z, moreover, may be criminal acts. An assessment of the
social utility of penalizing X should therefore discount the benefit
of decreasing X by the corresponding harm of increasing Y and Z.
This idea suggests that a penalty cannot be set at a level based sim-
ply on the harm that an activity causes. Rather, it must be set at a
level that assimilates consumer reaction to the penalty.
Granted, this economic model is thin, and many qualifications
and enhancements must be made. Begin by questioning whether
criminals actually know the law; for if not, then how can this view of
deterrence make any sense? A theory of behavior that understands
the norm-creating component of law provides one answer: substitu-
tion-like effects will occur when the law influences the social under-
standing of the blameworthiness of particular acts, even when
people lack knowledge about the law. To take another complica-
tion, consider whether criminals act rationally. Cognitive psycholo-
gists have demonstrated that people decide between various
alternatives in ways that are often "irrational," through framing ef-
fects, aversion to extremes, and so on. This work may be extrapo-
lated to show how, even when strict assumptions about rational
choice are relaxed, making very harmful substitutes look worse and
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less harmful substitutes look better might minimize dangerous sub-
stitution effects. Other modifications that this article develops ad-
dress the income and distributional effects of penalties and the issue
of how preferences and tastes toward crime develop. This article is
not centered around the old-fashioned question of whether deter-
rence works. Instead, it asks: Under what conditions does deter-
rence work, and what are some of its effects when it succeeds and
fails?
Part I begins by sketching out a common understanding of de-
terrence and substitution. Part I also introduces, as one simple ex-
ample of substitution, how consumption and dealing of heroin may
have increased as a reaction to the new crack penalties. Part II then
illustrates some of the normative conclusions that follow from this
economic model, including a new argument in favor of the Sentenc-
ing Guidelines. This Part also illustrates how, once the income ef-
fect is understood, criminalization of acts may have perverse
consequences, possibly increasing commission of those acts in cer-
tain circumstances.
Parts I and II utilize an economic model of deterrence that as-
sumes that preferences are fixed. This model yields a tidy set of
prescriptions for policy, but it has the shortcomings noted above. It
suffers, in short, from its own quest for simple elegance. Part III,
therefore, posits what ultimately may be a more persuasive model
of criminal punishment, one that relaxes the assumption of fixed
preference. Instead of assuming that penalties act only to constrain
opportunity, this Part examines how punishment may reduce the
taste for an activity and explains how this preference-shaping con-
ception of criminal law may either enhance or detract from the sub-
stitution effect. This Part goes on to develop a theory of the
mechanism by which preferences adapt to punishment. Highlight-
ing theories. of social control from sociology and theories of choice
from psychology, it shows how the criminal law exerts a strong, and
sometimes unconscious, force on people's preferences.
The effects of criminalization are both varied and complicated,
and it is only natural for readers to stumble on the contradictory
effects and new vocabulary that appear in the pages that follow.
Part IV tries to reduce this complexity by compiling and describing
all the effects of a penalty and by providing examples of how penal-
ties might work in practice. (While it might strike some as unnatu-
ral to save these illustrations until the end, doing so yields a fuller
picture.) It must be stressed, however, that this piece is only a pre-
liminary attempt to begin to peel away some of the assumptions
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behind deterrence. Future work will have to examine substitution
elasticities, consumer preferences, interactions between social atti-
tudes and law, and a host of other details. This article is meant to
raise more questions than it answers; what follows is therefore not a
complete theory of criminal deterrence, but rather a first install-
ment in an attempt toward one. In sum, this article illustrates the
complexity of the deterrence question and shows that a simple and
elegant answer to the deterrence question has not yet been found.
As a result, much research and reflection is needed, particularly
with regards to elasticities of substitution and the subterranean
norm-creating role of the criminal law.
I. THE ECONOMICS OF SUBSTITUTION
A. Conventional Deterrence and its Marginal Refinement
To understand the implications of substitution, it is important to
set the context by examining the conventional perspective on deter-
rence. Gary Becker pioneered modern economic analysis of crimi-
nal deterrence in his 1968 article.2 Following Becker's lead,
deterrence analysis has primarily focused on whether a particular
penalty for a crime and the enforcement of the penalty will deter
the commission of that crime. The analysis turns on whether the
penalty is set at an appropriate level to optimize deterrence - bal-
ancing the cost of the activity against the cost of enforcement. It
makes sense to think about many problems in substantive criminal
law this way. The approach provides us, for example, with a
straightforward way to examine whether a fifty-dollar fine for spit-
ting gum out on the sidewalk will deter the optimal number of peo-
ple from spitting their gum out and messing up sidewalks.
A few law and economics scholars, however, noted that Becker
missed a crucial variable for optimality: marginal deterrence. The
idea is essentially the problem of cliffs - exacting equal penalties
for crimes of lesser and greater magnitude leads to crimes of
greater magnitude. As its primary exponent, George Stigler, put it,
"[i]f the thief has his hand cut off for taking five dollars, he had just
as well take $5,000.''3 Stigler's insight tracked that of the
2. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL
ECON. 169 (1968). The concept of price was first applied to criminal penalties, I believe, by
the French criminologist Gabriel Tarde, who wrote: "The same thing applies, it seems to me,
to the effect of penalties upon criminality as applies to the effect of prices on consumption."
GABRIEL TARDE, PENAL PrmLosoPii 482 (Rapelje Howell trans., Little, Brown, and Co.
1912) (1890).
3. George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. PoL ECON. 526, 527
(1970). For economic discussions of marginal deterrence, see Dilip Mookherjee & I.P.L. Png,
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eighteenth-century Italian theorist Cesare Beccaria, who argued:
"If an equal punishment is laid down for two crimes which damage
society unequally, men will not have a stronger deterrent against
committing the greater crime if they find it more advantageous to
do so."4 Jeremy Bentham made a similar move as well, arguing that
the goal of a sanction is "to induce a man to choose always the least
mischievous of two offences; therefore [w]here two offences come
in competition, the punishment for the greater offence must be suf-
ficient to induce a man to prefer the less."'5
At its best, the marginal deterrence argument is one about cre-
ating incentives for individuals to refrain from committing the same
crime on a greater scale.6 As such, it is a much-needed refinement
of the traditional deterrence question. While the traditional ques-
tion asks whether a penalty for X deters X, the marginal deterrence
theorist asks whether a penalty for X may prompt commission of
the marginally more severe crime X + 1 because that crime receives
the same magnitude of punishment as X. For that reason, Stigler's
solution to the marginal deterrence problem was to state that
"[e]xpected penalties [should] increase with expected gains so there
is no marginal net gain from larger offenses."' 7 This is where substi-
tution comes in.
Marginal Deterrence in Enforcement of Law, 102 J. PoL ECON. 1039 (1994); Louis L. Wilde,
Criminal Choice, Nonmonetary Sanctions, and Marginal Deterrence: A Normative Analysis,
12 INTL REV. L. & ECON. 333 (1992). A philosophical treatment of marginal deterrence,
bristling with general insights into the nature of criminal law, is found in Dan M. Kahan &
Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269
(1996).
4. CESARE BECCARIA, On Crimes and Punishments, in ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS
AND OTHER WRITINGS 1, 21 (Richard Bellamy ed. & Richard Davies et al. trans., Cambridge
Univ. Press 1995) (1764). Or, as Chabroud complained 200 years ago, "if I have betrayed my
country, I go to prison; if I have killed my father, I go to prison; every imaginable offence is
punished in the same uniform way. One might as well see a physician who has the same
remedy for all ills." MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH: THE BIRTH OF THE
PRISON 117 (Alan Sheridan trans., 2d ed. Vintage Books 1995) (1975) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting 26 ARCHIVES PARLEMENTAIRES DE 1787 A 1860 (1st ser.) 618
(1887) (statement of Chabroud)).
5. JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEoISLA-
TION 168 (J.H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., Athlone Press 1970) (1789) (emphasis omitted);
see also JEREMY BENTHAM, THE THEORY OF LEoIsLATON 201 (Tripathi Private Ltd. 1975)
(1802) ("Where two offences are in conjunction, the greater offence ought to be subjected to
severer punishment, in order that the delinquent may have a motive to stop at the lesser."
(emphasis omitted)).
6. This may explain why Stigler's attempt to rehabilitate marginal deterrence went over
like a lead balloon with most people, with the important exception of a few academics. See,
e.g., Richard Craswell, Damage Multipliers in Market Relationships, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 463
(1996) (discussing the applicability of marginal deterrence in torts and contracts).




This article argues that Beccaria and Stigler's insight about mar-
ginal deterrence reflects only one instance of substitution. By
pointing out that consumers (criminals) will base their choices be-
tween X and X + 1 on the price (expected penalty) of each, margi-
nal deterrence demonstrates a relationship between price and
conduct. But criminals often have choices beyond X and X + 1;
thus an increase in the price of X may increase the commission of
non-X activities. The substitution perspective therefore expands
the conventional deterrence question by asking whether a penalty
for X will distort behavior and lead people to commit an altogether
different crime (Y, Z, or some combination of the two). These
other acts may be other crimes, or they may be lawful endeavors.
Substitution's chief insight is that it shows that the focus of marginal
deterrence - one example of substitution - is too narrow.
The move I am making away from marginal deterrence is one
familiar to many readers in public economics. Essentially, I am ar-
guing that marginal deterrence utilizes a partial equilibrium model
that does not yield a complete account of the effect of a particular
penalty, and that general equilibrium analysis is, in general, better
suited to analyzing the problem due to the numerous distortions in
behavior created by a penalty.8 In part, this is because at a high
enough price, virtually anything can become a substitute. Even a
monopolist who can charge a higher price because of the absence of
competition is constrained by substitution from charging a price
that is sky-high. In the days when trains were effectively the only
means of long-distance transport, for example, many believed that
train companies had a monopoly and that they could charge
whatever they wanted. But a sky-high price for a train ticket meant
that most people would stay home, or that they would use their
bicycles.9 The point is that at high prices, even the things that aren't
ordinarily considered substitutes, such as bicycles and train rides,
function that way. Indeed, even exact opposites - a train ride and
forgoing a train ride - are substitutes when the price of a train ride
is high enough. Or, to take another example, many politicians used
to think that salt was a perfect item to tax because it had no substi-
8. Cf. RICHARD W. TR.EscH, PUBLiC FNANCE: A NORMATIVE THEORY 14 (1981)
(describing faults of partial equilibrium analysis in public finance context).
9. The point at which consumers switch to alternate goods (or to no good) depends on




tutes. But if salt taxes were raised, consumers would have switched
to different spices or would not have used salt at all.' 0
Criminal law has unconsciously relied on such concepts.
Viewed one way, the whole point of deterrence is to make the price
of a crime high enough so that a criminal will "substitute" forgoing
the crime. Just as a high price on train rides meant that people
would not take them, a high price on a crime means people will not
commit it. But, as the bicycle option in the train example shows, a
gradation of potential options is open to people. When it comes to
crime, however, most of us don't take the economics seriously
enough to examine whether an analogue to the bicycle exists - we
assume that crimes do not have much to do with each other. Even
marginal deterrence is generally concerned with the problem of in-
centives to commit the same crime on a greater scale. The para-
digm is generally (but not exclusively) that criminals have four
choices: commit the crime, do not commit the crime, commit the
crime on a greater scale, or commit the crime on a lesser scale. The
general idea is that crimes are not substitutes but "independent
goods." This underlying assumption that crimes are independent
may explain why the conventional deterrence perspective has en-
dured. As we shall see, this assumption appears to have some
merit, particularly for what I call nonmarket crimes." But many
crimes are not independent. Their substitutability will be deter-
mined by the "elasticity of substitution" - the ease with which the
demand for one crime may be substituted for the demand for
another.12
To illustrate this concept, imagine that the demand for two
products is perfectly elastic. Under this condition, a small change in
10. Price is set by both demand and supply. As Marshall noted, in the short run, the price
of a good is set by demand because supply is fixed. At some point, however, the supply will
clear the market. If the price of a good increases beyond a certain point, consumers will then
substitute other goods for the product. The price will be set by the price at which a marginal
user will buy the good. Nevertheless, as time elapses, the cost of producing the good will set
the price because supply will increase. At that point, the marginal cost of production will set
the price because a lower price will induce people to substitute the product for the others
that they had previously used. But as the demand for the good at the lower price increases,
the supply will again clear the market. People will then invest to increase the supply, and the
circle will repeat itself. This led Marshall to note that the question of whether price was set
by demand or supply was like asking whether one end of a scissors did the cutting or the
other. See 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 348 (9th ed. 1961); see also
NICHOLSON, supra note 1, at 10-11.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 145-50.
12. See J.R. HICKS, THE THEORY OF WAGES 117 (2d ed. 1963); see also Charles
Blackorby & R. Robert Russell, Will the Real Elasticity of Substitution Please Stand Up?, 79
AM. EcoN. REv. 882 (1989); Y. Mundlak, Elasticities of Substitution and the Theory of De-
rived Demand, 35 REv. OF ECON. STUD. 225 (1968).
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the price of one product will lead to a large change in demand for
that product because consumers will substitute the other. This is
the flipside of the marginal deterrence problem. Marginal deter-
rence states that when the price of two goods is equal, consumption
will shift to the product that provides the user with greater utility.
Conversely, when the utility of two goods is equal (that is, the
goods are perfectly elastic) and their prices are slightly different,
people will prefer the cheaper one. A one-tenth of a cent differ-
ence in the price of two nonbrand cigarettes will lead the marginal
user to substitute the cheaper one for the more expensive. Once
brands are placed on the cigarettes, however, the products are not
identical, and a small price difference will not induce the same
amount of substitution. The degree of substitution is a function of
the difference in price in relation to the desire for the two goods.
Thinking about criminal law, it is not difficult to understand how
crimes committed for profit are ripe candidates for substitution
analysis, but it is hard to imagine how other crimes can be analyzed
in such terms. Yet even crimes of passion may, perhaps, be ex-
amined in terms of substitution.13 Passion, after all, comes in differ-
ent forms, and a penalty structure may induce people to act in
particular ways by assigning costs to particular passionate activities.
As Richard Hermstein puts it, when husbands and wives start
throwing dishes at each other, they do not usually throw the fine
china.14
Take what seems like the quintessential example in which sub-
stitution would not occur: rape. Insofar as these categories are sep-
arable - and the argument does not depend on their separability
- is rape a crime of sex, violence, or domination? If rapists seek
sex, it might follow that lowering the penalty for prostitution will
reduce the frequency of rape. If they seek to dominate and humili-
ate, legalized prostitution may provide a substitute as well. To the
extent that rapists seek violence, lowering the penalties for other
violence, say, assaults, may reduce the commission of rapes. Con-
versely, a high penalty for rape may mean that there are more in-
stances of spousal abuse and other violence. These ideas are not
policy suggestions, only possible illustrations of substitution at
work. There may be many reasons why legalized prostitution is
13. See HERBERT L PACKER, TmE Lmrrs oF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 41-42 (1968) (ar-
guing that Bentham's rational-actor deterrence model helps analyze even "irrational" and
"impuls[ive]" crimes).




problematic.15 But the complementarity between prostitution and
rape itself suggests that interrelationships between behavior cannot
be ignored.16
Even when the penalties for a crime are so high that it appears
that all the crime that can be deterred will be deterred, substitution
presents possible problems. After all, one result of a higher penalty
may be an increase in criminal activity - both of the particular
crime and of other crimes. As explained above, at high prices,
many crimes may substitute for one crime. The rapist who is deter-
mined to rape a particular woman and is not deterred by a high
penalty for rape may go out and commit other crimes. He may first
rape the woman, then kill her, and finally assault unrelated others,
because the cost of future criminal activity is negligible. If, on the
other hand, the penalty for rape is not high, the marginal cost of
additional criminal activity may be much higher.
To take another example, imagine the potential consequences of
the "three strikes you're out" rule.' 7 If offenders know that, on
their third offense, they will be jailed for life, they may be less likely
to commit that third offense; but if they do, they might make it a
drastic one. Indeed, they may even decide to kill the witnesses to
their crimes because - at least in states without a death penalty -
there is nothing more that the government can do to them.'8
Viewed in these terms, the death penalty could provide an in-
centive for additional crime. The person who has already killed a
child in a state where such action qualifies for the death penalty will
not have a legal incentive, or at least not a very strong one, to re-
15. Consider, for example, the potential complementarity between legalized prostitution
and rape and the harm legalized prostitution might do to the status of women. See generally
Neal Kumar Katyal, Note, Men Who Own Women: A Thirteenth Amendment Critique of
Forced Prostitution, 103 YALE U. 791 (1993).
16. Although I have expressed, through the train and salt examples, the belief that at a
high enough price, virtually anything can be a substitute, I specifically do not make the claim
that all crimes are in fact substitutes for each other. I simply do not have the necessary
statistical information as to criminals' preferences for committing different crimes in order to
determine at what point substitution may or may not occur.
17. See, e-g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559 (1994); CAI_ PENAL CODE § 1170.12 (West Supp. 1997).
18. See Nkechi Taifa, "Three-Strikes-and-You're-Out" - Mandatory Life Imprisonment
for Third 7ime Felons, 20 U. DAYTON L. Rnv. 717,724-25 (1995); Victor S. Sze, Comment, A
Tale of Three Strikes: Slogan Triumphs Over Substance as Our Bumper-Sticker Mentality
Comes Home to Roost, 28 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1047,1070-71 (1995); Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike
Law Shows It's Not as Simple as It Seems, N.Y. TimEs, Feb. 15,1994, at Al; Lisa Leff, Chiefs
3 Strikes Theory Generates Mixed Reaction, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 14, 1996, at 1; Edwin Meese III,
Three Strikes Laws Punish and Protect, INsIGHT MAO., May 16, 1994, at 18, available in 1994
WL 11601844; William Tucker, Three Strikes and You're Dead, AM. SPECrATOR, Mar. 1994,
at 22, 26 ("Three-strikes-you're-out will only turn more victims of violent crime into murder
victims. Dead men tell no tales."); Thaai Walker, Police Concerned About '3 Strikes' Law,
S.F. CHRON., Mar. 14, 1994, at A15.
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frain from killing again. If a legal incentive exists, it is simply to
avoid getting caught. But because deterrence is a function of both
the sanction level and the probability that it will be imposed, the
disincentive is lower for the repeat murderer than it is for the first-
time one.19 Since the penalty for one, two, or even three more
murders is the same, the penalty itself does not work to provide
additional deterrence.
On the other hand, Chief Judge Posner has used similar ideas to
make an interesting argument for capital punishment. Posner sug-
gests that the threat of death creates an additional rung on the lad-
der to increase the range of punishment:
Capital punishment is also supported by considerations of marginal
deterrence, which require as big a spread as possible between the
punishments for the least and most serious crimes. If the maximum
punishment for murder is life imprisonment, we may not want to
make armed robbery also punishable by life imprisonment, for then
armed robbers would have no additional incentive not to murder their
victims. 20
Yet the problem with Posner's argument is that the death penalty
eliminates the "spread" for all death-eligible crimes. As we have
seen, imposing a death penalty for a particular crime gives an incen-
tive to those who commit it to commit further crimes. Posner's in-
attention toward this problem is, I imagine, related to his reliance
on the principle of marginal deterrence - itself a nice demonstra-
tion of the narrow focus of marginal deterrence and the broader
perspective substitution engenders. Once it is understood that the
death penalty creates equality between a variety of crimes, then the
death penalty might not be as helpful as Posner suggests. If the
question is between deterring X and X + 1 - as Posner puts it,
between armed robbery and murder + armed robbery - and those
who commit X receive a life sentence, then perhaps those who com-
mit X + 1 should get the higher sentence of death.21 But once sub-
stitution is considered, the question is not about simply deterring X
+ 1, but deterring crimes Y and Z, and therefore, imposing the
19. The possibility of being caught may not be constant, as it might increase if the
murders take a particular pattern, or if the murders are committed in one place, because the
police may devote more resources to such a crime. But then, the logical response might be to
simply substitute other crimes that have nothing to do with the initial one.
20. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
1193, 1210-11 (1985).
21. This analysis, of course, does not consider other arguments against the death penalty,
such as those based on morality. I should also note that a jury might be more likely to
convict someone for one murder if evidence is introduced that he also committed other
murders. This issue arises in, inter alia, debates about prior bad acts and prejudicial indict-
ments that allege a laundry list of criminal activities to smear a defendant.
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death penalty for the activity of X + 1 could cause Y and Z to be
committed instead. Jail, unlike death, has many different rungs -
ranging from duration of sentence to the size and characteristics of
one's jail cell.22
The limitations of models that do not incorporate substitution
also explain some of the rather odd conclusions of academics writ-
ing in criminal law. For example, Robert Cooter has argued that
the government could afford to get sanctions wrong, but that it
could not afford to make mistakes when it imposed prices on activi-
ties.23 More recently, Dan Kahan has argued that the lenity doc-
trine should be abolished because people who break the law know
that what they are doing is wrong.24 The problem that both authors
face is that they assume that people will either commit crime X or
no crime at all. If people are picking between a range of crimes,
however, then the government, contra Cooter, cannot afford to
make mistakes about a sanction. Such mistakes create perverse in-
centives and may lead people to engage in conduct that is more
harmful than what they would have done otherwise. 25 Similarly,
the lenity doctrine may provide legislators with incentives to draft
laws that specify precise punishments so that actors know the rela-
tive severity of different activities. And specification may permit
the government to channel law-breaking behavior into the least
harmful forms by increasing the expected sanctions on harmful ac-
tivities. As Brissot once wrote, the laws must be clear "so that each
member of society may distinguish criminal actions from virtuous
22. There are ways to create rungs with the death penalty. As one eighteenth-century
French tract described it:
some prisoners may be condemned to be hanged, others to having their hands cut off or
their tongues cut out or pierced and then to be hanged; others, for more serious crimes,
to be broken alive and to die on the wheel, after having their limbs broken; others to be
broken until they die a natural death, others to be strangled and then broken, others to
be burnt alive, others to be burnt after first being strangled; others to be drawn by four
horses, others to have their heads cut off, and others to have their heads broken.
FOuCAuLT, supra note 4, at 32 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting JEAN ANTOINE
SOULATGES, TIrlt DES CRIMES (1762)). These options are, of course, constrained by our
Eighth Amendment - which functions as an explicit morality limit on the outer bounds of
deterrence theory. See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
23. See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1523, 1550 (1984) ("For-
tunately, if the officials make a mistake and attach the wrong sanction to a crime - either
too high or too low - the behavior of most people will not be affected by the error, because
the cost of crime far exceeds the benefit.").
24. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. CT. REv. 345,
396-97, 400-03.
25. In addition, to the extent punishments are meted out based only on the harmfulness
of an activity, without a discount for substitution effects, criminal enforcement resources are
likely to be misdeployed. See infra section II.B.
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actions."26 Yet the laws must also permit distinctions among crimi-
nal actions to provide proper incentives.
When considering proper incentives, the law must also take ac-
count of potential complementarities between activities. Certain
acts lend themselves naturally to the commission of other acts, and
even if the initial act does not itself harm society, the encourage-
ment the initial act gives to these others may provide a basis for
criminalization. The possession of a set of burglar's tools does not,
in itself, create much social harm. Nevertheless, the law may seek
to criminalize possession because of the complementarity between
possession and burglary. Indeed, many acts are punished, or pun-
ished severely, not because of their inherent harm, but because of
the likely complementarity with other crimes (such as prohibitions
on drunk driving).27 But, as previously noted in the three-strikes
and death penalty examples, increasing the expected sanction
might, in limited circumstances, increase complementarity between
crimes as well.28
Increasing the expected sanction can be understood in economic
terms as a decrease in the "wage" for a criminal activity, an increase
in "tax" for that activity, or, more simply, as an increase in the
"cost" of that activity. Naturally, the expected sanction is only one
of many costs for criminals. Take the example of a drug dealer.
Other costs may be the price at which the dealer buys the drugs and
the cost of other materials such as crack vials or plastic glassine
bags - all of which affect substitution. These costs, analogous to
raw materials, are "variable" in the sense that a dealer incurs addi-
tional costs when she sells an additional unit. The dealer may also
have "fixed" costs - for example, the price of a scale or other
weighing device, rent on an apartment or other place to sell drugs,
and so on.29
In addition to raw materials and fixed costs, two other costs de-
serve consideration. First, the aforementioned expected sanction
can be understood as a cost. Because in most cases the likelihood
of getting caught increases with each additional drug deal, the cost
can vary. Because the expected sanction increases due to the quan-
tity of a given sale - a larger sale increases jail time and may be
26. 1 J.P. BmisSOT, TitoRI DES Lois CRrNutau.Es 24 (1781). I am grateful to Aaron
Panner for the translation.
27. See PACKER, supra note 13, at 270.
28. See supra text accompanying notes 17-22.
29. Some of these raw materials may also have legal costs. To the extent items such as
scales are considered contraband, or reliable indicia of criminal behavior, they can possess
costs beyond their purchase price.
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the subject of additional law enforcement - the cost varies not
only by the raw number of sales, but by the number of units sold as
well.30
Second, criminal behavior entails opportunity costs. The most
obvious such cost is that the amount of time one spends on illegal
activity detracts from the time one could spend on lawful employ-
ment.31 (Note that as the returns from legal activity increase, the
opportunity cost of criminal activity increases as well - a fact that
may partially explain why some criminal activities tend to be per-
formed by poorer, unemployed individuals.)
Criminal behavior also foists indirect opportunity costs, of both
an economic and social nature, on individuals. One possible cost is
that those who undertake criminal behavior may internalize the
legal system's view of them as "outlaws" and believe that they are
not suited to lawful employment. The law-abiding world, for its
part, may not want to hire people who are or were engaged - or
suspected to be engaged - in illegal activity. 32 The fact that per-
sons only suspected of criminal activity may be affected is impor-
tant, for it suggests that even when someone has not been arrested
for a particular activity, the unlawfulness of that activity may still
impose costs on that person.33
Such stigmatization costs can be said to be opportunity costs
since the cost of criminal activity is the forfeiture of some lawful
employment. This type of opportunity cost, however, is not a func-
tion of the attributes of the particular activity (such as the time
spent in performing it), but of the fact of criminalization, which cre-
ates opportunity costs that would not exist if the activity had been
legal.34
30. Therefore, to the extent that a given dealer prefers a few large risks - as opposed to
a smaller number of minor risks - she will tend to make larger sales.
31. For those without lawful employment, the opportunity cost could be reduced leisure.
32. Professor Opp, for example, notes that punishment may label particular people as
criminals, stigmatizing those individuals and channeling them into criminal careers. See Karl-
Dieter Opp, The Economics of Crime and the Sociology of Deviant Behaviour: A Theoretical
Confrontation of Basic Propositions, 42 KyiLos 405, 420 (1989). And we must add to this
cost of punishment the fact that imprisonment often breeds crime because of the unsavory
contacts one meets while imprisoned, contacts that may reduce the cost of further criminal
activity. This suggests that a penalty on first-time offenders should be low to avoid labeling
effects. See Stephan M. Panther, The Economics of Crime and Criminal Law: An Antithesis
to Sociological Theoriesl 2 EUR. J.L. & EcoN. 365, 375 (1995).
33. The concept of "stigma" is developed in detail in section III.B.3.
34. There are other forms of opportunity cost that may exist regardless of a legal sanc-
tion. If hard drugs were legalized tomorrow, for example, employers still might not want to
hire those people suspected of part-time drug dealing. The opportunity costs arising from
stigmatization, therefore, are not perfectly symmetrical to the legal sanction of that particular
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Another related cost may follow in some cases. For a person
who has two "jobs," one of which then becomes illegal, criminaliza-
tion could either lead him to decrease his now-unlawful employ-
ment (the deterrence hypothesis) or, ironically, to decrease the time
he spends in his lawful occupation. The latter option may be a rea-
sonable reaction because his lawful employment may make it more
difficult to carry out his illegal one (for example, his law-abiding
coworkers could inform the police). Put in terms that are now fa-
miliar, the social and economic impact from the criminalization of
an activity may engender complementary relationships with other
illegal acts.35
The stigmatization opportunity cost can be said to be variable in
that the more criminal the activity, the greater the stigma. Burger
King is less likely to hire big-time, rather than small-fry, drug deal-
ers. But there may also be a minimum fixed stigmatization cost of
committing a crime. When neighbors derogatorily say that some-
one is a "drug dealer," their disapproval generally is not adjusted to
take account of the fact that he sold only one vial of crack last
week. In other words, stigma itself has cliffs. The fact that a person
is a drug dealer may impose fixed opportunity costs on that individ-
ual. Such costs may vary from individual to individual - for exam-
ple, by how susceptible the individual is to internalization, or by
how many people know about the person's status as a dealer. But
for some people, at least, such costs may be fixed at a minimum
floor amount. Increasing the amount of criminal activity one un-
dertakes may raise these costs, but they won't drop below that
floor. This suggests that once a lawbreaker faces stigma - either
from the community, individuals, or the law - she may capitalize
on her sunk cost and increase her criminal activity. A proper analy-
sis of stigma requires knowledge about the interrelationships be-
tween law and social norms, raising issues that are well beyond the
confines of traditional economics and that will be taken up later in
this article.36
An actor can be expected to conduct that amount of criminal
activity for which the marginal gains obtained from an additional
activity. They are intermediated by a number of social norms - norms that have a compli-
cated relationship with the law. See infra section III.B.
35. Complementary relationships may also exist because of something inherent about a
particular type of crime. Auto thefts, for example, may be a complement to burglaries be-
cause stolen cars are often used in committing other types of crime. See Simon Hakim et al.,
Substitution, Size Effects and the Composition of Property Crime, 65 Soc. Sci. Q. 719, 731
(1984).
36. See infra section 1II.B.
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crime are exactly equal to the marginal cost of undertaking that
additional crime. The expected sanction, however, differs from a
"cost" in at least one crucial sense - it is only probabilistic. If the
criminal doesn't get caught, she doesn't incur the expected sanction.
She may suffer other costs as a result of the expected sanction, even
if she isn't caught - for example, she may pay a higher price for
the drugs or she may suffer stigmatization opportunity costs. But
the expected sanction itself may not be imposed.
These terms - elasticities of substitution, variable costs, oppor-
tunity costs, and so on - are relatively unfamiliar concepts in con-
temporary criminal law. Contrast, for example, two other legal
fields, torts and taxation. Ever since Calabresi and Posner's writ-
ings,37 the question of whether to impose liability on a tortfeasor
has been governed in part by an analysis of whether the imposition
of liability will create substitution incentives that make society
worse off than it would be by letting the loss lie where it falls. If
imposing strict liability on doctors for malpractice will lead to fewer
working doctors - because doctors will substitute leisure or other
income-producing activity - strict liability may be counter-
productive.38
The notion that increased liability will have counterproductive
results also brings to mind Laffer's claim that an increase in a tax
rate actually results in less tax revenue.39 The intellectual pedigree
for his claim depends, in part, on substitution as well. At about the
same time that Calabresi and Posner were incorporating substitu-
tion into torts, tax policy received a large boost with the publication
of James Mirrlees's 1971 article.40 Mirrlees, extending the
landmark work of Frank Ramsey,41 developed a theory of optimal
taxation that explicitly incorporated substitution. In examining
what income tax rate structure would maximize social welfare,
Mirrlees argued, one must take account of the substitution between
income-producing activity and leisure.42 Optimal tax theory there-
37. Gumo CALABREsI, THE COSTS OF ACCrDENTs (1970); RIcHARD A. POSNER, Eco-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 78, 84-88 (1st ed. 1972).
38. As I contend below, however, there are important differences between tort and crimi-
nal law. See infra text accompanying notes 183-200. (arguing that taste-shaping helps explain
the tort/crime distinction and why substitution may be even more pronounced in criminal
law).
39. See JOHN B. TAYLOR, PRrNCIPLES OF MICROECONoMIcs 483-84 fig.15.7 (1995).
40. J.A. Mirrlees, An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation, 38 REV.
ECON. STUD. 175 (1971).
41. F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).
42. For one discussion of the Mirrlees model and the substitution between income-
producing activity and leisure, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and
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fore broke away from what Edward McCaffery calls "[t]he tradi-
tional ideal" that "certain presumptively equal things ... be taxed
on nominally equal footing."43
Optimal tax theory began by examining whether taxation would
impose deadweight losses. The deadweight loss, or excess burden,
is the difference between the revenue raised by the government and
the burden imposed on taxpayers. 44 The revenue raised is a prod-
uct of the income effect, so any additional burden on the taxpayers
is the substitution effect. If the substitution effect outweighs the
income effect, then the tax imposes a deadweight loss and should
not be imposed. For this reason, it is said that optimal taxation
turns on the compensated, or Hicksian, elasticity - the substitution
effect.45
Optimal tax theory has moved on to consider the impact of tax-
ation on different income-producing activities. As one of the lead-
ing analyses of optimal tax describes it, the idea is that "[a]ctivities
or commodities for which substitution effects are the smallest ought
to be taxed more heavily." 46 Of course, all of this is tough to do 47
- but the difficulty does not mean that tax analysts should ignore
optimal taxation altogether.
Both torts and taxes are areas where the government attempts
to price conduct in ways that minimize certain distortions in behav-
ior. The insights of substitution from these areas of law suggest a
rather different way of thinking about deterrence in criminal law;
instead of examining whether a penalty deters a particular activity,
it is also important to inquire about the cost of that deterrence. Just
as torts analysts ask what the price of strict liability is, and just as
the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905, 1962-65
(1987).
43. Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code 40 UCLA L. REv. 983, 1035 (1993).
44. Alan J. Auerbach, Excess Burden and Optimal Taxation, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC
ECONOMICS 61, 67 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1985).
45. See Edward J. McCaffery, Slouching Towards Equality: Gender Discrimination, Mar-
ket Efficiency, and Social Change, 103 YALE L.J. 595, 659-60 (1993).
46. Walter Hettich & Stanley Winer, Blueprints and Pathways: The Shifting Foundations
of Tax Reform, 38 NATL. TAx J. 423, 428 (1985); see also David F. Bradford & Harvey S.
Rosen, The Optimal Taxation of Commodities and Income, AM. ECON. AssN. PAPERS &
PROC., May 1976, at 94; McCaffery, supra note 43, at 1047 ("[O]ptimal taxation can be under-
stood as an elaborate device for minimizing the impact of taxation on free market alloca-
tions."); Agnar Sandmo, Optimal Taxation: An Introduction to the Literature, 6 J. PUB.
ECON. 37 (1976) (considering optimal tax rates by considering income distribution, work in-
centives, and capital formation).
47. See McCaffery, supra note 43, at 1038 ("Elasticities are a tricky and treacherous busi-
ness; they vary among the short and long terms, are difficult to measure, incorporate numer-
ous expectancies regarding the future, and are highly particularistic.").
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the tax wonks examine whether particular changes to the tax code
will change income-producing behavior, scholars and policymakers
might gain a fuller appreciation of the impact of deterrence through
the vehicle of substitution.48
C. The Example of Crack Cocaine
I want to put this abstract discussion in concrete terms. To this
end, this section brings forth some background material regarding
the new mandatory-minimum sentences for crack cocaine so that
readers may use such penalties as a concrete example to think
about substitution theory and its variants. My goal is not empirical,
as there is no adequate study of drug consumption among the gen-
eral population. It is only theoretical - I want to raise the possibil-
48. This idea, though, does not by itself eliminate other reasons for punishment besides
deterrence. At least one of these, incapacitation, is subsumed within this model. See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REv. 193, 223-27 (1991); Steven Shavell, Criminal
Law and the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232,
1232 & n.1 (1985). If incapacitation strategies lead the government to put people who com-
mit a minor offense in jail for a longer time than others who commit more harmful crimes, it
will encourage commission of those more harmful crimes - and will mean that those who
should be incapacitated for longer periods will not be. The story with rehabilitation and just
deserts is a bit more complicated, but both could fit within the substitution model. One
cannot consider adopting a penalty for rehabilitative purposes without understanding the
effect that the penalty will have on a potential lawbreaker's behavior. If, as I have suggested,
the penalty scheme channels the activity into an area that is even worse (for now, this may be
defined in terms of harm to society, where such harm includes the probability of similar
future acts because the defendant has not been rehabilitated), then the substitution effect
works in much the same way. To put the point slightly differently, if rehabilitation is con-
cerned with the use of rewards or education to change behavior, see GEORGE P. FLETCHER,
RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW 414 (1978), then it becomes highly important to understand
whether such a system may distort behavior by shifting activity to comparatively more dan-
gerous activity.
In addition, the methods of rehabilitation may create substitution-like results. For exam-
ple, if part of rehabilitation is to train those in jail for new jobs, and one part of that is to
teach people how to become good actors, the number of crimes where good actors are
needed (e.g., fraud schemes) may increase. If the government tells those in jail that violence
is wrong, the consequence may be an increase in theft. And if the government tells thieves
that theft is wrong, it may increase violence. If sodomy is against the law and the law seeks to
reduce the instances of sodomy, putting people in jail may shape tastes and lead to an in-
crease in sodomy. The jail also permits criminals to meet others like them and may en-
courage future crime. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 267 ("The prison makes possible, even
encourages, the organization of a milieu of delinquents, loyal to one another, hierarchized,
ready to aid and abet any future criminal act .... ").
Similarly, if the law is concerned with punishing those who are morally blameworthy, see,
e.g., LEo KATz, BAD AcTs AND GUILTY MINDS 27-28 (1987), then the penalty scheme might
want to ensure that a set of penalties is not likely to induce a potential lawbreaker to commit
a more blameworthy act. Again, the opportunity-shaping effect of criminal law may run
counter to the very goals of criminal law. The one exception to this is a Kantian conception
of criminal punishment that focuses only on the initial blame of an act and not on any conse-
quences that follow from the act or its punishment. To the extent that this reasoning under-
lies our criminal law (and it may in cases such as murder), substitution does not change the
reasoning, it only explains what the result of such thinking may be.
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ity that substitution effects from the crack penalties might have led
to an increase in heroin consumption.
Eleven years ago, Congress enacted mandatory-minimum
sentences for the possession and dealing of crack cocaine.49 Promi-
nent lawmakers, believing that crack "make[s] people into
slaves,"50 made possession of five grams of crack a felony offense
that carries a mandatory five-year jail term. Congress acted quickly
- only a few months after they learned of crack's existence5 l -
and rushed to pass the legislation before Election Day. The
mandatory-minimum scheme Congress enacted provides that a mi-
nor crack dealer caught with five grams of crack will be in jail for at
least sixty months, even on a first offense.52 Additionally, the Anti-
Drug Abuse Act of 1988 criminalized simple possession of a five
gram amount with a mandatory-minimum sentence of sixty months
in prison.5 3 In contrast, simple possession of any quantity of any
other substance by a first-time offender is a misdemeanor punished
by a maximum of twelve months in prison.5 4
Simply by weight, the ratio of crack to heroin penalties is ap-
proximately 20:1. The Guidelines double the sentence, roughly, for
each six offense levels.55 For a first-time offender, the base levels
are the following: 80-100 grams of heroin is punished by 51-63
months (whereas 4-5 grams of crack receives that penalty); 100-400
grams of heroin is punished by 63-78 months (whereas 5-20 grams
of crack receives that penalty); 400-700 grams of heroin is punished
by 78-97 months (whereas 20-35 grams of crack receives that pen-
alty); 700-1000 grams of heroin is punished by 97-121 months
(whereas 35-50 grams of crack receives that penalty), and so on.56
49. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) (1994).
50. 132 CONG. REa 26447 (1986) (statement of Sen. Chiles).
51. Crack was first mentioned on the floor of Congress on March 12, 1986. Senator Haw-
kins, borrowing from the latest issue of Newsweek, described crack as resulting in "almost
instantaneous addiction, whereas if you snort coke it can take two to five years before addic-
tion sets in." 132 CONG. Rac. 4412,4418 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Kids and Cocaine, NEVSWEEK, Mar. 17, 1986, at 58, 58 (quoting Arnold Washton).
52. The base level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for five grams of crack is level
26. U.S. SENTENCING GumELINEs MANUAL, § 2D1.1(c)(7) (1995) [hereinafter USSG]. A
level 26 offense earns between 63 and 78 months for the first offense. Five grams of crack is
equivalent to ten to fifty doses, and costs between $225 and $750. See U.S. SENTENCING
COMMN., COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY at viii (1995) [hereinafter SENTENC-
ING COMMN. REPORT]. This 200-plus page report, which is dedicated to eliminating the dis-
parity between crack and powder cocaine, does not breathe a word about the impact of high
crack sentences on heroin use (or even powder cocaine use for that matter).
53. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1994).
54. See 21 U.S.C. § 844(a) (1994).
55. See U.S. SENTENCING GUlDEtUNES MANUAL ch.1, pt.A, intro.
56. See U.S. SENTENCING GumELINms MANUAL § 2D1.1(c).
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A dealer can carry 375 grams of heroin and be punished at the same
level, 5 to 61h years, as the 5-gram crack dealer.
When drug dosage is factored into the equation, the crack to
heroin punishment ratio is somewhere between 80:1 to 400:1. This
is so because a gram of heroin produces four to twenty times more
doses than does a gram of crack.57 The incentives created by this
penalty structure are fairly clear. Given this sentencing scheme, it
should come as no surprise that crack defendants receive the long-
est sentences.5 8
It is, however, very difficult to test whether heroin is being sub-
stituted for crack.59 In part, this is because the data regarding drug
57. Compare United States v. Kinder, 64 F.3d 757, 764 n.7 (2d Cir. 1995) (Leval, J., dis-
senting) (observing that single dose bags of heroin are generally 20 to 50 milligrams), cert.
denied, 116 S. Ct. 931 (1996) and OFFICE OF NATL. DRUG CONTROL POLY., HEROIN USERS
IN NEW YORK, CHICAGO, AND SAN DIEGO 27 (1994) ("A bag of heroin in New York typically
contains around 25 milligrams of pure heroin.") with The U.S. Sentencing Commission and
Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm on the Judiciary, 104th Cong.
26 (1995) (statement of Michael Goldsmith, Commissioner, U.S. Sentencing Commission)
(stating that crack dosages range from 100 to 500 milligrams) and The U.S. Sentencing Com-
mission and Cocaine Sentencing Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
104th Cong. 20 (1995) (statement of Judge Deanell Reece Tacha) (same) and SENTENCING
COMMN. REPORT, supra note 52, at viii (same) and Drug Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dept. of
Justice, "Crack" Price Data, in DRUGS & CRIME DATA; CRACK FACTS AND FIGURES 50
(Office of Nati. Drug Control Policy Drugs & Crime Clearinghouse Packet No. PK25, 1996)
(same). It is not clear to what extent these fractions control for purity.
58. The mean length of imprisonment for crack offenses during one year studied was
133.4 months, and the median was 102 months. See U.S. SENTENCING COMMN., 1994 AN.
NUAL REPORT UNITED STATES: JANUARY 1992-MARCH 1995, at 115. Heroin offenders, on
the other hand, received a mean sentence of 76.2 months and a median of 51 (both approxi-
mately half that of the crack sentences). See id.
59. Some softer data and reports suggest an increase in heroin consumption. See gener-
ally Enforcement of Federal Drug Laws: Strategies and Policies of the FBI and DEA: Hear-
ing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. 25
(1996) (statement of Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, DEA) ("We are also seeing a
resurgence of heroin. It's now available in more cities, and at lower prices and higher puri-
ties, than ever before in our history."); Heroin Production and Trafficking Trends: Hearing
Before the Subcomm. on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
103d Cong. 30 (1995) (statement of Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, DEA); OFFICE
OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLY., PULSE CHECK: NATIONAL TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE,
Spring 1995, at 7 [hereinafter PULSE CHECK 1995] (documenting increase in heroin use); id.
at 8 ("Sources in New York, New Jersey, Delaware and Connecticut mention that some crack
users are switching to snorting heroin because it is cheaper, more plentiful and less stigma-
tized than crack."); OFFICE OF NATL. DRUG CONTROL POLY., PULSE CHECK: NATIONAL
TRENDS IN DRUG ABUSE, Dec. 1994, at 5 [hereinafter PULSE CHECK 1994] ("More teenagers
and young adults nationwide are using heroin, and some are also shifting to injecting as a
primary route of administration. More middle and upper-middle class people are using her-
oin."); Trip Gabriel, Heroin Finds a New Market Along Cutting Edge of Style, N.Y. TIMES,
May 8, 1994, at 1; David Lipsky, The Hard-Core Curriculum, ROLLING STONE, Oct. 19, 1995,
at 99; Alan Lupo, Heroin Makes a Comeback in Hub, BOSTON GLOBE, June 18, 1995, at 1;
Sam Vincent Meddis, Smack's Back, USA TODAY, May 25, 1994, at 3A.
The common justification for the increase in heroin consumption - the rise in snortable
heroin - probably does not fully explain the increase. Snorting has been around as a way to
hook new users for at least two decades. See MARK LIEBERMAN, THE DOPE BOOK 117
(1971) (describing how pushers and "friends" turn new users on by encouraging them to
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consumption is weak - for somewhat understandable reasons -
and because crack was only added to the surveys in 1987. The two
main annual studies are the University of Michigan's Monitoring
the Future study and the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services's National Household Survey on Drug Abuse. The former
primarily measures consumption of drugs among eighth, tenth, and
twelfth graders, which will not yield an accurate portrait of drug
consumption throughout the general population.60 The latter does
not concentrate on any particular age group, but its results are al-
most certainly skewed because its surveyors conduct their inter-
views while the subjects are in their homes, which creates self-
reporting problems and excludes a large percentage of the relevant
drug-using population (for example, the homeless). 61 Moreover,
because the study changed its methodology after 1993, the data
from earlier surveys is not generally comparable to the data from
the more recent studies.
The Monitoring the Future survey reveals that, in general, heroin
consumption has been increasing while crack consumption has been
declining. The survey shows that the percentage of twelfth graders
admitting to crack use in their lifetime was 5.4% in 1987 and 3.3%
in 1996, whereas the percentage of twelfth graders admitting to her-
oin use was 1.2% in 1987 and 1.8% in 1996 (the last time heroin
prevalence reached such high levels was in 1977).62 Results were
similar when the twelfth graders were asked about whether they
consumed crack or heroin in the past year or past month. 63 What's
snort); OFFICE OF NATL. DRUG CONTROL POLY., supra note 57, at 17-18 (reporting that one-
half of first-time users snorted heroin and that most users studied had first exposure before
1985).
60. Indeed, it might even be the case that harsh penalties create another substitution of
sorts, the targeting of relatively innocent children and teenagers as customers. Because chil-
dren are less likely to turn in a dealer - due to their na'fvet6, susceptibility to fear and
coercion, or belief that it would upset their community norms - and because it is harder to
use undercover buyers in such markets, harsh general penalties that do not escalate punish-
ment for targeting youth might encourage substitution towards that market. For a similar
point, see infra text accompanying notes 107-09 (discussing distributional effects of
penalization).
61. See U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., NATIONAL HOUSEHOLD SURVEY ON
DRUG ABUSE: MAIN FINDINnGs 1993, at 9 (1995) (describing these problems).
62. See OFFICE OF NATL. DRUG CONTROL POLY., HEROIN: FACTs AND FIGuREs 7 tbl.2
(1997) (citing Inst. for Social Research, Univ. of Michigan, Monitoring the Future Study).
The study changed the heroin question in 1995 on half of the forms so that separate
questions were asked for use with injection and without injection. See icL at 11 n.j. This
change might have biased some of the results.
63. The data shows that 4.1% of twelfth graders admitted to crack use in the past year in
1987 (compared with 2.1% in 1996), and that 0.5% admitted to heroin use in 1987 (compared
with 1.0% in 1996). See id. at 8 tbl.3. Again, before the crack penalties came into effect, the
last time heroin prevalence was so high was in 1975, when 1.0% admitted to heroin use in the
past year. See id.; see also id. at 9 tbl.4 (showing similar trends in thirty-day prevalence).
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more, the study reveals that a significantly higher percentage of
twelfth graders think heroin is "fairly easy" or "very easy" to get
than at any time since the study's inception in 1975. 64 The National
Household Survey shows a similar drop in crack consumption, but
its heroin consumption results demonstrate a slight drop as well.65
The correlation between the increase in heroin consumption
and the decrease in crack consumption may not be a coincidence.
The truth is, no one has studied the connection between the two
drugs, and a regression study that attempts to analyze the consump-
tion patterns of the two drugs is needed. From a theoretical stand-
point, at the very least, crack and heroin provide us with one
situation in which to apply some of the refinements to our under-
standing of deterrence. If the new penalties induce a substitution
toward heroin, some might even argue that the law is creating harm
because heroin could be more dangerous than crack. 66
One of the most important lessons of substitution theory is that
criminalization can cause substitution even when the goods may be
complements in an unregulated market. Again, what a substitute or
complement is depends on one's taste and on the price difference of
the goods. Cheese and pasta, for instance, may be complements
when the price is low, but may be substitutes if the price for each is
relatively high. If there were no penalties on heroin and crack, they
could be complements or even independent goods.67 They have
64. In 1996,32.2% said that heroin was "easy" or "fairly easy" to get. This compares with
23.7% in 1987. The data reveals a sharp rise in perceived availability after 1987. Before
1987, the percentage generally hovered in the high teens or low twenties (1976: 18.4%; 1980:
21.2%; 1985: 21.0%). After 1987, the percentages rose dramatically (1988: 28.0%; 1989:
31.4%; 1992: 34.9%; 1995: 35.1%). See id. at 15 tbl.11.
65. See Jennifer A. Neisner, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, HEALTH CARE FACT SHE=r
ILLICIT DRUG USE IN Tm U.S., Sept. 17, 1996, at 59 (reprinting preliminary data from 1996
survey) (showing that crack consumption dropped from .7% of the population in 1988 to .5%
in 1995 and that heroin consumption dropped from .3% in 1988 to .2% in 1995). For a
discussion of the problems with the survey's heroin data, see U.S. DErr. OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 61, at 9.
66. Unlike crack, heroin is physiologically addictive. See SENTENCING COMMN. REPORT,
supra note 52, at 24. For discussions about the drugs' other effects, see Nancy P. Fieldman et
al., Dimensions of Self-Concept: A Comparison of Heroin and Cocaine Addicts, 21 AM. J.
DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 315 (1995); Dorothy K. Hatsukami & Marian W. Fischman, Crack
Cocaine and Cocaine Hydrochloride: Are the Differences Myth or Reality?, 276 JAMA 1580
(1996); James A. Inciardi & Anne E. Pottieger, Crack-Cocaine Use and Street Crime, 24 J.
DRUG IssuEs 273, 274, 288-89 (1994); Sung-Yeon Kang et al., Correlates of Cocaine/Crack
Use Among Inner-City Incarcerated Adolescents, 20 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL ABUSE 413
(1994); Reginald G. Smart, Crack Cocaine Use: A Review of Prevalence and Adverse Effects,
17 AM. J. DRUG & ALCOHOL AnusE 13 (1991).
67. Crack users often like to use heroin to moderate the intensity of the drug. See Heroin
Comes Back, TIME, Feb. 19, 1990, at 63. One study shows that most crack users used crack
before they used heroin. See Andrew Golub & Bruce D. Johnson, Cohort Differences in
Drug-Use Pathways to Crack Among Current Crack Abusers in New York City, 21 CruM.
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vastly different effects - one intensifies experience and the other
numbs it. But because both are illegal, consumers and dealers tend
to group them together more than they would in a free market.
Illegality defines the product market, and therefore encourages
substitution. Indeed, Colombian heroin traffickers are known to
"persuad[e] their established cocaine distributors to purchase and
sell heroin as a condition of doing business." 68 And the point is
generalizable - illegality often makes activities substitutes when
they wouldn't ordinarily be so.69
Even within the drug context, substitution may be at work in
ways other than crack and heroin shifts. For example, the rise in so-
called "designer drugs" might be explained by the criminalization
of marijuana and other soft drugs. The dangers of designer drugs
- many of which are made by amateur teenage chemists and are
deadly - arguably dwarf the health dangers of marijuana use.70 A
more obvious substitution may be excessive teenage cigarette
smoking and drinking, perhaps in part the result of the high price of
JUST. & BEHAv. 403 (1994) (finding that only 10% of crack users born after 1967 had previ-
ously injected heroin).
68. Intelligence Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, South American Heroin Trafficking in the
United States, in DRUGS & CReME DATA: HEROIN INFORMATION PACKET 5, 6 (Office of
Natl. Drug Control Policy Drugs & Crime Clearinghouse Packet No. BC0005670H, 1995); see
also PULSE CHECK 1995, supra note 59, at 5 ("[I]n Atlanta and other areas where heroin is
becoming increasingly popular ... crack and cocaine dealers are changing their product lines
completely; that is, getting out of cocaine and into heroin."). Of course, substitution will be
even more pronounced for dealers than for consumers, since their involvement with drugs is
motivated by money rather than by something inherent about the activity. Cf. Mixed Signals
on Possible Heroin Upsurge, ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE WK., June 26, 1991, at 4 ("[T]he
recently increased marketing of heroin is a result of former cocaine dealers moving away
from the 'violence and rip-offs' associated with that drug to the more 'mature and stable
heroin market."').
69. For example, prostitutes often refuse to take jobs in legal industries after a while in
the "life." If they quit prostitution, they often take a job in another illegal industry such as
drugs. See generally KATHLEEN BARRY, THE PROsTrruTION OF SEXUALITY 199-201, 215,
268, 305-116 (1995). Part of this substitution for one activity, prostitution, of another, such as
drug dealing, may occur because the legal system labels them "criminals." Prostitutes who
want to leave internalize their criminal status, and the law-abiding outside world reinforces it
by not wanting to hire them. See generally Katyal, supra note 15. A system of decriminaliza-
tion, therefore, may prevent women from becoming drug dealers. Indeed, there may be a
dual economy composed of legal jobs and illegal ones. Those in the illegal economy, such as
prostitutes, fear that they cannot enter the legal one. They see themselves as "specialists" in
illegal activity. The law's ability to attach the label "criminal" to an activity, therefore, may
actually be creating crime in other areas. See infra section III.B.3.
70. Similarly, young kids may tend to use inhalants because they are more accessible than
penalized drugs like alcohol and marijuana. See Richard L. Peck, Are Drugs Making a
Comeback with Kids?, BEHAv. HEALTH MGMT., May-June 1994, at 12,14 (interview with Dr.
Zili Sloboda, Director, Division of Epidemiology and Prevention Research, National Insti-
tute on Drug Abuse) (finding that one in five eighth graders uses inhalants and that they "are
more readily available to these teens"). This leads me to speculate that the prohibition policy
on drugs could have been the greatest single boon for the cigarette and alcohol industries in
history.
2408 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2385
other types of drugs. Another somewhat less obvious form of sub-
stitution may be the increase in drug purity. Because the penalty
structure uses the Weight of a drug as the relevant factor in sentenc-
ing, drug dealers have compensated for the increased risk of
sentences by increasing the purity of the drug.71
The substitution argument has general applicability in areas of
the law besides drugs. Take, for example, penalties for white-collar
crime. Substitution explains why a manager bent on making some
extra money may be more likely to embezzle $100 than she is to
take a $100 kickback because the kickback is punished at twice the
sentencing level.72 It might be the case that reducing kickbacks is
"worth" the cost - more embezzlements - but the validity of this
argument is not immediately obvious. This type of analysis can be
done throughout the penalty structure. For example, a recent New
York Times article details how the New York City mafia has shifted
away from extortion and bid-rigging and toward white-collar crime
because of increased enforcement.73 In this article I concentrate on
the simple example of crack and heroin, but readers should treat
this as only one illustration of substitution.
D. Further Refinements
1. A Model of Economic Substitution
At this point, a formal model may simplify matters. The eco-
nomic substitution argument states that the expected punishment
71. For these reasons, the Supreme Court's decision last year in Neal v. United States, 116
S. Ct. 763 (1996), which held that the carrier medium for LSD would be weighed in determin-
ing a mandatory-minimum sentence, might exacerbate the drive to increase purity to reduce
the expected punishment. The Court eschewed such policy arguments and decided the case
on statutory grounds. See 116 S. Ct. at 769.
72. Section 2B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines penalizes the embezzlement at a base
level of 4, and section 2B4.1 penalizes commercial bribery at a base level of 8. For first-time
offenders, both offense levels are punished between 0-6 months, and the guidelines do not
draw a difference between the two. If the defendant has already committed two offenses,
then the punishment diverges, with base level 4 punished between 0-6 months and base level
8 punished between 4-10 months. See U.S. SENTENCING GumL ES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A
(1995). This means that the sentencing structure likely will influence the behavior of repeat
offenders. Since repeat offenders, as repeat players, tend to be some of the most sophisti-
cated criminals in terms of knowledge of the law, the Guidelines, ironically, encourage substi-
tution for the class they are most likely to influence. while this is admirable when the
sentencing structure accurately reflects the goals of punishment, it is pernicious when the
structure does not.
73. See Selwyn Raab, Officials Say Mob is Shifting Crimes to New Industries, N.Y. TiMEs,
Feb. 10, 1997, at Al ("With their longtime control of extortion and bid-rigging rackets in New
York City and New Jersey weakened by years of relentless prosecutions and by regulatory
crackdowns, the region's Mafia crime families are switching increasingly to white-collar
crimes as ripe sources of plunder .... With a tinge of irony, law enforcement officials said
that their successes in eliminating long-established rackets had caused the crime families to
mine new fields for booty.").
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- determined by considering the probability of detection multi-
plied by sentence and fine imposed by law - for one crime may
prompt actors to shift to other crimes. Assume the following:
b = benefit to individual from committing the act, where b > 0;
p = probability of detection; and
s = sentence and fine imposed by law.
Someone will commit an illegal act if the benefit to him exceeds the
expected punishment (b > p * s). If it does not, then the expected
punishment of other crimes is irrelevant; so long as p * s > b, a
person will not commit the act. In other words, if the expected pen-
alty for crack exceeded its benefit to the individual (b, < Pc * s,), it
does not matter that the expected penalty for heroin exceeded its
benefit as well (bh < Ph * sh). But when the expected penalty for one
activity is significantly different from its substitute, some consumers
may prefer the substitute.74 When pc * Sc > Ph * s,, substitution of h
for c may occur. Under these conditions, substitution is not limited
to the condition that bh >- bc. The proper predictor of substitution is
when bh - (Ph * sh) > bc - (Pc * sc). When the benefits of heroin less
the expected punishment of heroin exceed the benefits of crack mi-
nus its expected punishment, the marginal user will substitute
heroin.
Substitution may not necessarily occur when the benefits of
both activities exceed their expected punishments. If Ph * sh and Pc
* sc are negligible - say, under a decriminalization regime - then
little or no substitution may occur, depending on the degree of the
substitutability. Again, the equation above holds, and substitution
would occur when the difference in punishments outweighs the dif-
ference in benefits.
In addition to p and s, another variable, I - representing the
expected loss to the individual from the act - must be introduced.
Some crimes, particularly drug crimes, have a paradoxical quality in
that they have both benefits and harms for individuals. Variables I
and b can be framed in several ways. For drugs, 1 may be the per-
ceived risk of addiction and the health risks involved, while b may
be the attainment of euphoria. In other words, one element of
"price" is the harm to the user. If crack has the potential to send
users on paranoid hallucinogenic trips, that is a cost to the user.
While b can incorporate 1, it is useful to separate them out because
they suggest different concepts. One goal of law is to shape atti-
74. Implicit in this model is the assumption that the benefit from the two activities is
commensurate. To the extent that the activities produce such radically different forms of
benefit that they cannot be evaluated on a single b axis, substitution theory does not apply.
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tudes towards 75 Moreover, 1 may not correlate with actual harm,
since it only measures perceived harm. Given this refinement, we
can say that the marginal user will substitute when bh - lh- (ph * Sh)
> b - 1, - (p, * sc).
Matters are complicated further because p may increase over
time. A criminal known for dealing crack may have a higher p on
his tenth offense than on his first. While this does not change the
basic equation, it acknowledges that substitution may occur over
time even when expected punishments do not initially exceed the
difference in benefits. Criminals benefit from diversification just
like everyone else.76 The known crack dealer may shift to heroin to
walk a different beat.
Another complication must be introduced: p * s may positively
correlate with b. That is, when the risk and severity of punishment
increases, the benefits from undertaking the crime - such as profit
- may increase.77 For this reason, rather stiff penalties may not
deter commission of the offense, because the incentive to commit
the crime increases as well. For most crimes, this is not a 1:1 re-
placement, so deterrence at some level will outstrip benefit.
The preceding analysis assumes that bh < b, an assumption that
may not play out in real life. If, however, bh > b, then substitution
will not occur because people will already be using heroin, assum-
ing that the (p * s) + 1 difference is favorable to heroin. In reality,
both happen - some prefer crack and others heroin. For those
users who believe bh < b,, substitution is predicted. All that matters
for my argument is what the marginal user will do.
2. Probability Versus Sentence
A strong economic objection could now be made that the model
should reflect enforcement costs and that an efficient policy would
75. As I will show later, this shaping may occur regardless of whether individuals actually
know that the law, s, is motivating their views of L See infra section III.B.1.
76. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FscHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
CoPoRAT LAW 29-30, 122-24 (1991) (discussing the benefits of diversification in financial
investments).
77. Some crimes are market-based, where an increase in p * s will increase b. Others are




impose a very high s and lowp to save such costs.78 In other words,
s and p are themselves substitutes and p costs more than does S.79
We will encounter one significant rejoinder to this argument
later in this article, the inverse sentencing effect, which predicts that
an increase in s may decrease p.80 A second response to the eco-
nomic objection attacks its premise, that p and s can be indepen-
dently controlled. The models Becker and his followers use do not
recognize that higher sentences may create higher, not lower, en-
forcement costs. This complementary relationship may be the re-
sult of several different forces. For one, a high sentence on a
particular activity may send a signal to the police that they should
concentrate on that activity.8' For another, police may, perhaps un-
consciously, be influenced by a penalty scheme and come to believe
that the acts with the highest penalties are the worst ones and thus
the top enforcement priorities. What's more, to the extent the po-
lice endeavor to keep as many lawbreakers off the streets as possi-
ble, pursuing those criminals who commit high penalty crimes
maximizes that goal since each arrest keeps a criminal in jail for a
longer period of time. A somewhat separate, but important point,
is that individuals may not be able to disaggregate relatively similar
probabilities of detection and may perceive them to be equal. As
Harsanyi has argued, people reduce complexity in decisionmaking
by treating some outcomes as certain and will not distinguish be-
tween 80% and 100% probabilities of an event happening.82
78. As Posner observed, eighteenth-century England punished nonserious crimes with
capital punishment but lowered the probability of being caught (there was no organized po-
lice force) so that the expectation of punishment was low. See POSNER, supra note 37, at 230.
The English solution might have been appropriate for the time and place. But today, when
the government has many resources at its disposal and when those resources can be selec-
tively targeted to attack particular crimes, the English strategy seems counterproductive. See
supra text accompanying notes 21-22 (discussing the potential ineffectiveness of the death
penalty when full substitution options are considered) and infra text accompanying notes 90-
94 (explaining the comparative effectiveness of targeted and wide-band approaches).
79. In some ways, the economic proposal here is similar to a debate in tax policy -
should the government tax the small number of rich people a lot or should it tax a larger
number of people less?
80. See infra text accompanying notes 212-22.
81. Indeed, the stiff crack penalties were created for precisely this reason. The House
Subcommittee on Crime determined that mandatory minimums create the proper incentives
for the Department of Justice to use its "most intense focus" on "major traffickers" and that
"[o]ne of the major goals of this bill is to give greater direction to the DEA and the U.S.
Attorneys on how to focus scarce law enforcement resources." H.R. REP. No. 99-845, pt. 1,
at 11 (1986).
82. John C. Harsanyi, Practical Certainty and the Acceptance of Empirical Statements, in
REcrr DEVELOPMrNTs IN TimE FOUNDATIONS OF UTILITY AND RISK THEORY 27,30-34 (L.
Daboni et al. eds., 1986). While this idea does not necessarily track the rational-actor as-
sumption, it may be consistent with it because differentiating between 80% and 100%
probabilities is too costly.
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(Though it might be that people also reduce complexity by not dis-
tinguishing between eight- and ten-year sentences as well.) Never-
theless, the standard law and economics view that reducing the
probability of detection can be compensated by increasing s may
not be realistic.8 3
Lucian Bebchuk and Louis Kaplow have provided a third re-
joinder to the economic objection.84 They contend that individuals
vary in their assessments of the probability of detection and that
even small variations in this assessment mean that it is not optimal
to set a sanction at the highest possible level. To illustrate their
claim, they posit an act with a harm of 10 and a maximum sanction
of 500. With a sanction level of 500, a two percent probability of
detection would deter the act. And with a sanction level of 100, a
ten percent probability of detection deters comparably. Imagine
that half of the people overestimate the probability of detection by
one percent, and half underestimate it by one percent. In the two
percent regime, half will face an expected sanction of 15, and half
will face one of 5. With the ten percent solution, however, half face
an expected sanction of 11 and half face 9 - producing much less
over and underdeterrence. If the cost of increasing the probability
of detection by eight percent is less than the harm caused by under
and overdeterrence, the probability of detection should be set at
ten percent.
A final set of responses contends that, once substitution is con-
sidered, variations in the probability of detection may not matter as
much as those in the expected sanction. This is because the actual
and perceived differences in the probabilities of detection for her-
oin and crack may not be large enough to change behavior.8 5
Catching a dealer is analogous to an "experience good" 86 - the
83. Another reason that probability of detection and sentence may positively correlate is
because preventive deterrence may create a feedback loop. As citizens internalize the lore
created by the punishment scheme, they will push for increased enforcement to combat those
activities with the highest penalties. This idea requires incorporation of sociological theories
of deterrence and is discussed infra Part III.
84. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Louis Kaplow, Optimal Sanctions When Individuals Are Im-
perfectly Informed About the Probability of Apprehension, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 365 (1992).
85. For an analysis of how actual and perceived probabilities of punishment differ, see
Raaj K. Sah, Social Osmosis and Patterns of Crime, 99 J. PoL ECON. 1272, 1273 (1991). Sah
notes that perceptions vary locally and that there is a large variance in perceptions among
social groups even when the crime is narrowly defined. See also Claude Montmarquette &
Marc Nerlove, Deterrence and Delinquency: An Analysis of Individual Data, 1 J. QUANTITA-
TIVE CRIMINOLOGY 37 (1985) (finding that perceptions of expected punishment have an im-
pact on crime rates).
86. An "experience good" is one in which its characteristics are known only after the
good is purchased. See JEAN Tto.E, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 95, 106
(1988); Phillip Nelson, Information and Consumer Behavior, 78 J. PoL. EcoN. 311 (1970).
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police must invest capital in busting people at a time when what the
dealer carries is an unknown. The police only discover what the
dealer is dealing when they catch him. As such, the differential en-
forcement between crack and heroin is not likely to matter much.
Contrast this with larger dealers known for a particular drug - say,
a Colombian drug lord - where the police know in advance that
the drug lord exports cocaine. In this case, analogous to "search
goods," the differences in enforcement may matter a great deal.87
The experience goods point suggests that the probability of de-
tection for heroin may increase when the probability of detection
for crack increases. In other words, because targeting crack may
necessarily result in additional heroin arrests, the two variables may
be positively correlated. What's more, the perceived difference in
enforcement may be negligible. Heroin dealers, for example, may
self-enforce the laws in response to an increase in crack enforce-
ment and refuse to deal.88
This argument, however, presupposes a lack of dealer sophisti-
cation that is probably untenable for repeat players. If, because
heroin and crack enforcement are not independently controlled, an
effort to arrest crack dealers results in an increase in enforcement
against heroin dealers, the substitution effect may be minimized. If
not, then the result of targeting particular crimes will be an increase
in substitution. There are examples, however, of situations in which
untargeted police crackdowns have prevented the commission of
more serious crime. James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling call
this the "broken window" effect and argue that the punishment of
all minor crimes will demonstrate the government's "get tough"
strategy to lawbreakers.89 By using an untargeted, or wide-band,
approach, the government may reduce the complementarities be-
tween one crime and another. Recent empirical support for this
proposition can be found in New York City, where, since 1993, the
murder rate has fallen by almost forty percent and the robbery rate
This contrasts with a "search good," in which the characteristics of the product are known
before purchase. See ToLE, supra, at 106. A dress is an example of the latter;, canned food
is an example of the former. I thank Ian Ayres for introducing me to this terminology.
87. To put the point in economic terms, the enforcement effort is independently con-
trolled for small-time dealers, but not for larger dealers. Of course, because small-time deal-
ers operate as retail merchants, their choice of wares will have an impact on the importation
choices of bigger "wholesalers."
88. This argument parallels one made in the First Amendment context, that restrictions
on speech will "chill" conduct outside the technical scope of such restrictions.




has fallen by over thirty percent.90 These statistics might be the
result of the intense campaign a new police commissioner waged to
punish vigorously all "public order" offenses. 91 By adopting a non-
selective enforcement regime, New York City sent a signal that all
crimes - big or small - would be prosecuted.
The New York City approach also has its problems. To the ex-
tent that substitution suggests that expected punishments should be
tailored to particular crimes, equalizing the probability of detection
may not be desirable. The overall crime rate may drop, for exam-
ple, but those crimes that do occur may be particularly heinous.
One way to minimize such distortion is to equalize the probability
of detection but to permit the expected sanction to vary. This strat-
egy provides criminals with an incentive to refrain from more harm-
ful activity.92 But the range of sanction levels may be subject to a
maximum sanction constraint - either because there is no room
for increased penalty (beyond death) or because such equality in
punishment would contravene other, moral, theories of punish-
90. See Dan M. Kahan, Social Influence, Social Meaning, and Deterrence, 83 VA. L. Rav.
349, 367-68 n.68 (1997).
91. See William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department's Civil Enforcement of
Quality-of-Life Crimes, 3 J.L. & PoLY. 447, 448 (1995).
92. Other economic concerns, however, may suggest that this wide-band strategy should
be slightly altered to take account of victim precautions. See Gary S. Becker & George J.
Stigler, Law Enforcement, Malfeasanc and Compensation of Enforcers, 3 J. LEOAL STUD. 1,
14 (1974) (noting that "[t]he amount of victim enforcement would be optimal if successful
enforcers were paid the amount that they had suffered in damages, excluding their enforce-
ment costs, divided by the probability that they are successful").
If the police were to enforce all crimes equally, it would reduce the incentive for potential
crime victims to take precautions. For example, if the police devoted as many resources to
catching house robbers and car thieves as they did to the war on drugs, people would not
have as much of an incentive to install deadbolts on their houses and to buy The Club for
their vehicles - even though these devices are a much more efficient way to reduce such
crimes. Alternatively, if the police devote large sums to prosecuting car thefts where the
victims leave their keys in their cars, it may increase the number of those who leave their
keys in the ignition. In such circumstances, it may be efficient to reduce public enforcement
so that people do not act carelessly. An optimal enforcement strategy, therefore, would cre-
ate enforcement differentials to take account of the possibility of self-enforcement. If done
correctly, this strategy would create just as much of a wide-band effect as unselective enforce-
ment. The only difference would be that it would be more efficient because it would recog-
nize that private enforcement plays a role in the prevention of crime. See generally Omr
Ben-Shahar & Alon Harel, Blaming the Victim: Optimal Incentives for Private Precautions
Against Crime, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 434 (1995).
An important caveat must be added: Self-enforcement may at times be counterproduc-
tive. If the government, for example, reduced street patrols in an area believing that the
victims were the cheapest cost avoiders, the strategy might increase the incentive for crime
because fewer people would walk the streets, thereby reducing the number of people who
could (1) intervene to prevent the crime, (2) call the police, and (3) testify as an eyewitness at
trial. Assessments of who is the cheapest cost avoider, therefore, should consider the positive
externalities of what may initially appear to be inefficient behavior on the part of victims.
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ment.93 For these reasons, sometimes the only way to increase an
expected penalty is to use a strategy that increases the probability
of detection by increasing enforcement as the severity of the crime
increases.94
The relationship between the probability of detection and sanc-
tion level has other important lessons for criminal law. As we have
seen, criminalization raises the cost of an activity. A decision to
make heroin illegal raises the cost to the seller and to the user. For
the user, it increases cost because dealers will charge a premium for
incurring legal risk. The user also bears her own costs, such as the
threat of jail. But the threat of jail is probabilistic - she may or
may not get caught. The price, on the other hand, is certain. An
increase in monetary price may therefore create substitution even
when the law does not deter consumption through its other costs -
such as the risk of jail.
To the dealer, on the other hand, the threat of a jail sentence
will push many potential competitors out of the market. For those
criminals who are not as risk averse,95 a penalty on drug dealing
confers monopoly power.96 Criminalization thus creates the possi-
bility for entrepreneurship and for true profit.97 Frank Knight con-
tended that all profit is created by unleveraged risks, that if one
could insure against an outcome then it would not beget profit.98
When possession or sale of a good is criminalized, the inherent un-
93. Another maximum sanction constraint is the inverse sentencing effect discussed infra
section III.B.
94. Such a policy may raise intricate ethical concerns because those who are punished are
punished not only for their acts, but for those of uncaught others. As Kant wrote,
"[p]unishment can never be administered merely as a means for promoting another good....
For one man ought never be dealt with merely as a means subservient to the purpose of
another." IMMANUEL KANT, PMLOSOPHY OF LAW 195 (W. Hastie trans., Augustus M. Kelley
Publishers 1974) (1796); see also Johannes Andenaes, The Morality of Deterrence, 37 U. Cm.
L. REv. 649 (1970).
95. Gary Becker's examination of the relative elasticities of crime rates to changes in the
expected punishment led him to conclude that criminals must prefer risk. See Becker, supra
note 2, at 178. But, as Michael Block and Robert Lind have argued, this violates Becker's
assumption that criminals behave like noncriminals do. See Michael K. Block & Robert C.
Lind, An Economic Analysis of Crimes Punishable by Imprisonment, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 479,
480 (1975). Instead, it may be better to differentiate on the basis of degree of aversion to
risk. For other treatments of this issue, see A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, A Note on
Optimal Fines When Wealth Varies Among Individuals, 81 Am. ECON. REV. 618, 618 (1991);
A. Mitchell Polinksy & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Tradeoff Between the Probability and
Magnitude of Fines, 69 AM. ECON. REV. 880, 884-85 (1979); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal
Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43, 48 (1988).
96. See PACKER, supra note 13, at 279-81.
97. By true profit I mean what Frank Knight did - the profit one gets for taking an
uninsured risk. True profit is not payment for labor, return from capital, or monopoly rents.
See FRANK KNIGHT, RisK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 19-21, 35-48 (1964).
98. See id. at 46-47.
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certainty of being caught permits risk-takers to charge a high price
for that good. Increasing the expected sentence thus creates oppor-
tunities for true profit. Dealers are high-risk takers whose markets
and profits are expanded by criminalization.
3. Two Types of Deterrence
All of this talk about probability of detection and sanction level
matters a great deal for criminal law, and I shall sketch out three
implications here. Note that among drug users, the threat of jail has
different meanings for different people. For lawyers, going to jail
may mean a huge loss in social reputation and the loss of a legal
future. For others, particularly in communities where a high per-
centage of the population is behind bars, the threat of jail may not
matter nearly as much and may even be seen as a positive benefit
by some.99 In other words, the social "price" of the expected pun-
ishment may vary tremendously. Nevertheless, both might pay a
dealer the same monetary "price" for a gram of heroin.100
The first implication that follows is that the law creates two dif-
ferent types of deterrence. For users of moderate wealth, the threat
of jail may provide more of a deterrent than the monetary cost. For
low-income users, the threat of jail could matter less than the mone-
tary cost. In other words, the price of a drug may be the same to
two users, but the makeup of that price is different. One user wor-
ries about the legal and social price (the sentence), the other wor-
ries about the monetary price (the dollars).o l This suggests that
proposals such as Becker's 02 that would replace incarceration of
the wealthy with high fines may not provide adequate deterrence if
a high fine does not carry the same stigma as does jail.
This point is not only about economic class. Rather, people who
"invest" a great deal in their reputations are likely to forgo utility-
producing acts that tarnish their social standing. If they do risk
stigma, they will often pay a monetary premium to avoid legal risk.
For others, the utility of reputation is lower. These individuals are
willing to face a further loss in their reputation in exchange for
monetary gain. People invest in different areas, and differences in
99. I defer until section III.B the situation where reputations are enhanced, rather than
hurt, by crime.
100. This is not always the case. As I later contend, differentials in monetary price can be
used to enhance deterrence. See infra section II.D.2.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 31-34 (noting that the opportunity cost of unlaw-
ful behavior varies by return from legal activity).
102. Becker, supra note 2, at 193-98.
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investment strategies have distributional consequences. Some will
be more likely to gamble their reputation for high profit. Once
their reputation is tarnished, they may then increase their criminal
activity because they can suffer no further significant damage to
their status in society.10 3
The difference between social and monetary price may there-
fore explain why certain crimes are associated with certain types of
people.' 0 4 For those who do not invest in their reputations, more
high-risk activity is predicted. And, as will be shown later, because
the stigma associated with particular acts varies in different commu-
nities, the price of an activity varies by community as well. This will
also produce distributional variations.
The second implication that follows from the two types of deter-
rence concerns sellers. Because only some sellers will take unin-
sured risks, criminalization confers monopoly or quasi-monopoly
power on those that do. 0 5 Such individuals tend to be relatively
less risk-averse than the general public, a trait that may correlate,
for example, with a tendency towards violence.106
Monopoly power also has other dangerous ramifications. It
may, for instance, lead to greater economies of scale in criminal
operations. Such economies of scale may in turn increase distribu-
tion and marketing techniques, driving up consumption of illegal
drugs and inducing more people to break the law. It may also cre-
103. Other forms of distributional cost are associated with penalties. If criminalization of
an activity labels many people in a particular community lawbreakers, members of that com-
munity could internalize this status. See supra note 69 and infra section III.B.3. This idea
links up to a central concern in Foucault's work, that punishment systems are not only nega-
tive mechanisms to repress crime but also positive procedures designed to maintain the social
order. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 24. Punishments are more than social phenomena
reflecting the fundamental ethical choices of society or its juridical structure; they are part of
a system of inculcating behavior. Since the ways in which penalties affect individuals vary,
and these variations are in part a product of income, penalties have distributional conse-
quences that may disadvantage certain subgroups. See infra text accompanying notes 109-12
and section II.D.
104. In addition, who commits what type of crime may vary due to offenders' economic
situations. Furlong and Mehay found, for example, that elasticity of crime with respect to the
male unemployment rate was three times the elasticity of crime with respect to the police
clearance rate. William J. Furlong & Stephen L. Mehay, Urban Law Enforcement in Canada:
An Empirical Analysis, 14 CANADIAN J. ECON. 44, 52 (1981). This finding demonstrates that
deterrence of property crimes may be more a function of economics than of expected sanc-
tions. And the type of crime may be a function of general economic effects. For example,
sharp increases in gold and silver prices and the frequency of urban house burglaries are
apparently closely correlated. See Isaac Ehrlich, The Market for Offences and the Public
Enforcement of Laws: An Equilibrium Analysis, 21 BRrr. J. Soc. PSYCHOL 107, 110 (1982).
105. See supra text accompanying note 97.
106. The fact that dealers have to break the law to sell may itself have the complementary
effect that those who sell are less hostile to the idea of breaking laws and may indeed be
more likely to break other laws, such as those prohibiting violence.
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ate the potential for corruption and bribery, because as resources
grow, the ability of a criminal enterprise to use nefarious means to
thwart law enforcement grows as well. Economies of scale may also
induce such organizations to diversify and commit other nondrug
crimes - another complementary relationship. This is evident in
the case of juvenile gangs, where opportunities for true profit lead
individuals to band together and reinforce their tendency towards
all sorts of crime.10 7 And economies of scale may create turf wars
and violence as rival dealers vie for full monopoly power.'08
A third possible implication flows from the conceptualization of
two levels of deterrence. Some proponents of harsh drug penalties,
when faced with evidence that drug prices have dropped under
these harsh penalties, might argue that the price decline evidences
success of the drug war. That is, the price has dropped because
demand has dropped. If this argument were correct, however, it
would not necessarily follow that criminalization will increase social
utility. After all, those who don't use drugs because of their high
monetary cost are going to be more likely to use them if the price
drops.10 9 What's more, demand from the richer segment may drop
even further because some rich people use the drug because of its
high price." 0 Thus, to the extent that drug policies, from education
to penalties, reduce the demand of some individuals for drugs by
increasing the social stigma attached to drug use, they may increase
demand from others by decreasing the monetary price of drugs. It
might be the case that penalties only shift demand from one set of
consumers to another and do not reduce it overall.
Wealth effects make a pernicious result even worse. If poorer
citizens tend to be deterred by price, and richer communities by
legal punishment, a price decrease would tend to increase drug con-
sumption in poor communities. A "just say no" media campaign
could, for example, have a greater educational effect in richer com-
munities because stigma matters more to members of such commu-
nities. The resulting drop in demand in those communities would
mean that the price would drop, thus increasing consumption of the
107. See Martin Sanchez Jankowski, Getting into Gangs, in DnViANCE: Tnn INTER-
ACTIONIST PERSPECTIvE 279, 281-83 (Earl Rubington & Martin S. Weinberg eds., 6th ed.
1996) (arguing that joining a gang is "a rational decision to maximize self-interest" due to
opportunities for profit and that gangs reinforce criminal tendencies).
108. Removing one dealer when many others are around will not cement a monopoly,
but when only a few dealers exist in a market, the return from violence is much higher.
109. As more people use the drug, the price may rise again, which will reduce the rate at
which price-sensitive users will consume the drug, and so the cycle repeats itself.
110. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Note on Restaurant Pricing and Other Examples of
Social Influences on Price, 99 J. PoL. ECON. 1109, 1109-11 (1991).
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drug in poorer communities where price is more of a deterrent.
The distributional effects of the drug war, therefore, could be
traumatic. 1 '
It is even possible that criminalization may increase the number
of overall users by creating a more than 1:1 replacement from rich
to poor communities. As we have already seen, some drug policies
may unintentionally shift consumption from wealthy communities
to poor communities due to disparities in the cost of stigma. Even
if stigma has the same cost to rich and poor users, amplified distri-
butional inequalities could still occur because consumption by the
richer demand segment has fallen. That richer segment dictates the
market price, and as demand falls in that segment, prices drop ac-
cordingly. Sellers then can make up for the revenue loss through
sales to another, poorer demand segment.
The effect of this shift in demand segments is not only that the
poor consume what the rich previously did; it is also that the poor
may consume even more of the drug than what the rich previously
consumed. Because users in poorer communities have less income,
each user may not be able to consume at the same high levels of
their richer counterparts. As a result, dealers may be forced to deal
to greater numbers of people in an attempt to make up for the reve-
nue shortfall.112 Apart from the obvious. distributional conse-
quences, the reduction in price may therefore lead to a greater
number of users than existed before the policy, because the price
drops more than compensated for the loss in demand. The overall
units consumed may not increase under harsh penalties or educa-
tion, but the composition of the consumption will change; a greater
number of people will now consume the drug (though each user
111. This is particularly so if poorer individuals tend to lack representation in the political
process, so that richer individuals are simply externalizing their problem onto those who do
not have a voice.
112. The idea here is that there are two discrete demand segments, one composed of
richer consumers and the other of poorer consumers. When the richer segment has high
demand, dealers may prefer a Nieman-Marcus-style strategy (low volume; high price). But
when demand among that segment drops, for whatever reason, dealers may have to shift to a
K-Mart-style strategy (high volume; low price). Many more men, for example, seem to be
wearing Calvin Klein suits today as compared to ten years ago. Despite this increase in
consumption, prices of the suits have fallen dramatically. While there may be many reasons
for this increase in consumption of Calvin Klein suits, it is not unlikely that many people are
wearing them only because the price has fallen. And we can speculate that one reason the
price fell is because the richer demand segment dropped a great deal due to newcomers like
Giorgio Armani. This meant that Klein probably had to shift to a K-Mart-style strategy to
maintain profits. I do not know if any of this actually happened, but the fact it could have
happened is enough to illustrate the general point. On distinctions among forms of consump-
tion, see infra text accompanying notes 166-67 (outlining two different types of consumption,
horizontal consumption - the overall number of people consuming a drug - and vertical
consumption - the amount of a drug each user consumes).
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may consume less of it) because the monetary price deterrent has
weakened.
II. SoME, NORMATIVE RESULTS
A. The New Benefit of the Sentencing Guidelines
It is now time to begin thinking about some of the normative
conclusions that might follow from substitution effects.'1 3 I begin
with one rather simple insight, that a uniform system of sentencing
will be superior to an ad hoc one insofar as such a uniform system
can better respond to substitution effects. By showing how legisla-
tors can channel crimes into activities that are more desirable, a
deterrence perspective grounded in substitution theory may pro-
vide an important justification for the Guidelines. A uniform sys-
tem can shape behavior in ways that ad hoc sentencing legislation
often cannot. In particular, piecemeal approaches typically will not
address substitution and complementarity correctly. This idea sup-
ports thinking about criminal law somewhat like the way in which
we analyze questions in taxation." 4
As the 1986 Congressional debate on crack illustrates, Congress
creates penalty schemes with tunnel-vision." 5 No member of Con-
gress wants to be cast in the position of stalling a vote to penalize
what the media has dubbed the latest threat to Americans. It is
very difficult for legislators in such situations to think about the im-
pact of a penalty on other behavior. A sentencing commission that
proposes sentences on a whole host of crimes at once, on the other
hand, may be in a better position to design penalties that provide
the correct incentives. The only treatment of this issue, to my
knowledge, is Jeffrey Standen's." 6 Standen advocates the creation
of specific charging guidelines so that variance in prosecutorial dis-
cretion will not undermine marginal deterrence. Standen's point is
well taken, but is only one instance of a much larger notion. For the
substitution theorist, sentencing guidelines themselves, insofar as
they provide concrete knowledge about expected penalties, lead
113. This Part retains the assumption that preferences are fixed and that people act ra-
tionally on those preferences. See supra text accompanying note 2. Once complications re-
garding taste shaping are introduced, however, it might be impossible to determine the
deterrence and substitution effects of a penalty. Therefore, the policy suggestions in this part
are offered only under the economic assumptions that are specified - assumptions that may
prove to be unrealistic. See infra Part III.
114. See supra text accompanying notes 39-48.
115. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
116. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV.
1471, 1523-25 (1993).
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those who commit crimes to commit less serious ones from the en-
tire panoply of possible crimes. The substitution theorist seeks to
do to criminal sentencing what some optimal tax advocates did to
the field of taxation. The critics of the Guidelines who contend that
sentencing is so difficult that it should be done by judges 1 7 prove
the point. It is precisely because such determinations are so diffi-
cult, and the effects of penalization so varied, that one body should
set uniform guidelines.
A uniform increase in a sentence will also minimize so-called
"spillover" effects. Without uniformity, increasing the expected
sanction of a crime in one area may simply lead criminals to commit
the same crime in other areas - a kind of geographic substitu-
tion. 118 Interjurisdictional variations in sentences and the
probability of detection therefore mitigate the effectiveness of in-
creasing the expected sanction in one locale - unless the goal of
punishment is to externalize the crime onto neighboring jurisdic-
tions.1 9 By adopting a set of uniform penalties, geographic substi-
tution is constrained.
I do not want to defend the entire project of the Sentencing
Guidelines, but only to suggest that substitution provides an argu-
ment in favor of them. Substitution sometimes may shed light on
117. See, e.g., Jose A. Cabranes, Incoherent Sentencing Guidelines, WALL ST. J., Aug. 28,
1992, at All; Jose A. Cabranes, Sentencing Guidelines: A Dismal Failure, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 11,
1992, at 2.
118. See Samuel Cameron, The Economics of Crime Deterrence: A Survey of Theory and
Evidence, 41 KYjros 301, 303 (1988); Furlong & Mehay, supra note 102; Simon Hakim et al.,
Interjurisdictional Spillover of Crime and Police Expenditure, 55 LAND ECON. 200 (1979).
The latter study found intejurisdictional spillover for property crimes such as auto theft and
breaking and entering, but not for violent crimes. See id. at 211. This also provides further
evidence of the nonmarket crime hypothesis.
For one example of geographic substitution, see THm NNICC REPORT 1994: Tam SUPPLY
OF ILLEGAL DRUGS TO THE UNrrED STATES:
A combination of factors - saturated markets, low prices, violent competition, and/or
effective police pressure in major urban areas - has forced some crack distribution
groups, in conjunction with local gangs, to develop new markets in smaller towns and
rural areas.... The more established distribution groups are crisscrossing the nation to
find new markets ....
U.S. DEFT. OF JUSTICE, DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, Tam NNICC REPORT 1994: Tam
SUPPLY OF ILLEGAL DRUGS TO T=E U.S. at 7 (1995). Geographic substitution can also be
driven not only by high enforcement, but also by high sentences. If one jurisdiction decides
to punish an activity at a higher level than another, people may commit the crime in the latter
jurisdiction.
119. Hakim et al. also show how a one dollar per capita increase in police expenditures in
neighboring communities will generate a five cent per capita increase in police expenditures
in a given community. See Hakim et al., supra note 118, at 211. The authors assume that this
is evidence of geographic substitution, but this phenomenon may also reflect the influence of
norms. When a community decides to devote resources to prevent a type of crime, other
communities may follow suit, not only because of the possible externalization of crime, but
because they follow the example set by their neighbors.
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the problems with the Guidelines. For example, the Sentencing
Guidelines contain a multiplier effect that has heretofore gone un-
noticed. As previously mentioned, the Guidelines provide that a
sentence will approximately double for each six levels.120 The
Guidelines' enhancements and reductions, however, work by in-
creasing and decreasing the level of an offense. This can create
enormous disparities in sentencing that enhance substitution. Im-
agine an individual considering becoming a leader in a drug gang.
The Guidelines provide for a four-level increase from the base of-
fense level if the convicted person is a leader.' 2' The way the
Guidelines work, four levels mean something drastically different
when the offense is a low-level one than it does when the offense is
a high-level one. Leaving aside leadership enhancements, one kilo
of crack yields a 188-235 month sentence and one kilo of heroin
yields 121-151 months. 22 The four level enhancement increases a
crack sentence to 292-365 months - an average increase of about
ten years. The enhancement increases a heroin sentence, however,
to 188-235 months, a much smaller increase of about six years.
Under these circumstances - and assuming that profit did not in-
crease as a result of the criminalization 23 - the individual would
have to be a fool to lead a crack distribution ring. By pegging the
enhancement to the underlying crime, the Guidelines create grave
sentencing disparities that both undermine their purpose and mag-
nify the substitution problem.
Yet why should the government not prevent this substitution
problem by penalizing every crime at the highest possible level?
The "Singapore strategy" has something to commend it - if the
government punished everything with death, then people would
commit fewer crimes. As we have seen, however, substitution ex-
plains why those who then committed crimes would commit them
on a greater scale than they would under a proportionality re-
gime. 24 This strategy also has another flaw. Leaving aside both
120. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
121. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3B1.1 (1995).
122. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2D1.1 (1995).
123. See supra text accompanying note 97.
124. This is true, actually, in Singapore. As substitution theory would predict, some re-
ports show that serious crimes, such as murder and rape, are disproportionately high in Sin-
gapore. See Philip Bowring, In Singapor Unusual Law Doesn't Bring About Unusual
Order, INT. HERALD Tim., Apr. 20, 1994, at 6, available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US
File. ("Despite all these stringent laws, Singapore is not extraordinarily crime-free.... [I]t
has far more murders per head than Australia or South Korea, both highly urbanized socie-
ties."); Philip Sherwell, Island Makes No Apology for Draconian PenalCode, DAILY TELE.
GRAPH (LoNDoN), Mar. 18, 1995, at 21; see also Singapore Crime Drops, But Some Sexual
Offences Up, DEurscHm PRESsE-AGENTIUR, Mar. 21, 1997, available in LEXIS, News Li-
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the obvious moral problems and the excessive cost involved -
which was Becker's reason for rejecting such an approach' 25 - the
strategy may create overdeterrence. 126 A death penalty for those
who cause fatal car accidents will mean that fewer people will drive.
High penalties on criminal activity have chilling effects that radiate
beyond the core of the conduct for which the penalty is sought and
thus may inhibit lawful and utility-producing behavior. It will not
generally be feasible to set penalties at extreme levels without en-
tailing some significant costs.127
A difficult question now presents itself: How does one deter-
mine what activities are harmful enough to merit a particular sanc-
tion? That is, how are sentencing commissioners to determine
appropriate punishment?
B. Redefining Optimal Penalties
Substitution yields three important normative conclusions about
optimality. First, no matter what utilitarian criteria a penalty
scheme uses to determine what crimes merit what penalties, the
punishment should fit the crime vis-4-vis other crimes to avoid per-
verse consequences.128 Second, penalties cannot be set only in light
of the harm an undesirable act causes, but also must take account of
substitution effects. Third, a different deterrence strategy should be
used for those crimes where ease of substitution and elasticity of
offenders are high - I call such crimes market-based.
A government that punishes very harmful activity lightly and
less harmful activity strongly will encourage the commission of the
harmful activity, thus imposing a net harm on society. What is
"very harmful" should depend not only upon the particular attrib-
utes of the act, but also on whether the crime will induce comple-
mentary relationships with other crimes, either directly (for
brary, DPA File; Singapore's Crime Rate Up First ime in Seven Years, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Sept. 11, 1996, available in 1996 WL 12136162.
125. See Becker, supra note 2, at 180-81.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38 (explaining how high tort liability will have
chilling effects).
127. These costs do not, in general, mean that crimes should go unpunished on deter-
rence grounds. Just as Foucault realized that the prison, though it produces delinquency, may
channel that delinquency into "politically or economically less dangerous" forms, see
FoUCAULT, supra note 4, at 277, sentencing structures can reduce the most harmful crimes by
encouraging the commission of less harmful acts.
128. Specifically with respect to rehabilitation, policies aimed at reconditioning offenders
may have counterdeterrent effects. If an individual knows that he is going to get job training
in jail, the price of committing a crime is reduced to him. And if the penal system aims to
remove the stigma on those who serve time - for example, through measures to integrate
ex-convicts into society - the ex ante price of the crime is reduced even further.
2423August 19971
2424 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 95:2385
example, drug dealing leading to money laundering) or indirectly
(for example, by destabilizing the rule of law)129 - and whether it
will set an example and lead others to commit the crime through
complementarity. 130
Imagine that the purpose of the criminal law is to deter physical
harm to others. Behavior A imposes one unit of physical harm on a
victim, and Behavior B imposes two units of such harm. Common
sense would dictate that Behavior B should be punished at a level
somewhat above Behavior A.131 If not, and a person's taste for B is
higher than for A, the government will induce substitution
effects. 32
But now we need a fuller account of what substitution - at
least the narrow economic version of the substitution argument -
does to punishment calculations. Here, substitution should be
viewed as a cost of punishment. Every time an activity is sanc-
tioned, the sanction has the potential to create substitution effects.
Some of those effects will ripple downwards - inducing people to
commit less harmful crimes or no crime at all if lawful behavior is
substituted. Some of these effects, as we have seen, can work to
increase harm to SoCiety. 133
129. As the Italian theorist Gaetano Filangieri put it: "The proportion between the pen-
alty and the quality of the offence is determined by the influence that the violation of the pact
has on the social order." 4 GAETANO FILANGIERI, LA SCIENCE DE LA LfAoMs'AiON 214 (J.A.
Gauvin Gallois trans., Chez Cuchet 1786) (1784), quoted in FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 92-
93.
130. Crimes that shock the conscience may actually not be as harmful as those that every-
one tolerates. Cf FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 93 ("There is a scarcity of great crimes, on the
other hand, there is the danger that everyday offences may multiply.").
131. Determining what is "twice" as bad as something else can often be quite difficult.
For example, George Stigler, in his classic article, argued that the theft of $1000 is more than
twice as harmful as the theft of $500. Stigler, supra note 3, at 529. This is far from clear, for
two $500 thefts may in some circumstances impose more societal harm than one theft of
$1000. For example, those who have $1000 to steal may be better able to bear a loss than
those who have only $500. Not only may the wealthy be better able to bear a loss, they also
may have opportunities for self-enforcement that the poor do not - for example, locks,
guards, and alarm systems. Moreover, the occurrence of two thefts means two investigations
and two prosecutions - all of which will soak up additional government money. Larger
thefts also may be easier to detect and may therefore merit a slightly lower penalty because
the probability of getting caught is higher.
132. This type of analysis can be replicated under other theories of punishment as well
(e.g., if behavior B was twice as immoral as behavior A, then the government should punish
B at a level higher than A).
133. This point gives rise to another question: Should the government base the sanction
on the harm a particular activity causes to society or on the gain an individual reaps from that
activity? In many cases, there may not be much of a difference since the gain to the criminal
may be directly influenced, or precisely equal to, the amount of harm caused to society. But
there are occasions in which this equivalence may not hold. Selling one vial of crack, for
example, may result in a five dollar profit to an individual, but a much larger harm to society.
Criminal insider-trading, on the other hand, may provide an individual with a one million
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Of course, this all turns on how actors weigh crimes. If someone
believes in ignoring all expected sanctions, then it will not matter at
what level a penalty is set. Put differently, even with a maximal
sanction, some crime will still occur because some will have a taste
for it or because it maximizes their self-interest. The amount of this
residual crime will be, in part, a function of whether the particular
activity is a market-based one or whether it is not.134 A host of
other factors, from biological and sociological influences to "over-
estimation" of the crime's particular benefits, may also influence its
prevalence. 135
None of this undermines criminal deterrence once its function is
properly understood. Torts occur despite a system of tort liability,
yet our faith in deterrence is not completely shaken.136 Similarly,
the fact that crimes still occur is not a per se argument against the
validity of deterrence. It is just plain silly to think that criminal law
can deter all crime, but it is just as absurd to think that-the mere
fact that some crime occurs under any system of sanctions means
that deterrence is bankrupt. 37
In fact, even if you think that deterrence is generally bankrupt,
you might still be concerned about substitution. After all, under
dollar gain, but arguably may not impose any cost to society. See EASTERBROOK & FiscHmL,
supra note 76, at 345-48.
The answer in tort and contract law primarily has been that liability should be based on
the harm the victim suffers. The Sentencing Guidelines, however, provide that the size of a
fine should "reflect the seriousness of the offense (including the harm or loss to the victim
and the gain to the defendant)." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5.E1.2.(d)(1)
(1995). As Polinsky & Shavell have shown in the tort context, gain-based liability is problem-
atic when legal error is present because such liability will fail to deter many socially undesir-
able acts. A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Should Liability Be Based on the Harm to
the Victim or the Gain to the Injurer?, 10 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 427, 428-29 (1994). This is
because an underestimation of gain will lead individuals to commit an undesirable act. But
because harm generally exceeds gain by a large amount, errors in assessing harm are not as
likely to create the same incentives, and so harm-based liability is generally preferable. See
id.
An analysis of the proper type of liability based on the government's errors in determin-
ing gains would seem to apply in the criminal context as well, although it may be harder to
determine social harm and individual gain. The Polinsky & Shavell theory, in addition, does
not incorporate perception errors in processing information about gain and harm from ex-
pected punishment. The extent to which these errors affect the analysis is beyond the scope
of this article.
134. See infra text accompanying notes 145-49.
135. On possible biological influences on crime, see ADRIAN RAiNE, Ti PSYCHO-
PATHOLOGY OF CRIME: CRIMINAL BEHAVIOR AS A CLINICAL DISORDER (1993); Roger D.
Masters, Environmental Pollution, Neurotoxicity, and Violent Crime in AsPEcrs OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL TOXICOLOGY (J. Rose ed., forthcoming 1997).
136. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC STRUCrURE OF TORT
LAW 72-73 (1987); STEVEN SHAVELL, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 83-84
(1987).
137. For a similar argument in tort law, see Gary T. Schwartz, Reality in the Economic
Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377 (1994).
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the conventional inquiry, a penalty is said to deter only when it in-
duces law-abiding behavior. But this is the ultimate form of substi-
tution, and thus, the most difficult. To grasp this point, it might be
helpful to think once again about the salt example.138 A high salt
price could mean that people forgo salt altogether. But other spices
might be substituted as a response to an increase in the price of salt.
Indeed, other spices might be a closer substitute than nothing at all.
The same idea might hold in criminal deterrence. A penalty system
might not cause a criminal to forgo all illegal activity, but it might
influence which illegal activity a lawbreaker picks, just as the pric-
ing system influences which spice to use.
So even if criminals act "irrationally" by taking a risk where the
expected sanction exceeds the expected benefit, they may still take
the course of action with the lower cost-to-benefit ratio. A person
bent on defrauding clients may not calculate the costs and benefits
of his activity properly (or even at all), but may still decide that
defrauding the government is an additional risk that he does not
want to take. Deterrence still matters - even for those who will
not be deterred from committing a crime. To modify Herrnstein's
suggestion, you may not be able to stop the husband from throwing
the plates at the wall, but you may be able to stop him from throw-
ing the china.139
The above point suggests, in part, a modification of the category
economists call "nondeterrable crime." Nondeterrable crime refers
to situations where people so enjoy the crime they commit that no
criminal sanction will induce them to change their behavior. 40 In-
stead of looking to one particular crime, substitution focuses the
question on situations where sanctions will not be able to deter
crime without creating a shift to another crime.
This raises the question of whether the existence of substitution
effects inexorably leads to the conclusion that penalty should corre-
late with harm. If, hypothetically, penalty structures perfectly cor-
relate with harmfulness of activities, does substitution have any
importance? The answer is "yes." Even under the unrealistic as-
sumption that the government could devise perfect penalties, sub-
stitution suggests that punishment calculations cannot be premised
only on the social harm that an activity creates. Even if the
harmfulness of particular crimes can be calculated correctly, re-
138. See supra text accompanying note 10.
139. See supra text accompanying note 14.
140. See Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, An Economic Analysis of the Criminal Law as a
Preference-Shaping Policy, 1990 DuKE LJ. 1, 4 n.21.
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sources may be misdeployed due to the narrow focus on social
harm. Instead, sentencing commissioners must examine the likely
reaction of would-be criminals to a particular sentence. 141 If pun-
ishing crack means that offenders will substitute heroin, the law is
not doing much good. The converse is also true: substitution cre-
ates the possibility of the government creating less harmful substi-
tutes to dangerous activity and, thus, increasing social welfare
through deterrence.
This curse blessing follows from the realistic and uncontrovert-
ible proposition that no system of penalties, however sophisticated,
will deter all crime. As Beccaria wrote, "[i]t is impossible to foresee
all the mischiefs which arise from the universal struggle of the
human emotions."'142 There are at least three reasons for this: indi-
viduals vary in their responsiveness to sanctions; some crimes are
more amenable to deterrence than others; and some crimes become
more attractive as the punishment increases. As to the first, Alex-
ander and Staub have written of the distinction between the "neu-
rotic criminals" who "cannot help" committing crimes and the
"normal criminals" who are deterred by the "fear of painful conse-
quences."' 43 While this binary division is artificial, the distinction
helps clarify the behavioral extremes.144
141. The commissioners appear not to have considered such questions. See, eg., Sympo-
sium, Equality Versus Discretion in Sentencing, 26 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 1813, 1822 (1989)
(comments of Stephen Breyer) ("A theft of $10,000 typically led to a prison term, but a fraud
of $10,000 led more often to probation and no prison, or to lighter prison sentences. What is
the difference between fraud and theft? Fraud is larceny by trick, which is a form of theft.
Why should there be this discrepancy? The Commission could think of no reason. There-
fore, it raised sentences for white collar crimes .....
142. BECCARiA, supra note 4, at 19.
143. FRANZ ALEXANDER & HuGo STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC:
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 209-11 (Gregory Zilboorg & Franz Alexander trans., The Free
Press 2d ed. 1956) (1931). Wechsler & Michael do much the same when they write of "the
class of non-deterrable persons." Herbert Wechsler & Jerome Michael, A Rationale of the
Law of Homicide, pt. 1, 37 COLUM. L. REv. 701, 759 (1937).
144. Differences in behavior can occur for a variety of reasons. See FRANKLIN E.
ZIMRiNG & GORDON J. HAWKINS, DETERRENCE: THE LEGAL THREAT IN CRIME CONTROL
96-141 (1973). First, as previously discussed, people vary in their desire for risk. Those who
are risk-preferrers are more likely to commit crimes than those who are not. Second, those
who are "future-dwellers" may be more worried about future punishment than are "present-
dwellers," who find the immediate gains from crime more attractive. See MARGERY FRY,
ARMs OF THm LAW 82-84 (1951). People do not all discount the future with the same yard-
stick, and differences in discount rates may explain some criminal behavior. Third, people
may vary in their degrees of optimism and pessimism about the likelihood of punishment. As
Daniel Claster found, delinquent boys believed that they had a "'magical immunity' mecha-
nism" that protected them from punishment. Daniel S. Claster, Comparison of Risk Percep-
tion Between Delinquents and Non-Delinquents, 58 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE ScI.
80, 84 (1967). Fourth, those who are more impulsive may be less amenable to deterrence
than are those who are more deliberative. See Johannes Andenaes, Deterrence and Specific
Offenses, 38 U. CHI. L. REv. 537, 539 (1971) (stating the "old proposition" that "carefully
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In addition, one might expect particular crimes to be more eas-
ily deterred than others. This variation is not only the result of sub-
stantial differences between particular crimes, but also of the type
of people drawn to particular forms of lawbreaking. If the highest
risk-takers are drawn to dealing drugs, while the lowest risk-takers
are drawn to petty shoplifting, this stratification will have an impact
on the law's ability to deter each type of crime. The particular at-
tributes of crimes also will affect deterrence. A crime that is highly
impulse-oriented - say, murder in the heat of the moment - may
be more difficult to deter than one that is less impulsive - say,
bank fraud.
On the other hand, crimes that are impulsive are paradoxically
ones where deterrence sometimes can function well in a systemic
sense, because they are nonmarket crimes. The law's ability to de-
ter depends not only on the characteristics of a particular crime, but
also on whether a market for that crime exists.145 Criminalization
of some activities, such as drug dealing, results in an increased ben-
efit to drug dealers - a higher price - that creates an opportunity
for true profit.146 And if the elasticity of the supply of offenders is
high, punishing one criminal will not accomplish much because an-
other one will simply take his place.147
It is theoretically possible that such a replacement may be at a
level higher than 1:1. If some of the resources expended by a drug
ring, for example, are devoted to fighting rival rings, busting a drug
ring may actually increase the potential for crime by permitting a
surviving ring to earmark more of its resources for selling and less
for physical protection. Such a result is by no means inevitable.
Just as modem warfare between nation-states has partially moved
away from emphasis on the physical to the economic, drug rings in
some markets may fight each other through lower prices instead of
planned acts are more easily deterred than those that result from a sudden, emotional
impulse").
145. This distinction is, in some ways, similar to one used by Professor Packer. See
PACKER, supra note 13, at 281 (separating penalties on some crimes, such as those regarding
performance of then-illegal abortions, from others, such as bank robbery, because "[t]he
harder we work to make the sale of abortions risky, the higher we drive the price that makes
the risk worthwhile" yet "[w]e do not make bank robbery more attractive by punishing the
bank robbers whom we manage to catch. The potential gain is unaffected by the offsetting
risk of punishment"). Packer's distinction is valid, but his example is not. A penalty on bank
robbery would, I imagine, create a market for skilled bank robbers who could avoid detec-
tion, for strong-armed criminals who could prevail in a confrontation with bank security, and
so on. But the basic point, that the gain from some - not all - crimes increases with ex-
pected punishment, remains valid.
146. See supra note 97.
147. See Posner, supra note 20, at 1216-17.
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violence. If so, taking these dealers out of circulation will have the
price effect sought by the government - higher prices via reduced
competition among dealers. On the other hand, such a policy could
result in greater economies of scale and monopolization, with their
own attendant problems.148 Such problems could include a further
increase in crime - because removing some dealers increases the
price of the drug and hence the returns, particularly given possible
monopolization.
Another way that punishment may increase crime is if those
caught tend to be less competent and are replaced by more adept
criminals.149 If members of a drug ring are simply replaced when
they are caught, then the deterrent effect is virtually nil. And if a
person is caught because she happened to be the worst drug dealer,
the addition of a more cunning replacement to the ring would in-
crease, rather than reduce, crime. Law enforcement would thus
serve as a sorting mechanism to aid criminals in their search for
competent associates.
For "nonmarket" crimes, however, a market does not develop.
Target-specific violence, such as most rape and murder, are not
crimes where a market can be expected to develop. Other exam-
ples include assault, battery, and child abuse. An increase in the
penalty for these crimes will not generally result in an increased
benefit to the criminal.150 No market is created, and a new actor
does not replace a punished criminal - the elasticity of the supply
of offenders is low. Deterrence, therefore, may be a more effective
means of preventing some nonmarket, rather than market, offenses.
Because people and crimes vary in their amenability to deter-
rence, it is too large an abstraction to speak of a system of perfect
penalties that will deter all crime. It is helpful, instead, to think
about whether a penalty structure will provide the most deterrence
at the cheapest cost. To do this, the penalty structure cannot be
calibrated to those who are truly nondeterrable persons. If the law
has no impact on someone, then it makes little sense to elevate a
penalty to the highest possible level in a futile attempt to deter him.
148. See supra text accompanying notes 105-08.
149. See Stephen S. Brier & Stephen E. Fienberg, Recent Econometric Modelling of
Crime and Punishment: Support for the Deterrence Hypothesis?, in INDIcATORS OF CRIME
AND CRIMINAL Jus'icE: QUANTITATIVE STUDIES 82, 83 (Stephen E. Fienberg & Albert J.
Reiss, Jr. eds., Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dept. of Justice, NCJ-62349, 1980); Phillip J.
Cook, Punishment and Crime: A Critique of Current Findings Concerning the Preventive Ef-
fects of Punishment, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1977, at 164.
150. Sometimes it can, though. Imagine contract murder or a gang that "rewards" the
member who risks killing the leader of a rival gang.
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That will not deter him and will simply create substitution problems
for everyone else.151 This situation, naturally, is rare. More com-
mon is the case of a nondeterrable person who will commit some
crime, but has not decided which particular crime to commit. Sub-
stitution will provide an answer for these cases.
Imagine that Abe, who lost his shirt in the stock market, will
either commit embezzlement or take kickbacks to make up for his
loss. He is a nondeterrable person in the sense that he will commit
one of those two crimes, but this fact should not blind us to the
possibility that the legal system may affect which 'of the two he
eventually commits. Imposing a higher penalty on one may induce
him to do the other. On the other hand, if Ben is committed to
assaulting an ex-girlfriend, the possibility for deterrence is not as
great because he is a nondeterrable person committed to a
nondeterrable crime.152
People do not, however, generally face a choice between two
crimes like embezzlement or bank fraud. Instead, they have to con-
tend with a smorgasbord of options. In view of the range of these
choices, policymakers must gauge the likely response of individuals
to the enactment of particular punishments. If the only benefit of a
penalty is to lead criminals to substitute a slightly less harmful of-
fense, then the penalty is not accomplishing a great deal. In other
words, calculations about optimality must be refined to include sub-
stitution, and discussions about punishment cannot revolve simply
around the harm of the activity being punished. Crack may be the
worst, or second worst, thing around, but spending enforcement
dollars on it may not confer much benefit because of substitution
effects. Even if the penalty for heroin dealing or use is raised to
compensate for the substitution, other illegal substitutes are avail-
able. Even after penalties are raised on all illegal substitutes, there
are legal drugs that individuals abuse - model glue, nitrous oxide,
and so on. On the other hand, a high penalty on a nonmarket crime
such as murder may not create as much substitution. If murder is
an impulse-driven and target-specific crime, then allocating en-
forcement and punishment to prevent it is optimal.
151. Incapacitation, however, may be a powerful solution for the undeterrable. Lifetime
imprisonment is, of course, the ultimate specific deterrent. But again, the ex ante perspective
requires that such imprisonment be used only in circumstances where the benefit of incarcer-
ating the undeterrable for a given crime outweigh the substitution, framing, and other effects
that would ensue.
152. See supra text accompanying notes 136-40 (arguing that there is a range of crimes
that can be deterred even for the nondeterrable) and infra text accompanying notes 155-60(discussing the concept of Y-optimality, that high prices on activities can have income effects
that deter other, unrelated acts).
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More concretely, if my earlier conjecture proves wrong and the
conventional wisdom - that crimes like rape and assault have no
substitutes - is true, a clear way to enhance optimality will exist.
The unsubstitutability of nonmarket crimes would mean that en-
forcement resources should be allocated to prevent them. This idea
is best understood through a numerical example. Suppose that an
instance of crack use imposes five disutility units on society. Imag-
ine that a penalty is devised that prevents most crack consumption.
If the effect of the penalty is to encourage people to use, say, mor-
phine, which imposes three disutility units, society profits by a re-
duction of two disutility units.153 Now take a crime where
substitution is unlikely. Imagine, for example, that the crime is sim-
ple assault and that simple assault imposes three disutility units on
society. Enforcing laws against simple assault, then, may yield
more of a benefit to society (three units) than enforcing laws
against crack (two units). This is so even if we assume that crack
dealing is worse for society than simple assault.
Substitutes can be a benefit, however, and not just a burden.
The possibility for substitution to facilitate compliance with the law
should not be overlooked. If ready substitutes exist, the substitu-
tion effect may enhance deterrence. Which crime an individual
picks depends on her desire for the crimes relative to their expected
punishments.
The simple assault penalty discussed above may not yield much
of a benefit if it will not deter many people. Deterrence may be
unlikely if the actor has no alternative to - that is, no substitute for
- the simple assault. To examine the effectiveness of a penalty, it
is not enough to look only at substitution effects. A discount for
those whom the penalty does not deter is also needed. This sug-
gests a new role for the criminal law - creating substitutes. If the
law manufactured less harmful alternatives to activity that it wants
to discourage, deterrence might be improved. This is, after all, a
similar idea to what is at work in the concept of rehabilitation -
the teaching of useful behavior to replace criminal proclivities. But
the substitution-creating role extends well beyond the traditional
goals of rehabilitation and suggests that the law should, at times,
permit harmful activity in order to reduce activity that is even more
harmful.
153. Of course, if the effect of the penalty is to encourage people to do something that
imposes more than five units of harm, then the penalty is counterproductive.
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To illustrate, let us return to our crack-morphine hypothetical.
Suppose that crack and morphine were punished in accordance
with the discussion above and that marijuana consumption causes
one unit of harm. If marijuana use were legalized, it might en-
courage those who would have used morphine to use marijuana in-
stead, because the legal price of marijuana is much lower than that
of morphine, even though the benefits may not be as great. In so
doing, it would yield a net benefit of two units to society. In addi-
tion, this marijuana scheme may also help draw people away from
crack. In its absence, it was assumed that everyone would substi-
tute morphine for crack. This assumption was, of course, unrealis-
tic. Because some users may find that the benefits of crack minus
its expected penalty outweigh the benefits of morphine minus its
expected penalty, some will stick with crack. But when the ex-
pected penalty of marijuana is dropped to zero - or, factoring in
the monetary cost, an amount close to zero - marijuana may be
more of a substitute than morphine. 54
The possibility for law-enhancing substitution shows that these
concepts do not always portend a bleak future for criminal law. By
manipulating penalties to prevent those crimes that are both harm-
ful and preventable at a low cost, substitution opens new doors for
the government.
C. The Income Effect and Y-Optimality
Until now, we have been thinking about one half of the equa-
tion, the substitution effect. But the discussion would be incom-
plete without considering its other half, the income effect.
Specifically, the income effect, when applied to criminal law, sug-
gests that a high price - whether monetary or legal - for one
crime may decrease the commission of other crimes. We can see
this phenomenon most easily in consumption crimes, like drug use.
If the monetary price of heroin increases as a result of greater pen-
alties, those who continue to consume heroin likely will reduce
their consumption of other illegal drugs. This is because heroin
users' real income drops when the heroin price rises, so they do not
have the purchasing power they did before the price increase.
154. In addition, as section III.C argues, research in cognitive psychology shows that the
addition of a salient alternative, such as marijuana, may increase the perceived benefits of
morphine vis-A-vis crack. By adding a viable third option - marijuana - extremeness aver-
sion may lead people to pick morphine instead of the more extreme crack option. See infra
text accompanying notes 264-72.
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Although the income effect of a heroin price increase - a loss
of purchasing power - will tend to reduce a heroin user's con-
sumption of other narcotics, the substitution effect may work to en-
courage heroin users to switch to other drugs. That is, the high
heroin price decreases the relative price of heroin substitutes and
heroin users may try to maintain their old purchasing power by sub-
stituting other drugs. Therefore, we can see both substitution and
income effects at play. If constraints on substitution exist due to,
for example, an intense preference for heroin or an unavailability of
substitutes, a price increase may have an income effect that reduces
consumption of other drugs. This yields the interesting result that a
heroin penalty actually might not deter heroin consumption but
might deter other crimes.
Other income effects are possible as well. Consider a few quick
examples. First, if criminals have a target income, deterrence meas-
ures that reduce the return from each instance of criminal activity
may increase the amount of crime required to maintain the target.
Second, if criminals were punished by fines, it could increase crime
because some individuals will resort to crime to pay their fines or to
insure against getting caught and imprisoned in the future.155
Third, the income effect may mean that penalties for consumption
crimes may have exactly the opposite effect from that intended -
criminalization may expand consumption. In particular, criminaliz-
ing drugs may. increase their price, which in turn may encourage
users to hook new consumers so that they can deal to them to gen-
erate additional income with which to buy drugs. Criminalization
could, similarly, lead to theft and other crimes. 56
The most exciting application of the income effect in criminal
law regards what I term Y-Optimality.157 The previous section con-
sidered what should be done to a person with a taste for criminal
activity that is so high that no penalty will deter the person. Ordi-
narily, criminal lawyers throw up their hands and believe that deter-
rence has no role to play against such "undeterrables." But, as the
tea and foot powder example shows, 158 when someone has a strong
taste for a good - that is, when there is no viable substitute - a
price increase in that good will decrease consumption of other
goods. A Y-Strategy uses this insight to enhance deterrence of sev-
eral crimes through a penalty for one crime. Like an increase in the
155. See Cameron, supra note 118, at 303-04.
156. See infra text accompanying note 167.
157. The Y effect is economic shorthand for the income effect.
158. See supra text accompanying note 1.
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price of tea that reduces consumption of foot powder, an increase in
a penalty for one crime may have an income effect that reduces the
commission of other crimes - even when the penalty increase does
not deter commission of that particular crime.
Y-optimality occurs when the penalty for an activity is set at the
highest level where the activity will still occur.159 Under these cir-
cumstances, a penalty - even though it does nothing to reduce the
occurrence of the targeted activity - may reduce the commission
of other crimes.
For example, imagine that Jim commits one arson and one rob-
bery per week and that the penalty is five years imprisonment for
each of these crimes. Suppose that the government decides to in-
crease the arson penalty to seven years. The additional punishment
may not reduce Jim's proclivity to commit arson, but may reduce
his commission of robbery. For this to be true, the benefits from
arson must be such that Jim would not simply substitute additional
robberies to replace his previous arsons.160 On the other hand, Jim
may no longer commit robbery, but may decide instead to commit
an additional smaller crime - for example, a mugging. A high ar-
son penalty is thus deterring robbery and increasing mugging - two
crimes traditionally believed to have nothing to do with arson.
Put slightly differently, if the penalty is set at a level where sub-
stitution will not occur and the marginal user will still commit the
crime, the income effect suggests that commission of other crimes
may drop. Because the dominant paradigm in criminal law ignores
the interrelationships between crimes and their punishments, Y-
Optimality has been unrecognized and ignored. This is one more
example of how the key break from marginal deterrence towards
the economics of substitution takes criminal law far beyond its cur-
rent assumptions.
D. Income Effects and Drugs
1. Giffen Goods
Income effects are also important for other reasons. For exam-
ple, one might think that if heroin is becoming a substitute for
159. Readers will note that this necessarily means that the taste for the activity must be
larger than the utility derived from any substitutes.
160. For example, this may occur if Jim earned twice as much committing arson as rob-
bery. Of course, Jim's opportunities to commit arson must be limited by the risk of nondiver-
sified criminal activity or by some other external constraint, such as the number of willing
"clients" who pay him to torch buildings, for example. In the absence of such constraints,
Jim would be committing only arson in the first place.
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crack, heroin penalties should be increased to compensate for the
disparity. But yet again, simple and elegant conclusions do not al-
ways follow from complicated phenomena. If government policies
increase the price of heroin to the point where substitution would
not occur, it may wind up increasing drug consumption in a certain
segment of the population as a result of income effects. To under-
stand this ironic - albeit perhaps only hypothetical - effect, it is
necessary to introduce the concept of Giffen goods.
In general, when a consumer's real income rises, the consumer
will increase the quantity of each good that she purchases. Con-
versely, when her real income declines, the quantity of each good
bought decreases. When the price of a good increases, however,
both income and substitution effects are at play. The substitution
component will lead a consumer to substitute the good that has be-
come relatively cheaper for the one that has become relatively
more expensive.16' The income component means that a price
change will change purchasing power, decreasing the individual's
overall consumption accordingly.
Put a slightly different way, when the price of a good rises, sub-
stitution effects work together with income effects to produce a de-
cline in demand for that good. Income effects, however, are
sometimes hard to predict. An impoverished immigrant from
France who is used to eating pork and who prospers in America will
either eat more pork or substitute steak - depending on his taste.
Pork suggests an exception to the general rule about the impact
price changes have on demand. The consumption of some goods,
inferior goods, relates inversely to income. Examples might include
rot-gut whiskey and second-hand clothing. As an individual's in-
come declines he consumes more of these goods.162
For some inferior goods, a price increase could have the
counterintuitive effect of increasing consumption. These goods are
called Giffen goods. For such a good to exist, the income effect
must be large enough to outweigh the substitution effect and the
good must be inferior. The classic example, used by Victorian econ-
omist Robert Giffen, concerned the Irish potato blight.163 Before
161. In other words, the individual will reallocate her consumption in order to equate the
marginal rate of substitution between the two goods to the new price ratio. The marginal
rate of substitution reflects how much of one good an individual is willing to give up in return
for one more unit of another good. Because a consumer's relative preference for each good
may depend on how many units of each good the consumer purchases, the marginal rate of
substitution varies depending on the quantity of the good purchased.
162. See NIcHoLsoN, supra note 1, at 85.
163. Id. at 95-96.
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the blight, the typical Irish family ate a diet consisting mostly of
cheap potatoes and a little bit of meat, which was considerably
more expensive than potatoes. When the blight hit, potato prices
rose and the real income of the Irish plummeted. Had potatoes
been superior goods, one would expect that the consumption of po-
tatoes would have decreased because their price increased. But
Giffen observed that potato consumption increased; the Irish ate
more potatoes than they did before the blight, because the high po-
tato price reduced income to the point where meat had become
prohibitively expensive. Because there were no available substi-
tutes for meat besides potatoes, the price increase led the Irish to
become more dependent on potatoes than they were previously.
The positive income effect of the potato price increase had dwarfed
the negative substitution effect.164 There are, therefore, three types
of goods: superior goods, where a price increase in the good will
reduce consumption of the good; inferior goods, where a decrease
in income will increase consumption of the good; and Giffen goods,
where an increase in the price of a good will increase consumption
of the good.
I want to raise tentatively the possibility that heroin might be a
Giffen good and that a large penalty on heroin may work havoc
similar to the Irish potato famine. Some evidence suggests that
consumption of heroin may be inversely proportional to income. 16S
By increasing its price, a high heroin penalty reduces real income.
Such reductions in real income may create drug use by making users
even poorer than they were before the penalty. This poverty, in
turn, further contributes to the need for additional heroin.
To my knowledge, no one has described heroin as a Giffen good.
But the description may be appropriate for those users who are ad-
dicted. We all know about cycles of drug addiction where a user
becomes so impoverished that she loses hope for her future. Drugs
become the user's only escape. If drug prices were low enough that
164. Whether this actually happened in Ireland is a matter of some historical debate,
although, as Stigler points out, the fact that it could have happened this way suffices to illus-
trate the theoretical point. See GEORGE J. STILER, TIE THEORY OF PRICE 24,62-63 (3d ed.
1966).
165. For example, one study measured the income of 201 heroin users in Harlem during
1978-1982. It found that "daily" users had an average noncriminal income of $5607 and an
average criminal income of $11,974. Less frequent "regular" users had an average noncrimi-
nal income of $5,897 and an average criminal income of $11,203. "Irregular" users had an
average noncriminal income of $5,952 and the lowest average criminal income, $4,451. See
BRUCE D. JOHNSON ET AL., TAKING CARE OF BusINEss: THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME BY
HEROIN ABUSERS 81, 89 (1985). Unfortunately, the study, even if it were representative of
heroin users in general, cannot be determinative since it is unclear whether the loss in income
is caused by increasing heroin use, or vice-versa.
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users would not be impoverished, consumption might actually de-
cline.166 Addicted users - those who are least likely to opt for a
substitute - may increase their consumption of heroin as their mis-
ery, exacerbated by their decline in real income, increases.
A related point concerns types of drug consumption. The main
goal of current drug penalties has been to prevent what I suggest we
label horizontal consumption - the number of people using drugs
- and not to prevent vertical consumption - the amount of a drug
that a user consumes. But drug penalties, even if they decrease hor-
izontal consumption, may increase vertical consumption. If heroin
is a Giffen good, high heroin penalties increase vertical consump-
tion through income effects.
It is not immediately obvious that trading horizontal consump-
tion for vertical consumption promotes social welfare. High drug
dosages contribute to fatal overdoses, antisocial behavior, loss of
productivity, broken homes, and all of the other things that are
commonly used as justifications for punishing drug use. It is not
clear, however, whether consumption at lower dosages creates
these problems. Drug war proponents thus far have succeeded in
identifying situations in which high vertical consumption creates
problems - but these vertical consumption problems might be, if
the Giffen goods argument is correct, an effect of the drug war itself.
Of course, horizontal consumption is worrisome because of its po-
tential to lead to increased vertical consumption. But the strength
of the complementary relationship between the two cannot be as-
sumed and requires empirical support, particularly when costs are
high for unaddicted users.
A focus on income effects also suggests that one of the perennial
justifications for the drug war, that drugs increase crime, may actu-
ally draw the causality arrows in the wrong direction. Because of
increases in the price of drugs, addicts may turn to mugging and
other crimes so that they can continue to afford the drugs.167 High
166. An interesting question, beyond the scope of this article, concerns whether and to
what extent substitution varies by income. For example, rich persons may use more cocaine
than poor ones because there are more activities that richer folks can do while on the drug,
such as trade stocks, that are not available to less wealthy individuals. In other words, wealth
effects might make certain types of crime more or less common for certain socioeconomic
groups. Again, my point is not to suggest policy implications but simply to show how income
combines with substitution in interesting ways. For other examples of potential interactions
with wealth effects, see supra text accompanying notes 31-34 (regarding interactions between
criminal behavior and the workplace) and text accompanying notes 109-11 (discussing how
penalization might create demographic shifts in the drug-taking population because of the
two types of deterrence).
167. See JoHNsoN ET AL-, supra note 165, at 4-5 (citing studies showing that heroin ad-
dicts resort to theft, robbery, and other crime to support their habits); id. at 186 (presenting
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drug prices may also lead to other negative externalities. For exam-
ple, if drug prices increase, drug consumers may be forced, because
of the decline in real income, to begin dealing drugs to support their
habit.168 Some of this increase in dealing will take the form of ex-
posing neophytes to the drug, thereby increasing horizontal con-
sumption. Again, it is possible that high drug prices increase, rather
than reduce, the drug use.169
This observation, even if true, does not require America to call
off the drug war. After all, drugs can only be Giffen goods for those
who use them. Unlike potatoes, drugs are not a necessity to those
who are not addicted. 70 Proponents of the drug war are correct to
argue that high monetary prices could deter new users from taking
heroin, but they err in extrapolating their analysis to addicts. This
suggests that an optimal deterrence strategy would prevent new
users from being exposed to the drug and simultaneously ensure
that prices are low for those who are already addicted. In economic
terms, the goal is to create price discrimination.
data showing that as users decrease heroin use they decrease the number of robberies they
commit); Inciardi & Pottieger, supra note 66, at 289 ("Just as use of more heroin is associated
with commission of more crimes, increased levels of crack use are also clearly correlated with
a greater level of crime involvement."); see also PACKER, supra note 13, at 332.
168. One important study of Miami crack users found that the 114 men interviewed en-
gaged in 683,595 drug sales in a period of ninety days. The 84 women interviewed had en-
gaged in 258,849 drug sales, with 94% reporting that they had sold drugs during the time
period. See Inciardi & Pottieger, supra note 66, at 280; see also JOHNSON ET AL-, supra note
165, at 183 ("In addition to drug sales, the heroin business encompasses a repertoire of roles
by which heroin abusers distribute drugs to others like themselves. Steering, touting, cop-
ping, and other roles ... are central to the lives of heroin abusers. Performing these low-level
roles is the bread-and-butter of their drug sustenance."); Edward Preble & John J. Casey, Jr.,
Taking Care of Business - The Heroin User's Life on the Street, 4 INTL. J. ADDICTIONS 1, 3,
21 (1969) ("The cost of heroin today is so high and the quality so poor that the street user
must become totally involved in an economic career.... [T]he street heroin user is an active,
busy person, preoccupied primarily with the economic necessities of maintaining his real in-
come - heroin."). Many studies conclude that addicts are full-time or part-time dealers,
See e.g., John C. Ball et al., The Criminality of Heroin Addicts When Addicted and When Off
Opiates, in THm DRUGS-CRIME CONNECTION 39 (James A. Inciardi ed., 1981); John C. Ball et
al., The Day-to-Day Criminality of Heroin Addicts in Baltimore - A Study in the Continuity
of Offence Rates, 12 DRUG & ALCOHOL DEPENDENCE 119 (1983).
169. An increase in crime and drug dealing may be able to offset the Giffen good effect.
If addicts are able to make up for their lost income through crime and drug dealing, their
vertical consumption may not rise because their income remains steady. If they do not have
opportunities to make up their lost income, however, they may increase their consumption in
response to a drop in their real incomes. It may be that some users will maintain their real
income levels by turning to theft or other crimes, while other users will be subject to a Giffen
goods phenomenon.
170. As William Chambliss has written, "evidence, then, suggests that drug addiction, like
murder, is relatively unaffected by the threat or the imposition of punishment." William J.




Price discrimination occurs when a firm with a monopoly in two
markets charges different prices for its output in those markets.171
Generally speaking, price discrimination seems fanciful. We all
know that the existence of price differences leads to arbitrage -
wholesalers will buy on the cheap and sell high - which in turn
reduces the price differential. But for an illegal narcotics market,
price discrimination could be created through redesigning law
enforcement.
The government can manufacture price discrimination by creat-
ing a strategy that makes it very costly for dealers to sell to new
customers. Recall that new customers who approach a dealer are
met with a great deal of scrutiny, as the dealer tries to determine
whether the customer is an informant or a police officer.172 One
way to raise dealers' information costs is to have undercover police
pose as new users. By increasing the likelihood that a street sale to
an unknown customer will lead to jail time, dealers may be forced
to concentrate on known customers.17 3 Street sales to unknown
customers will be at higher prices to compensate for the increased
risk borne by dealers.174
Similarly, there are ways to raise the search costs for buyers.
First, undercover police could pose as dealers and arrest people at-
tempting to buy drugs from them. If the scheme deploys these
"dealers" in areas known for drug dealing, it will increase the
search costs a new consumer would incur. A well-designed strategy
could easily avoid entrapment challenges - for example, ensure
that would-be buyers initiate the transactions. Moreover, because
new users risk the possibility that their purchase will be low-quality
or even fake heroin, impugning the reputation of a particular area
as a market for good heroin may be an effective strategy to increase
search costs. Second, the police could target open-air drug markets
171. See NicHo.soN, supra note 1, at 339.
172. See Mark H. Moore, Policies to Achieve Discrimination on the Effective Price of Her-
oin, AM. ECON. REv., May 1973, at 270.
173. This also suggests that using addicts as informants may be counterproductive be-
cause it may undermine the price discrimination regime.
174. Heavy heroin users account for the bulk of money spent on heroin. See O-McE OF
NATL. DRUG CONTROL POLY., WHAT AMERICA'S USERS SPEND ON ILLEGAL DRUGS, 1988-
1993, at 15 n.21 (1995) (finding that 87% of heroin expenditures are made by heavy users).
This provides some incentive to dealers to concentrate on heavy users. When law enforce-
ment targets sales to new users, dealers deciding whether to expose new users may confront
collective action problems - turning a new user on is a large risk to the particular dealer,




to drive crime indoors. Again, this will raise search costs because it
will be more difficult for new buyers to locate dealers. 175
A third strategy may be to create an inverse scale of penalties so
that a first offense carries a greater penalty than does a second or
third. This would help create price discrimination by making the
monetary price a neophyte pays reflect a premium for security that
the dealer is not a cop. It would also reduce complementary effects
by preventing people from turning into new users and going down a
path that may lead to additional crime. This "three strikes you're
safe" rule inverts standard thinking about criminal penalties - a
first offense is, in every area of the law, the offense with the lowest
penalty. It is, yet again, a new way of thinking about criminal pen-
alties that flows from the application of substitution economics to
criminal law.176
These policies would concentrate law enforcement efforts on de-
terring people from becoming users. In so doing, the price for neo-
phytes would rise, but the price for known customers would drop.
A strategy that created dual pricing for heroin may be a powerful
way to address the Giffen goods problem. If the price for addicts
and repeat users were low, the factors that drive people to increase
their consumption of the drug may evaporate. A low price for ad-
dicts could also reduce the other harmful effects of high drug prices,
such as the increase in crime rates. Because the elasticity of de-
mand for new users is relatively high - because they are not yet
addicted - a price increase for new users may reduce heroin
consumption.177
Finally, note that there is one other potential solution to the
Giffen goods problem that does not rely on price discrimination.
We have already seen how the law's substitution-creating ability
might be able to reduce substitution effects.178 If the law created
viable substitutes for those who are addicted - for example, meth-
adone treatment - this could prevent the Giffen goods problem as
well. Because of the availability of a substitute, the income effect
175. See Moore, supra note 172, at 271-73.
176. As I shall suggest later, however, when sociological insights are superimposed onto
this economic analysis, it is not so clear that "three strikes you're safe" makes sense. See
infra section III.B.3 (arguing that stigmatization from penalization may increase crime).
Moreover, "three strikes you're safe" might encourage those who do engage in some criminal
activity to engage in a lot to reach "safety."
177. Some price discrimination probably already exists because of the monopolization
effect identified earlier. See supra text accompanying note 97 (explaining true profit incen-
tive). My point is only that price discrimination can be increased even further through ma-
nipulation of existing legal machinery.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 153-54.
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from a price rise in heroin would be tempered, and the increase in
consumption would not occur.
I am not advocating price discrimination in the heroin markets;
we do not yet know whether heroin is a Giffen good. As I have
suggested, this is a plausible hypothesis. But policymakers and
scholars, too steeped in the assumption that a higher penalty
reduces all evil in the world, have not yet asked the question. The
reconceptualization of criminal deterrence I advocate allows policy-
makers to focus on these questions by pointing out that substitution
is a consequence of higher penalties, and that higher penalties could
have pernicious income effects. 179
III. SHAPING SUBsTrrTION
Thus far, my analysis has assumed that preferences are fixed -
that is, that one's taste for a particular activity is not influenced by
its cost. This assumption corresponds to a cornerstone concept in
traditional economics, that preferences are given and that opportu-
nity is constrained by cost. This has yielded a tidy understanding of
deterrence - increasing the cost of an activity will prompt less peo-
ple to do it and more people to do something else. But this model
seems beset with problems. First, isn't the degree of substitution
much narrower? Why will someone who has learned how to break
safes switch to arson? Second, aren't social norms much more im-
portant than criminal law in reducing crime? Third, substitution
theory itself specifies no mechanism by which people choose be-
tween options, except by what is "rational" - a theory that is at
odds with much of what we know about human behavior. So how
do people really select crimes? Fourth, where does the impulse to
commit crime originate, at least for those crimes that are not obvi-
ously rational?
Each of the above problems suggests that substitution must in-
corporate knowledge about preferences. Instead of taking them as
given, a theory of how preferences adapt to the legal topography
may yield a fuller account of the likely reaction to particular penal-
ties. This approach, marvelously put forth by Jon Elster, stresses
the adjustment of wants to possibilities.180 In Elster's view, what
179. Substitution may show that drug penalties have other perverse effects. In addition
to the standard libertarian line that criminalization leads to underground markets and vio-
lence, one could plausibly argue that prohibition has driven a shift to newer, more dangerous
drugs. Indeed, one may speculate as to whether the rise of crack in the first place may have
been caused by efforts to clamp down on cocaine.




people want may be a product of what they can get. The fox does
not want sour grapes because it cannot get them.181 This idea is
central to the work of Cass Sunstein and those who read him. 82 In
the sections that follow, I go beyond this familiar legal exegesis to
explain how preferences adapt to criminal punishment. My descrip-
tion of the taste-shaping mechanism of punishment will take read-
ers through sociological theories of control as well as psychological
analyses of preferences to analyze the societal reaction to a set of
penalties. The upshot is that the simple and elegant economic
model of deterrence needs reexamination.
A. The Preference-Shaping View of Criminal Law
Consider a limitation of the model in Part I, namely, that many
crimes do not seem to have substitutes. Will an arsonist really be-
come a white-collar criminal simply because of an increase in the
penalty for arson? Sometimes criminal activity has sunk costs -
the equivalent of learning a new profession - and criminals may
not be able to transfer their skills to other areas. By pointing out
that the incentive to substitute different crimes to compensate for a
penalty increase will not always be strong, the terms of the objec-
tion beg a more fundamental question. After all, is the premise that
we have been laboring under, that criminal law focuses on reducing
incentives to commit crime, really a precise statement of what crimi-
nal law is? If so, why is it any different than tort law? Why are
governments everywhere failing to follow Becker's classic solution
to crime - take away all the wealth of those who commit crime but
do not imprison them? 8 3
The answer to such questions lies in the nature of criminal law.
Classical economics understands punishment as designed to con-
strain the opportunity for crime.'84 But some laws serve a more
complicated function in that they act as exemplars of good behav-
ior. They seek, in effect, to influence tastes or preferences s5 rather
than to constrain opportunity. Outside criminal law, for example,
181. See iL at 109.
182. Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Cm. L. REV.
1129, 1147 (1986).
183. Becker, supra note 2, at 193-98. In the recent OJ. Simpson trials, however, two
California juries adopted Becker's solution de facto. The extent to which civil sanctions may
deter murder and other crimes is a fascinating question that I leave for another day.
184. Cf. T.A. Marschak, On the Study of Taste Changing Policies, AM. ECON. REV., May
1977, at 386 (describing classical economics' hostility to theories based on endogenous
preferences).
185. I use "taste" and "preference" interchangeably in this article.
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the minimum wage, an opportunity-shaping law, may induce em-
ployers to extract additional concessions from employees while sex-
ual harassment laws, which are taste-shaping, may not.186
Criminal law may be said to set itself apart from many other
areas of the law because it concentrates less on constraining oppor-
tunities and more on shaping tastes. As Professor Dau-Schmidt has
argued so well, the criminal law seeks to reduce crime by minimiz-
ing the taste for it through imprisonment rather than fines.187
Criminal law, unlike torts, aims not to price conduct, but to change
people's preferences by requiring imprisonment and accompanying
social ostracism, regardless of the willingness of an individual to pay
a fine. 88 No matter what amount of money a person will spend, the
law says, the individual cannot commit the act. Criminal law is a
powerful illustration of Bob Cover's depiction of the state as an
entity that uses its coercive power to suppress alternative concep-
tions of law and rules of behavior. 8 9
Both tort and criminal law impact upon people's preferences,
but only the strong-arm of the criminal law focuses on intent, which
can be understood as a proxy for taste. Two people who commit
the same act, killing someone, are treated in different ways under
the law because of their internal preference for the act. Criminal
law, then, can shape taste by punishing undesirable preferences, not
simply undesirable acts. The intent requirement ensures that the
commission of an act alone is not enough to impose criminal pun-
ishment.190 As the next section will argue, criminal law not only
shapes the taste of those it punishes, its mechanisms of punishment
aim to shape societal tastes through stigma, lore, and a host of other
methods. My work therefore takes Dau-Schmidt's suggestion fur-
ther in two important respects. First, it attempts to provide an ac-
count of the devices criminal law uses to shape preferences, not
only for those who are punished, but for society at large. Second,
186. See Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1137. Sunstein also stresses the "endowment effect"
- the tendency for people to value the things they own more than they do when the same
things are owned by others. See id. at 1150. As he recognizes, however, this is really a "gen-
eralization" of the adaptive preference phenomenon. See id. at 1151.
187. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 140. See generally Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1146
("It is hard to imagine a preference not shaped in part by legal arrangements.").
188. One can now begin to understand why Becker's proposal to replace imprisonment
with fines to the extent possible seemed so implausible when it was stated. Becker assumed
that the point of criminal law was to reduce opportunity, not to shift preference. 'Then, how-
ever, criminal law looks no different than tort law. Becker's assumption that preferences are
static harmonized with modem economics, but not with criminal law.
189. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narra-
tive, 97 HARv. L. RFv. 4, 14-17, 46-47, 53-54 (1983).
190. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 140, at 25-27.
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my argument will center on the reverse of the Dau-Schmidt hypoth-
esis by showing how penalties shape tastes towards crime under cer-
tain conditions.
Taste shaping explains why potential substitutes for a particular
crime may radiate well beyond crimes with similar characteristics to
the original one. A penalty structure has importance not only for
current criminals, but for future ones. By shaping preferences, a
penalty structure therefore may encourage people to choose certain
lines of "work" - much the way that opportunities for profit guide
many college students and channel them into certain jobs. A dras-
tic change in the profitability of a career, say law, may not induce
those who are already lawyers to switch to another career, but it
may prevent many students from becoming lawyers in future years
- not only because of profit, but because people internalize the
belief that they do not "want" to become lawyers. In a similar way,
the point about substitution must be taken not only in terms of
what current criminals will do, but what future criminals will do.
Substitution theory expands on this insight by demonstrating that
the law may shape tastes in perverse ways. If the penalty for con-
sumption of one drug induces people to use other drugs, for exam-
ple, these penalties are altering those people's desires.191
Substitution theory also explains why the law cannot easily
move back to its starting point once punishment has shaped tastes.
Once people are addicted to heroin, for example, it may be difficult
to undo the damage that the criminal law has wrought. Or, to move
this discussion out of the drug context to demonstrate the broader
applicability of substitution, envision the cost when the law calls
someone a felon. This action reduces the cost of future criminal
activity to that person - it costs much less to be called a felon
again once you have already been called one - an instance of com-
plementarity at work. 192 And, even more problematical, it may cre-
191. For example, to the extent that the price-substitution effect induces marginal users
to shift to heroin, the taste for heroin is increased - the user is addicted.
192. Complementarity also exists, however, in letting crime go unpunished. Those who
get away with a crime may be more likely to commit that crime, or others, again. Consider,
in this regard, the words of Marion Le Goff, a famous bandit leader in Brittany in the mid-
eighteenth century, who, the perhaps apocryphal story goes, cried out from the scaffold:
Fathers and mothers who hear me now, watch over your children and teach them well; in
my childhood I was a liar and good-for-nothing; I began by stealing a small six-lard
knife... [.] Then I robbed pedlars and cattle dealers; finally, I led a robber band and that
is why I am here. Tell all this to your children and let it be an example to them.
FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 66.
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ate a taste for the criminal behavior as preferences adapt to the
social milieu of an underworld where lawbreaking is common.193
Punishment, therefore, can breed crime by increasing the taste
for it and by reducing the "price" of future criminal activity.194 The
former effect is particularly pronounced when the law punishes be-
havior that is commonplace in particular communities. When the
law is out of step with the norms in a given community, and it labels
"ordinary" citizens lawbreakers, the ability of the law to shape the
behavior of that community is compromised. The individual law-
breaker - whose reputation may even have been enhanced by the
skirmish with the police - is not as likely to heed a law-following
message as a resident of a community where the law tracks its
norms.
The natural demographic areas to apply such thoughts are areas
of inner cities where drug laws appear to have created a world of
lawbreakers with little respect for the legal system.195 Such laws
may induce complementary relationships and increase crime.196
This idea may yield important results in other areas as well. It may
show, for example, that the "gateway studies" - studies that show
that marijuana and alcohol use lead to the use of hard drugs - are
useless because they get the question backwards. It may be that the
legal system, by branding kids who take the relatively common
steps of drinking and smoking pot with the criminal label, shapes
preferences by reducing the cost of being called a criminal a second
time.197
193. See infra section III.B.3. This idea suggests one perverse consequence of workplace
drug testing. While such testing may provide some deterrent effect, for those who fail the
tests the result may be to increase drug use. By stigmatizing (firing) those people who fail,
the system may encourage them to increase their drug use. Drug use has a lower cost for the
unemployed - both because use does not interfere with the user's job and because employ-
ment may "incapacitate" a worker from criminal activity because of the time the actor spends
at work. On the latter claim, see Panther, supra note 32, at 372.
194. One could adjust punishment to compensate for this complementarity. For example,
the law could subject repeat offenders to higher lockstep penalties and could conduct in-
creased police surveillance of released felons. This strategy of deterring crime through high
penalties for recidivists has been validated by some empirical evidence. See Maurice Cusson
& Pierre Pinsonneault, The Decision to Give Up Crime, in THm REASONING CRIMINAL 72,77
(Derek B. Cornish & Ronald V. Clarke eds., 1986) ("We know that the more active a defend-
ant's criminal file, the greater the risk of a long sentence. Criminals know this as well. The
majority of our subjects told us that the fear of incurring a long prison term the next time had
an influence on their decision to stop.").
195. Even if people have little respect for the legal system, this does not mean that the
law does not deter, because penalties still exert an opportunity-shaping presence. But the
more significant power of the law to shape tastes is weakened in such instances.
196. See generally W.A. Govw, TiE LABELLING OF DEVIANCE (1975); EARL RUBINGTON
& MARTIN S. WENERo, DEVIANcE (1981).
197. See RIcHARD R. CLAYTON & HARWiN L. VOSS, YOUNG MEN AND DRUGS IN MAN-
HATrAN: A CAUSAL ANALYSIS 62-64, 99-113, 138, 161 (National Institute on Drug Abuse
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What follows from this discussion of preferences, apart from
broadening the reach of substitution, is an interesting result about
education. Both punishment and education create substitution ef-
fects. If teens are educated about the dangers of crack all the time,
for example, they may read this as an indication that heroin is less
harmful than they previously thought. Crack is stigmatized, and
people will try something that is not stained by the stigma. Or, to
take another example that invites exploration, the intense educa-
tional campaign against teenage drunk driving may have led teens
to substitute driving while under the influence of marijuana. Sub-
stitution theory, as modified by taste shaping, does not yield conclu-
sions only about punishment.198
Finally, taste-shaping helps clarify the complicated relationship
between a penalty and attitudes towards loss and provides another
answer to Becker's claim that sentences should be increased and
the probability of detection should be lowered. 199 The criminal law
sends a message that those activities with a high expected penalty
may have a high loss. For these individuals, taste-shaping provides
deterrence above and beyond the legal price imposed by a penalty.
The government is saying, for example, that consuming this drug
imposes huge losses on your health. Even if circumstances thus
present themselves that eliminate the expected sanction, such as be-
ing in the company of a very close friend, many people will not use
the drug because of possible health effects.
Again, though, penalties have paradoxical effects at times be-
cause a strong punishment could suggest low loss levels. "The only
reason the government is regulating this stuff is because it is not
harmful, because were it harmful, people wouldn't be doing it." In-
deed, one result of high sentences is that some individuals may be-
gin to associate the "price" of an activity, such as taking a drug,
with only its legal cost. When the opportunity presents itself and a
Research Monograph No. 39, 1981) (providing data suggesting that, while marijuana is a
gateway drug, the complementarity may arise from its illegality, which pushes users into deal-
ing drugs and in turn leads to consumption of other drugs).
If certain activities cause complementarity, the law could take advantage of this escalator
effect to increase the penalty for undertaking such activities. For example, if the use of mari-juana in an unregulated market often leads to consumption of harder and more dangerous
drugs, the government may want to increase the penalty for marijuana to deter people from
using marijuana in the first place - not because of the harm marijuana use, by itself, causes,
but because of the potential for marijuana use to lead to consumption of more harmful drugs.
198. A somewhat similar story might be told under the opportunity-shaping view. One
could say that educational campaigns simply increase awareness of the costs of an activity,
and that the opportunity-shaping conception is thus viable because this education reduces the
transaction costs to obtaining information about penalties.
199. On attitudes toward loss, see supra text accompanying note 75.
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tempted person is unlikely to be caught consuming, a person may
use the drug because the cost appears low. In other words, one
casualty of using a high-sanction strategy may be a decrease in per-
ceived loss - at least for those users whose preferences are not
shaped by a penalty. When the opportunity to "get away" with an
act presents itself, the harm of the act may not appear to be as dan-
gerous as it once was. The crime is essentially "on sale," and we all
know - too well - that discounts are powerful inducements to
act.200 The deterrent effect from penalization varies, then, by peo-
ple's internalization of a penalty's taste-shaping component.
We have now seen that substitution is not simply about reducing
the opportunity to commit harmful acts, but also about shaping
tastes to reward less harmful activity. This theory predicts that the
law will encourage people to refrain from crime even when there is
no chance that they will get caught or suffer any adverse conse-
quences. But legal cost is not everything in determining behavior.
Internal preferences matter too, in a number of ways.
B. Sociological Norms and the Coercion of Preferences
1. Know Your Law
Perhaps the above discussion smacks of law-fetishism. Prefer-
ences are not, after all, simply a product of the legal system. Crimi-
nal law must therefore try to understand the interrelationship
between preferences, norms, behavior, and the law. Implicit in the
discussion up to this point was the assumption that people actually
know the cost of an activity despite the costs of obtaining such in-
formation.201 The substitution skeptic is rightfully concerned -
how can policymakers expect would-be lawbreakers to know such
details? This is a recurring theme in any legal-economic analysis,202
and an answer here is no more difficult than it is anywhere else in
law. Yet a full answer to this critique deserves a separate article,
and so it is best here to only give readers a taste of my response.
Before introducing the response, however, we must first situate
the criticism in light of deterrence generally. If people do not know
200. This conclusion follows from work in cognitive psychology, which I discuss infra text
accompanying notes 260-72.
201. See, e.g., Assembly Comm. on Criminal Procedure (Cal.), Public Knowledge of
Criminal Penalties, in PERCEPTION IN CRIMINOLOGY, 74, 78 (Richard L. Henshel & Robert
A. Silverman eds., 1975) ("[P]enalties cannot act as deterrents since these are unknown until
after a person has committed a crime or become a prisoner.").
202. For one example, a powerful and rich analysis of the issue in tort law, see Alan




the law and do not understand the penalties, then it is tough to see
how increasing the penalties will ever make a difference. Perhaps
the substitution skeptic can respond by modifying her position to
argue that people know the law in general, but that they do not
compare differences in penalties. The skeptic's gambit seems tenu-
ous here. We all know that some crimes are punished more than
others - littering versus robbery, for example. And it may be ex-
actly the reverse, that people may not know precise penalties, but
know that one activity carries a relatively higher penalty than an-
other.203 The skeptic's better argument, therefore, is that for one-
shot crimes, where only a low chance exists that the perpetrator will
repeat the activity, substitution may not occur. Because she does
not plan on committing the crime again, the perpetrator has little
incentive to "invest" in gathering information about penalty
differences.
Yet the substitution skeptic is asking the wrong question by as-
suming that an actor's knowledge of the law is determinative. My
contention in this section is that high criminal penalties may deter
crimes even when people do not know what those penalties are.
Traditional economists, too focused on the price of criminal con-
duct, have not understood that preferences may be shaped even
when the price is unknown to actors. People who have never eaten
caviar, for example, do not need to know its cost for their prefer-
ences to be affected by the price. This would be particularly so if
the high price of caviar put a stigma on caviar-eaters - that they
were greedy and selfish, for example. In such circumstances, even if
the monetary price of the good is unknown, the social price (which
is in part a function of the monetary one) will deter consumption.
My idea is an extension of the pathbreaking work of Johannes
Andenaes, who argued that criminal law deters crime through its
educative impact.204 He believed that penalties send out
"messages" to members of society and that these messages exert a
moral influence to inculcate social norms. This theory of messages
thus gives meaning to James Fitzjames Stephen's statement that
[s]ome men, probably, abstain from murder because they fear that, if
they committed murder, they would be hung. Hundreds of thousands
abstain from it because they regard it with horror. One great reason
why they regard murder with horror is, that murderers are hung with
the hearty approbation of all reasonable men.20 5
203. See supra text accompanying notes 138-39.
204. JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974).




Stephen wisely realized that a penalty can have an unconscious de-
terrent effect - through a subtle changing of people's mores.
Stephen's words, therefore, mark him for more than the general
deterrence theory for which he is cited today. Stephen believed
that a penalty can affect the behavior of more than the individual
punished - the general deterrence point. But he also argued that
the criminal law has an educational effect and that this effect may
dwarf general deterrence. 206 Note also Stephen's important as-
sumption about taste-shaping, that murder is "regard[ed] with hor-
ror" because of the penalty structure. 207
It is now not difficult to understand how penalties may deter
behavior even when such punishments are unknown to would-be
lawbreakers. The educational impact of the criminal law is not a
narrow Skinnerian stimulus and response, but rather one that works
through a complex process of social interaction. A small group of
people may look at the sentencing structure and be influenced by
its relative treatment of crimes. As time passes, the information
this group possesses will trickle down, but now in a way no longer
tied to sentencing. Instead, it may simply be said that activity X is
worse than activity Y.
This trickle-down theory leads me to posit the existence of in-
formation vanguards - people who "get the message" first and
then transmit it to others. These information vanguards take in in-
formation, digest it, and pass it along to the rest of the world. They
may relay the message as they first heard it - committing murder
has a 20 year jail sentence - or they may pass it along in a
processed form as lore - committing murder is simply bad.208 It
does not matter for deterrence purposes which one of these actually
happens. My word choices may be shaped by the influence of to-
day's great writers, but I do not have to be aware of the writers to
be influenced by them. Consumers do not need to know that an
206. And for this reason, Stephen claimed that "the sentence of the law is to the moral
sentiment of the public in relation to any offence what a seal is to hot wax." 2 JAMES
FrrZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883).
207. See Dau-Schmidt, supra note 140, at 18 n.88. As Paul Robinson and John Darley
have recently put Stephen's point: "Most people obey the law not because they fear punish-
ment but because they see themselves as persons who want to do the right thing." PAUL H.
ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JUSTICE, LABiL=rY, & BLAME 201 (1995).
208. Some of the vanguard will be composed of people who have already been arrested
and subjected to the penalty. Such people, and their loved ones, may communicate the pen-
alty schemes directly to others or may pass their knowledge on as lore. Others who may




activity is illegal to refrain from doing it. They need only know that
it is "bad" or "dangerous. '209
To put the idea slightly differently, this lore - arising in the
shadow of the law - influences behavior regardless of whether its
origin is known. The cross-pollination of norms explains why lore
need not be heard by everyone for it to affect everyone.210 This
may explain why death penalty studies can never adequately mea-
sure the deterrent effect - lore created in states that have the
death penalty may even influence people in states without it.
The generalized educational effect, when combined with substi-
tution, yields a powerful explanation of deterrence. In particular,
we can now understand how relative differences in punishment can
unconsciously influence criminal behavior through the vehicle of
lore. No one, not even Andenaes, has yet examined whether pen-
alty schemes can invert the educational mission by overdeterring
some crimes and underdeterring others. Economists have shied
away from such thoughts because of a belief that sociology and dis-
cussion of lore and norms is "too fuzzy.' ' 21' Sociologists, for their
part, have not incorporated the rich insights of substitution and eco-
nomics into their approaches.
A theory of lore and norms will also illustrate other defects in
the opportunity-shaping view of behavior. Ever since Becker, a
standard law and economics assumption has been that reducing en-
forcement costs and increasing penalties creates optimal deter-
rence. But this approach ignores the way in which people react to
high penalties. Such penalties create what may be termed an in-
verse sentencing effect. High penalties, instead of increasing convic-
tion rates, may decrease them. As penalties increase, people may
209. The question remains whether the relative differences in penalties can be transmit-
ted through the vehicle of lore. The substitution skeptic can concede that penalties can have
an educational effect that deters crime in general but can quibble with the claim that actors
distinguish between crimes on the basis of an indirect educational effect. But we can dismiss
this argument for the same reasons we rejected the skeptic's gambit earlier. One may know
that dealing marijuana and crack may both be "bad" - and still have a clear idea that one is
"worse" than the other - even without direct knowledge of the penalty scheme for each.
See supra text accompanying note 203.
210. One interesting avenue for exploration is whether the information vanguard for var-
ious crimes is composed of the optimal characters. If drug dealers compose the brunt of the
information vanguard, the message that they transmit could be something like: "Heroin isn't
as bad as crack." If, instead, community leaders play this role, the message could be: "Her-
oin and crack are both equally evil - it's just harder to catch crack dealers - and you should
not use either poison." This suggests that the goals of criminal law may be enhanced if social
leaders explained the rationale behind policy decisions and attempted to counteract the
"spin" that savvy and unsavory individuals put on criminal sanctions.
211. See Opp, supra note 32, at 426.
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not be as willing to enforce them because of the disproportionate
impact on those caught.
Several different mechanisms are responsible for the inverse
sentencing effect. When the penalties are high, for example, the
public may not be willing to turn lawbreakers in, police and prose-
cutors may not want to prosecute, and jurors may not vote to con-
vict.212 Beutel observed this phenomenon in his study of bad check
laws.213 He found that Nebraska's severe punishment for bad
checks hampered enforcement and conviction. In Colorado, by
contrast, he found that fewer bad checks were written because the
punishment was weaker but enforcement was more consistent.214
Across the Atlantic, when England tried to increase the penalty
on prostitutes for solicitation in the 1959 Street Offenses Act,
"many police forces adopted a practice of cautioning women for
soliciting on the first and even the second occasion; and... a prosti-
tute could usually escape prosecution by moving to another police
district when she knew she could not expect another caution. ' 215 In
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, even though the number
and severity of English penal laws had increased, English jurors re-
garded the penalties as excessive and were lenient in applying
them.216
Andenaes noted this phenomenon in his discussion of strong
sentences,217 but he did not explain how this observation could be
212. For an analysis of a somewhat similar issue, jury nullification, in the context of race,
see Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal Justice
System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
213. See FREDERICK K. BEUTEL, SOME POTENTIALITIES OF EXPERIMENTAL
JURISPRUDENCE AS A NEW BRANCH OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 366 (1957). Recent studies show,
moreover, that one effect of three-strikes laws is that prosecutors tend not to use them. See
Henry J. Reske, Hardly Hardball: Prosecutors in Most of 22 States Studied Are Not Using
Three-Strikes Laws Against Repeat Offenders, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1996, at 26. Other evidence
shows that those who are charged under three-strikes laws refuse to plea bargain and clog the
courts, which in turn prevents the administration of swift sentencing. See Cyndee Fontana,
'Three Strikes' Law is Bearing Down on Fresno Courts, FRESNO BEE, Jan. 21, 1996, at Al.
214. See BEUTEL, supra note 209, at 366-67. The inverse sentencing effect could also vary
by community. Some communities may be more receptive to the norms a criminal penalty
engenders than others. It may also vary by the particular targets of the crime. For example,
in eighteenth-century Europe, peasants who fled from their masters received much sympa-
thy, while a man who "committed crimes at the expense of this population, the vagrant beg-
gar.., who robbed and murdered, easily became the object of a special hate." FOUCAULT,
supra note 4, at 83.
215. NIOEL WALKER, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN BRITAIN 241 n.3 (2d rev. ed. 1968).
216. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 14. Within the economic tradition, James Q. Wilson
has pointed out that high sentences also mean that defendants are unlikely to plead guilty,
which may reduce the speed with which sentences are imposed, itself an important factor in
enhancing deterrence. See WILSON, supra note 14, at 134-35.
217. ANDENAES, supra note 204, at 61-62.
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consistent with his overarching theory of criminal law. If the crimi-
nal law sends out messages that shape the moral behavior of soci-
ety, then how can it be that high penalties can lead to a lower
expected punishment? Shouldn't those high penalties shape behav-
ior and prevent inverse sentencing? Andenaes's failure to answer
these questions threaten his whole theory, for it suggests that mo-
rality may be exogenous to law.
But there are ways to rehabilitate the theory. My answer em-
phasizes the lag of lore - the tendency for old messages from crim-
inal law to stay entrenched when new messages take their place.218
The lag of lore predicts that the effect will be most pronounced
when an old message is entrenched into public consciousness. But
for crimes where the old message is weak - for example, anti-
sodomy laws - or perhaps nonexistent - such as the widespread
ignorance of crack in 1986 - the lag is weaker.219 This lag explains
why the current penalties for crack may not have had an inverse
sentencing effect and why an increase in the penalty at this time
may.
If crack penalties were increased further today - say, dealing a
one-gram amount means life imprisonment - an inverse sentenc-
ing effect is possible. This is because the message created by the
1986 laws has become entrenched, and the immorality of using
crack, in large part, has been determined. An increase in the pun-
ishment now may therefore create a much greater inverse sentenc-
ing effect than would the same increase had it been implemented in
1986. Indeed, the lag of lore may yield a powerful explanation of
why Prohibition was a failure - Americans had a preexisting
message that alcohol use was tolerable.220 Scholars such as Byse
may, then, be wrong to say that the Prohibition experience is evi-
dence that "goodness cannot be legislated into men. '22 1 Had
218. The concept is similar to the inherent obstacles caused by taste-shaping when the
law attempts to return to a starting point. See supra text accompanying note 188.
219. One could even take this point to suggest that an increase in legal penalties may
reduce aggregate deterrence. As the OJ. Simpson trial suggests, even unsuccessful criminal
enforcement can deter crime through the creation of stigma. In other words, detection re-
suits in costs exogenous to the legal system - such as social stigma - that the level of
penalty does not always influence. Such areas tend to be ones where lore has developed and
is entrenched. In these cases, the probability of detection may be more important than the
length of sentence, and reducing the probability of detection to compensate for an increase in
the sentence may be counterproductive.
220. The inverse sentencing effect is thus related to anomie theory. By providing a mech-
anism for understanding how norms develop when penalties do not deter actors, it explains
why social norms may not fully correlate with penalties. See infra text accompanying notes
224-28.




America waited out the lag period, Prohibition may even have
turned into a success.
The influence of lore means that policymakers should be partic-
ularly attuned to first determinations of penalties because lag may
constrain the potential to correct penalties later. This theory pro-
vides an explanation of why the 1986 crack law probably has not led
to an inverse sentencing effect - the absence of a preexisting
message.222 All of this suggests that the law should invest more in
determining optimal penalties at the outset, rather than trying to
adjust them later. It also predicts the effectiveness of campaigns
that work to influence the preferences of young children before
they develop strong tastes of their own - such as President Clin-
ton's antismoking policies - and the weakness of ex post penaliza-
tion schemes.
The divide between sociology and economics creates other casu-
alties as well. We have already seen that when the cost of a particu-
lar crime is lessened, more people may undertake that crime. Yet
the economist's definition of "cost" - focusing on the expected
legal sanction - is too law-centric. Instead, one must also factor in
the social "cost" of crime - the ostracism a community levies upon
a lawbreaker.3 This is, of course, related to a sociological perspec-
tive on crime, anomie theory.224 Anomie theory posits that crime
will occur more frequently when members of a group desire a cer-
tain goal and it is difficult to use lawful means to obtain the goal.225
222. Of course, first determinations may matter more for other reasons, too, such as the
fact that criminals incur sunk costs so that, as time passes, the law's ability to encourage
substitution to less harmful activities will be weaker.
223. Community ostracism may not be as much of a deterrent as the disapproval of those
close to the person contemplating crime. As Marcus Felson has put it, most actors tend to
have a relationship with another individual, the "intimate handler," and the disapproval of
this handler strongly influences the actor's legal and illegal activity. Marcus Felson, Linking
Criminal Choices, Routine Activities, Informal Control, and Criminal Outcomes, in THE REA-
SONING CRIMINAL, supra note 194, at 119, 121-23.
224. See ROBERT MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRucruRE 185-248 (rev. ed.
1968).
225. I note that this is only one understanding of anomie, and it represents a peculiarly
American interpretation of the theory. For a comparison of this interpretation with others,
see MARCO ORuu, ANOMm: HISTORY AND MEANis 2, 123-24, 129-47 (1987). Durkheim
himself did not appear to consider the substitution point:
Thieves are as strongly disposed to theft as murderers to homicide. The resistance
shown by the former category is in no way weaker than that of the latter. Thus, to
overcome it, we should have recourse to the same means .... The punishment should
vary only according to whether the subject is more or less hardened a criminal, and not
according to the nature of the criminal act. An incorrigible thief should be treated like
an incorrigible murderer.
EMILE DuRKHEIM, DE LA DIVSION DU TRAVAIL SOCIAL 52-64 (10th ed. 1978), excerpted




Legal means may be difficult because social norms do not reward
such activity - and may actively discourage it - or because such
means are not available to members of the group - for example, a
weak educational system makes it difficult for children in certain
communities to obtain their goal - money - through lawful
employment.
Thus, anomie theory may be stated, at least partially, in eco-
nomic terms: as the costs of achieving one's goal through lawful
activity grow - costs that may be social or systemic entry barriers
- unlawful activity to fulfill that goal is more likely to occur.226
But anomie theory also contains the further insight that social
norms are not static and that the gap between preexisting goals and
lawful means may influence them.227 If children growing up on the
South Side of Chicago do not believe that they will be able to earn
money lawfully, some may turn to illegal means, and this behavior
may further erode social taboos against such means. This nicely
tracks Elster's conception of adaptive preferences, which holds that
preferences will adapt to a situation where lawful employment does
not permit fulfillment of one's monetary goals, not by reducing the
taste for money, but by increasing the taste for crime. For these
segments of society, a subnorm towards crime develops. 228
In some respects, this insight may be seen as the converse of the
taste-shaping economic approach to criminal law. That economic
approach focuses on a penalty's ability to influence the tastes of
actors. Anomie concentrates on what happens when a penalty does
not deter unlawful behavior and the taste-shaping effect that occurs
when, and because, the penalty fails. Anomie thus shows how the
economic approach, even with its taste-shaping modifications, can-
not fully explain deterrence. Instead of only concentrating on those
criminals that a penalty deters, as the economic approach does, an-
226. This may provide one explanation for why people take drugs. As Cloward and
Ohlin have emphasized, the meanings and motives for drug use develop in the context of
group membership, and anomie theories that emphasize the adaption of goals to possibilities
must take such group goals into account. RicHARD A. CLOWARD & LLOYD E. OHtUN, Da-
LINQUENCY AND OPPORTUNITY: A THEORY OF DELINQUENT GANGS (1960); see also Trevor
Bennett, A Decision-Making Approach to Opioid Addiction, in THE REASONING CRIMINAL,
supra note 194, at 83, 89 ("There is almost complete agreement among studies that opioid use
is typically initiated in the company of friends.").
227. See ROBINsON & DARLEY, supra note 207, at 201 (providing empirical research
showing that "discrepancies between the criminal code and the community tend to undercut
the condemnation of conviction and thereby lessen the effectiveness of condemnation as a
deterrent threat"); Bruno S. Frey & Karl-Dieter Opp, Anomie, Nutzen und Kosten, 30 Soz.
ALE WELT 275 (1979) (distinguishing anomie theory from economic approaches to crime
because anomie posits a belief in preference changes).
228. See infra text accompanying note 256.
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omie inquires into the beliefs of those actors whom a penalty does
not deter and the ensuing impact on social norms.
2. The Coercion of Punishment
The preceding discussion has analyzed one way in which law
contributes to the formation of social norms - information van-
guards and lore. A separate point has to do with the role of punish-
ment in the formation of norms. As opposed to seeing the law's
influence on norms solely through the process of statutory enact-
ment, it is also important to view its impact through the social ma-
chinery of the act of punishment. Stephen's quote about hanging
murderers is illustrative of this concept - the imposition of punish-
ment itself influences norms.229 Michel Foucault has developed the
underlying theory at length, and I will compress his argument here.
Foucault contends that European political systems used torture to
brand a victim's body with infamy. The public nature of such tor-
ture, its "spectacle," further solidified the social meaning of the
punishment. The very excessiveness of the punishment was part of
its glory: justice went beyond the mere confines of the body so that
its victims cried out in pain for all to hear.230 The guilty man openly
bore his condemnation for society to see.
Foucault's work is centrally concerned with why the system of
torture developed, and he concludes that it arose to fill a gap be-
tween rarified legal discourse and the people. The tradition of pe-
nal truth inherited from the Middle Ages depended on complicated
distinctions between "full proof," "semi-proof," and a host of other
factors.231 Public punishments were designed to reconstitute the in-
jured sovereignty of the Crown and to restore that sovereignty by
making it spectacular:
Although redress of the private injury occasioned by the offence must
be proportionate, although the sentence must be equitable, the pun-
ishment is carried out in such a way as to give a spectacle not of mea-
sure, but of imbalance and excess; in this liturgy of punishment, there
must be an emphatic affirmation of power and of its intrinsic superi-
ority. And this superiority is not simply that of right, but that of the
physical strength of the sovereign beating down upon the body of his
adversary and mastering it .... 232
229. See supra text accompanying note 205.
230. See FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 36-39. For modem analogues, see generally ELAEn
ScARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN (1985).
231. See FOUCAuLT, supra note 4, at 36-39.
232. Id at 49.
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Punishment showed both the horror of the crime and the fact that
the sovereign had mastered it.
Criminals were marked through permanent scarring to make the
guilty person the herald of his own condemnation.233 At some
point, Foucault contends, the rampant abuse of power in state ex-
ecutions itself created crime. Excessive sentences and arbitrary en-
forcement led people at the end of the eighteenth century towards
violence: "[T]he terror of the public execution created centres of
illegality: on execution days, work stopped, the taverns were full,
the authorities were abused, insults or stones were thrown at the
executioner,.., fights broke out, and there was no better prey for
thieves than the curious throng around the scaffold. ' 234 People
were threatened by a legal system that imposed violence without
restraint or reason, and were led to violence themselves. This phe-
nomenon eventually led to the growth of the prison and a more
bureaucratized form of justice.
Foucault's ideas can be applied to the transmission of norms cre-
ated by modern penal systems as well. He recognizes, for instance,
that punishment is about power and that it is designed to instill a
version of "truth" in individuals.235 Criminal justice plays the role
of a "principle of transmission."'236 The ways in which it metes out
justice will influence the values and preferences of citizens. Though
not explicit, Foucault shows how the "sign" of punishment is used
across two different axes - by being extended across time (that is,
the brand on the body that bears the didactic mark long after the
punishment has lapsed) and across space (that is, the "spectacle" of
punishment serves to spread, through the empathy of viewers, the
pain of the body to other bodies).2 37
Punishment - not the law books - therefore becomes a mech-
anism to encourage a dialogue between citizens and the govern-
233. See id. at 43. This feature of deterrence could lead to variations in deterrence in
communities where the guilty herald their convictions without shame or even with pride. (In
this respect, the idea is very similar to anomie theory.) For one such example, see Kenji
Yoshino, Suspect Symbols: The Literacy Argument for Heightened Scrutiny for Gays, 96
COLUM. L. Rv. 1753, 1786-88 (1996) (describing how the pink triangle has been appropri-
ated as a badge of pride for gays).
234. FOUCAULT, supra note 4, at 63.
235. See id. at 55. He also recognizes that there is still a trace of torture in modem penal
systems because imprisonment operates on a physical level by shutting the body away in a
cell. See id. at 127-31.
236. Id. at 282.
237. Physical torture of course is not the only means of marking people out in this way.
The "Scarlet Letter" is a less physically invasive version of the impulse, which, unlike torture,
has broad literal and figurative appeal today (for example, Megan's Law).
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ment.Z3 8 The penalty reveals not only the power of the
government, but the laws' content as well. Each instance of punish-
ment is, in short, a kind of fable, designed not only to shape prefer-
ences of the individual who is punished, but also those of society at
large. Torture and segregation are forms of universally intelligible
speech, understood even by illiterates, and thus have great didactic
value. This is another, related way of understanding the govern-
ment's role in norm creation. What follows is that the act of pun-
ishment generally serves as a preference-shaper. If, however, the
law is out-of-step with community norms, its preference-shaping
ability will be circumscribed by such norms, as it was in late
eighteenth-century France3 9 or twentieth-century Nebraska.240 To
the extent individual communities can construct enduring narra-
tives that do violence to the state's chosen one, the law's general
preference-shaping power will suffer. 241
3. The Counterproductive Coercion of Stigma
The observation that marking the offender will inculcate social
norms is, however, incomplete. One must also consider the effect
of stigmatization strategies on the individual criminal. By segregat-
ing such actors from mainstream America, the criminal law could
reinforce a tendency towards criminal action. In economic terms,
when an individual cannot get hired for lawful work because she
was once an outlaw, the relative cost of illegal activity decreases.
238. This idea also suggests that the types of punishment may be important. See id at 45,
104-05. If one goal of punishment is to create an immediate link between the punishment
and the crime, then the punishment should replicate the crime. For example, eighteenth-
century torture was often imposed at the very site of the crime, and sometimes the torture
would theatrically reproduce the crime. Such measures were believed to enhance deterrence.
As Beccaria put it, "[t]he punishment should, as far as possible, fit the nature of the crime...
so that [fear of punishment] removes and redirects the mind to ends other than those which
the enticing idea of breaking the law would wish to point it." BECCARIA, supra note 4, at 49.
Marat put the point a similar way:
To derive the punishment from the offence is therefore the best means of proportioning
punishment to crime.
If this is the triumph of justice, it is also the triumph of liberty, for then penalties no
longer proceed from the will of the legislator, but from the nature of things; one no
longer sees man committing violence on man.
JEAN-PAUL MARAT, PLAN DE LolS.TAON CRIMINELLE 72-73 (Aubier Montaigne 1974)
(1790), cited in FOuCAuLT, supra note 4, at 105..
This view of deterrence often led to rather ingenious means of punishment. French legal
reformer Vermeil stated that abusers of public liberty should be deprived of their own lib-
erty, that speculation and usury should be punished by fines, theft by confiscation, murder by
death, fire-raising by the stake, poisoners by poison, and so on. See FouCAULT, supra note 4,
at 105.
239. See supra text accompanying note 234.
240. See supra text accompanying note 213.
241. See Cover, supra note 189, at 35-39, 47-50. See generally Butler, supra note 212.
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Moreover, from a psychological perspective, those branded outlaws
may begin to internalize such labels and fulfill the expectation that
they believe the criminal system and society have for them. Instead
of reducing crime, stigmatization strategies may increase the crimi-
nal activity of particular actors.
This analysis flows quite naturally from Erving Goffman's im-
portant work on stigma.2 42 Goffman explains that "normal" society
shuns stigmatized individuals - those that deviate from the norm.
Such individuals may choose either to correct the stigma (for exam-
ple, a physically deformed person who elects plastic surgery),
devote effort to overcome the stigma's effect and thus open doors
that appear closed (for example, work hard in school to compensate
for the deformity), or join with others who face the same stigma.243
Those who cannot remove the stigma, whose identities are
spoiled, will often arrange their lives to avoid contact with normal
- that is, unstigmatized - people.244 Even if the deformity can be
hidden, the risk of being exposed will often serve as an inducement
to avoid such contacts. As one unemployed man put it during the
Depression:
"When I go out, I cast down my eyes because I feel myself wholly
inferior. When I go along the street, it seems to me that I can't be
compared with an average citizen, that everybody is pointing at me
with his finger. I instinctively avoid meeting anyone. Former ac-
quaintances and friends of better times are no longer so cordial. ' 245
This comment is revealing, as it shows that isolation is a product of
the subjective internalization of stigma. The comment raises, more-
over, the possibility that normal people avoid those who are stigma-
tized. Such avoidance stems in part from the importance of the
"with" relationship in society - the social reality that when A is
"with" B, people learn about A's social identity from his presence
with B.246 "Normal" people do not want to be seen with the stig-
matized. Finally, even if a stigmatized person surmounts these hur-
dles, and normal people treat her with respect, she is left wondering
whether the normal people are faking it and whether they are de-
fining her only in terms of her stigma.247
242. ERVING GOFFMAN, STIGMA: NoTEs ON THE MANAGEMENT OF SPOILED IDENTITY(1963).
243. See i at 8-10, 23-25.
244. See id. at 12.
245. Bohan Zawadzki & Paul Lazarsfeld, The Psychological Consequences of Unemploy-
ment, 6 J. Soc. PSYcHOL. 224, 239 (1935).
246. See GoFF-MAN, supra note 242, at 47.
247. See id at 14.
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Both internal and external avoidance prompts those with stig-
mata to find sympathetic others. Those with the similar stigmata
can provide the individual with moral support and the comfort of
feeling at ease.24 Illiterates, for example, will behave remarkably
differently when surrounded by others like them:
The existence of a different value system among these persons is
evinced by the communality of behavior which occurs when illiterates
interact among themselves. Not only do they change from unexpres-
sive and confused individuals, as they frequently appear in larger soci-
ety, to expressive and understanding persons within their own group,
but moreover they express themselves in institutionalized terms.
Among themselves they have a universe of response. They form and
recognize symbols of prestige and disgrace; evaluate relevant situa-
tions in terms of their own norms and in their own idiom; and in their
interrelations with one another, the mask of accommodative adjust-
ment drops.249
Illiterates do not only band together with each other, they develop
a set of beliefs and "evaluate" "situations in terms of their own
norms. '250 Sometimes, when stigmata are invisible, some individu-
als will try to "pass" as unstigmatized people2 51 Yet members of a
group or those outside the group may threaten to expose a person's
stigma to the outside world.Z2 A modern-day example might be
"outing" in gay politics.
Goffman concentrates primarily on physical and social handi-
caps, but his conceptualization of stigma provides several useful in-
sights into criminal punishment. First, criminal punishment
imposes a stigma on individuals that is sometimes visible - recall
Foucault's similar description of marking victims. This stigma may
lead criminals to avoid contact with law-abiding people. Outside
contact becomes problematic because of the risk that normal peo-
ple will disapprove or define a criminal only in terms of his
stigma.25 3 Outsiders, for their part, will avoid criminals because of
the possibility that being seen with one will contaminate them both
248. See id. at 20.
249. Howard E. Freeman & Gene G. Kassenbaum, The Illiterate in American Society:
Some General Hypotheses, 34 Soc. FORCES 371, 374 (1956).
250. Id.
251. See GorFMAN, supra note 242, at 135.
252. See id. at 85-86.
253. Consider what one criminal said:
"And I always feel this with straight people - that whenever they're being nice to me,
pleasant to me, all the time really, underneath they're only assessing me as a criminal
and nothing else. It's too late for me to be any different now to what I am, but I still feel
this keenly, that that's their only approach, and they're quite incapable of accepting me
as anything else."
TONY PARKER & ROBERT ALLERTON, THm COURAOn OF His CoNVICTIONs 111 (1962).
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socially and legally. Stigma also becomes a way to justify one's ca-
reer choices, much the way those with scars and harelips may justify
their decisions.2 4 Thus, those who have already committed crime
may feel that other options are closed to them and continue their
criminal activity - sour grapes, again.25
Second, stigmatization from the law-abiding world will prompt
criminals to band together with others like them. The stigma im-
posed from outsiders is celebrated within this group, and their
norms differ from the world of the nonstigmatized. They develop
subnorms that may be antithetical to those of the law-abiding
world. This may become both an inducement to further crime, as
law breaking is seen as a socially positive act within the group, and
a disincentive to noncriminal alternatives. As one criminal de-
scribes it, "I can remember.., on more than one occasion.., going
into a public library near where I was living, and looking over my
shoulder a couple of times before I actually went in, just to make
sure no one who knew me was standing about and seeing me do
it.'256 We can now understand the explanatory power of adaptive
preference and anomie theories. The former theory explains how
the preferences of lawbreakers develop - as an adaptation to a
world where crime is a more realistic option than lawful employ-
ment. The latter explains how such attitudes become entrenched
within a social group and the formation of subnorms.
In this fashion, crime may spiral upward. The youth who is
caught for selling one vial of crack emerges from confinement as a
social pariah. He internalizes that belief and avoids contact with
the law-abiding world. His isolation from the lawful world leads
him to keep company with other pariahs. The subnorms of this
group reward the criminal activity that the law-abiding world pun-
ishes, and devalues the lawful alternatives that the law-abiding
world celebrates. The punishment, then, produces the crime it was
254. Dr. Baker and Dr. Smith explain:
For years the scar, harelip or misshapen nose has been looked on as a handicap, and its
importance in the social and emotional adjustment is unconsciously all embracing. It is
the "hook" on which the patient has hung all inadequacies, all dissatisfactions, all
procrastinations and all unpleasant duties of social life, and he has come to depend on it
not only as a reasonable escape from competition but as a protection from social
responsibility.
William Y. Baker & Lauren H. Smith, Facial Disfigurement and Personality, 112 JAMA 301,
303 (1939).
255. Some support exists for the claim that the stigma imposed by criminal sentences
precludes lawful employment. See HERBERT S. MILLER, THE CLOSED DOOR: T Es'mcr
OF A CRIMINAL RECORD ON EMPLOYMENT wITH STATE AND LOCAL PUBLIc AGENCIES
(Manpower Admin., U.S. Dept. of Labor Contract No. 81-09-70-02, 1972).
256. PARKER & ALLERTON, supra note 253, at 109 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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intended to prevent. What is more, it may even produce other
types of crime, substitutions of sorts, both because stigmatized indi-
viduals avoid the law-abiding world and because they may learn
new ways of earning money from members of the stigmatized
group.
Even the very names that criminals develop - aliases and nick-
names - expose the subnorm problem. 257 Criminals may use ali-
ases to avoid the effects of stigma - both legal and social - by
forming a new identity. But often the stigma catches up with and
exposes them. At this point, stigma has the counterproductive ef-
fects noted above. Similarly, they take nicknames known only to
the underworld in part to enhance their reputation for lawbreaking,
to revel in the stigma amongst sympathizers. So, the perhaps fleet-
ing taste that once led them to crime may soon land them in a social
milieu where crime is the norm, and preferences will again need to
adjust to fit this situation.
None of this undermines the earlier point about taste-shaping
and the importance of punishment in deterring crime. The point is
that the same mechanisms that deter one group - punishment,
stigma, lore, and so on - can work to increase crime in another
group. The degree to which one trend will outweigh the other is a
difficult statistical issue. But whatever the extent is, the penalty
scheme has distributional effects that lead some people to become
entrenched in crime, and others to be free of it. Particularly when
these effects replicate preexisting social inequalities, the criminal
law may impose drastic costs.
C. Preference and Reference
Microeconomics understands preexisting preferences to be ex-
ogenous. I have argued in this article that this view misstates the
impact that legal systems may have on preferences, and that an un-
derstanding of criminal law divorced from its taste-shaping impact
can be a poor one. As an alternative, I have suggested that the law
has a taste-shaping function and that tastes may be shaped by a
legal system that operates indirectly and unconsciously on consum-
ers. In this section I examine another way of examining preference
formation and substitution: psychology and cognitive bias.
Psychological preference formation theory stresses the way peo-
ple process information about alternatives. A choice among op-
tions creates conflict, particularly when one must consider several
257. Cf GoFFMAN, supra note 242, at 59.
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different and often competing attributes. Economists use the as-
sumption of value-maximization to analyze such choices. This eco-
nomic theory predicts that preference ordering between two
options should not change when additional alternatives are intro-
duced. One example of this assumption is the "regularity condi-
tion," which states that a nonpreferred option cannot become
preferred when other options are added. An increasing body of
psychological literature, however, demonstrates that these eco-
nomic assumptions do not accurately describe the reality of human
decisionmaking.258 Among other things, this research has shown
how the addition of technically irrelevant alternatives can influence
preference.
The simplest point is status quo bias. Eldar Shafir has demon-
strated that conflict between attributes leads people to seek new
options or to refrain from choice altogether.5 9 A person faced with
choosing between attractive X and the less-attractive status quo will
choose X. But if the choice is between the less-preferred status quo
and equally attractive X and Y, the person may defer the choice
and select the status quo. The fact that each alternative is better
than the status quo may not be enough to induce a person to pick
one of them because the choice between the two alternatives is
hard to justify.260
A more complicated point has to do with decisionmaking bias
created by the introduction of supposedly irrelevant alternatives.
Imagine, for example, two products of equal value to a consumer;
Product A is high quality with a high price, while Product B is low
quality with a low price. A consumer is indifferent between Prod-
uct A and Product B because Product B's low price compensates
258. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, The Psychology of Preferences, Sci. AM.,
Jan. 1982, at 160; Mark Kelman et al., Context-Dependence in Legal Decision Making, 25 J.
LEGAL STUD. 287 (1996); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Causal Schemas in Judgments
Under Uncertainty, in 1 PgooREss IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 49, 61-70 (Martin Fishbein ed.,
1980); Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Ori-
gins and Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY:
HEURISTICS AND BIASES 129, 149 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); Amos Tversky &
Daniel Kahneman, Extensional Versus Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in
Probability Judgment, 90 PsycHoL REv. 293 (1983); Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman,
Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S260-62 (1986).
259. Eldar Shafir et al., Reason-Based Choice, 49 COGNION 11, 18, 21 (1993).
260. In one study, students were told to imagine that they had planned to spend the night
working on a paper due the next day. Half of them were told that they then discovered that
an admired author was going to give a public lecture, and half were told about the lecture
and also about a screening of a movie that they wanted to see. Many more students in the
second half- with both choices - chose to go to the library (40% versus 21%). See Donald
A. Redelmeier & Eldar Shafir, Medical Decision Making in Situations That Offer Multiple
Alternatives, 273 JAMA 302, 302-03 (1995).
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for its low quality. If a third option, Product C, is introduced, with
the same low price as Product B but even lower quality, people may
begin to favor Product B over Product A, because Product C makes
Product B look like a good value. Conversely, if Product C has the
same high price as Product A but with less quality, people will buy
Product A. Even though people are not receiving additional infor-
mation, the extraneous information skews their choices. In other
words, a particular option can become more desirable simply be-
cause the options are presented or framed along with irrelevant
information.261
The addition of an inferior alternative may thus enhance the de-
sirability of an option. Cognitive psychologists dub this the asym-
metric dominance effect - the tendency to prefer x over y
increases by the addition of alternative z that is inferior to x but
superior to y.262 Here is a clear example: Simonson and Tversky
offered subjects a choice between $6 and "an elegant Cross pen. '263
36% chose the pen and 64% took the cash. A second group was
given the choice between $6, the Cross pen, and "a second pen that
was distinctly less attractive." This time, 46% took the Cross and
52% chose the cash. Again, this shows that the regularity condition
does not hold: the cheap pen option should not influence the
choice between the Cross pen and the cash. Yet whether the trade-
offs within the new set are favorable or unfavorable can influence
the tendency to prefer a particular alternative - what Simonson
and Tversky call a "tradeoff contrast."
Another exception to the regularity condition is extremeness
aversion. Extremeness aversion predicts that within an offered set,
261. Shafir et al. tested this prediction by offering groups of students hypothetical choices
between two CD players on a one-day clearance sale. The "popular SONY player" costs
only $99 while a "top-of-the-line AIWA player" costs $169. An equal number of students,
27%, picked each brand, and 46% chose to wait until they learned more about the various
models. See Shafir et al., supra note 259, at 22. On the other hand, a second group of stu-
dents was posed the hypothetical without the AIWA model. This time, 66% of people picked
the SONY, and only 34% selected the deferment choice. The third group of students was
presented with a choice between the SONY, "an inferior AIWA player for the regular list
price of $105," or the deferment choice. This time, 73% picked the SONY player and only
24% picked deferment. The introduction of the cheap AIWA should not have influenced the
choice between deferment and the SONY, but it did. More people were willing to buy the
SONY, which looked like a better deal once the cheap AIWA was shown. See id. at 22-23;
see also Amos Tversky & E. Shafir, Choice Under Conflict: The Dynamics of Deferred Deci-
sion, 3 PSYCHOL. Scr. 358, 360-61 (1992).
262. See Joel Huber et al., Adding Asymmetrically Dominated Alternatives: Violations of
Regularity and the Similarity Hypothesis, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 90 (1982); Douglas H. Wedell,
Distinguishing Among Models of Contextually Induced Preference Reversals, 17 J. EXPERI-
MENTAL PSYCHOL 767 (1991).
263. Itamar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and Ex-
tremeness Aversion, 29 J. MA.KEriNG REs. 281, 287 (1992).
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options with extreme values are relatively less attractive than those
with intermediate values.264
Both asymmetric dominance and extremeness aversion are ex-
planations of why reference points influence choices between op-
tions. These ideas are very useful in analyzing criminal deterrence
and substitution of alternatives. The substitution perspective
predicts that individuals do not view the costs and benefits of a par-
ticular crime in a vacuum. Rather, they examine them in light of
the costs and benefits of other crimes. The psychological adden-
dum to substitution suggests that people evaluate the relative harms
and benefits of a particular crime by using reference points. Conse-
quently, when the law proclaims, through a harsh penalty, that the
cost of a particular activity is very high, it might make other crimes
appear more attractive than they were before the penalty.
A harsh penalty on an activity might, therefore, invert
Andenaes's idea of general deterrence. Andenaes, as we saw, ar-
gued that the criminal law creates deterrence by educating people
about those acts that should not be done.265 But Andenaes's educa-
tional effect can be stood on its head. High penalties on crime X
may not only educate people about the particular danger of X, but
also about the comparably less dangerous - that is, less punished
- crimes Y and Z, even if Y and Z are in reality more dangerous.
Y and Z may then look more attractive than they did before. Theo-
ries about the educational impact of criminal law should incorpo-
rate these reference points in order to account for these
substitution-like effects.
To illustrate, let us return to the crack cocaine example. While
the new crack penalties did not directly say anything about heroin,
they may have influenced people's perception of heroin's utility.
The penalty increase could have changed the way people thought
about the cost of consuming crack. The law - through Andenaes-
like and lore effects - might have shaped people's view of crack as
the most evil drug. This would give rise to asymmetric dominance
and extremeness aversion effects. By penalizing crack as an ex-
264. See Itamar Simonson, Choice Based on Reasons: The Case of Attraction and Com-
promise Effects, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 158 (1989). For example, subjects were shown five
cameras varying in quality and price. One group was given a choice between a $170 Minolta
and a higher quality $240 Minolta. The second group was given the additional option of an
even higher quality $470 Minolta. In the first group, subjects were split between the two
cameras, but in the second group, 57% chose the middle option and the remaining subjects
were equally divided between the two extremes. The introduction of an extreme option re-
duced the desirability of the other extreme option, but not of the option in the middle. See
Shafir et al., supra note 259, at 25.
265. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
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treme drug, the high crack penalties, via extremeness aversion,
made heroin look better than it did before and thereby increased
the taste for it. For some consumers, heroin became a middle
choice - not as bad as either crack or total abstinence from
drugs. 266
In the case of drugs, the psychology of addiction exacerbates the
reference point effect. As anyone close to an alcoholic or drug
abuser knows, one of the most powerful facets of addiction is de-
nial.267 Harsh crack penalties may have the subtle effect of playing
into denial. People do not want to think they have reached rock
bottom. The existence of crack, and its treatment under the law,
may provide an excuse for these people. By concentrating on
crack, the law has indirectly told people that other drugs are safer
when, in fact, the reverse could be true when it comes to heroin.268
The media exacerbated this problem by devoting constant attention
to the one "new terrible drug" on the streets and neglecting older
- and perhaps more dangerous - drugs.2 69 One reason that her-
oin use is increasing at such an alarming rate could be that the con-
temporary understanding of crack may have influenced views about
heroin.270
The substitution effect, therefore, might work in tandem with
general principles from the psychology of addiction and from the
effects of reference points more generally to increase consumption
of heroin. By concentrating on crack, the law may indirectly sug-
gest that heroin is safer than it earlier appeared to be. Calling this a
266. Similarly, the asymmetric dominance effect suggests that when crack and heroin
were considered equals, users may have abstained due to conflict about which drug to try.
(Recall that people will often defer choice even when that deferment is not "rational," see
supra note 261.) But when the equality between crack and heroin was severed by the
mandatory minimums, it may have increased the consumption of drugs - indeed, even of
both drugs. Extremeness aversion, however, would temper the increase in crack and would
channel much of the increase in drug use to heroin.
267. Cf. Robert L. DuPont, Nicotine, 272 JAMA 1221 (1994) (reviewing NIcoTINE AD-
DICtiON: PRINCIPLES AND MANAGEMENT (C. Tracy Orleans & John Slade eds., 1993) and
stating that "[d]enial is a hallmark of addiction to alcohol and other drugs").
268. See supra note 66.
269. See Heroin Comes Back, supra note 67, at 63 ("'If crack didn't have the attention of
the media.. . heroin would have been on the front pages of every newspaper in America."'
(quoting Robert Stutman, head of the Drug Enforcement Administration's New York field
office)).
270. Heroin-related emergency room visits increased by 65% from 1988 to 1993. See
Lupo, supra note 59, at 1. One source reports that in 1992, for the first time in recent years,
there was a significant drop in the perceived risk of harm associated with heroin use among
high school seniors in the Monitoring the Future Study. See DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMi.,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSICE, U.S. DRUG THREAT ASSESSMENT 44 (1993). But the drops, which
occurred in the class of 1991, were not that significant. See OFFICE OF NATL. DRUG CON-
TROL POLY., supra note 62, at 12 tbl.7.
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substitution effect is somewhat of a misnomer, since it is based on
two noneconomic ideas - the inability of value-maximization to
predict choice in the real world and the sociological conception of
penalty messages. This interplay nicely demonstrates my claim that
incorporation of these concepts, gathered from several different dis-
ciplines, may yield a more realistic picture about the deterrent ef-
fect of a criminal penalty than a simple and elegant prediction from
any one particular method alone.
If extremeness aversion and asymmetric dominance turn out to
be powerful real-world forces, they may help governments devise
solutions to minimize harmful acts. By introducing alternatives that
are superior in one aspect and relatively equivalent in another, the
law may influence the choices that people make. The introduction
of technically irrelevant options may also make a previous option
look more attractive.271 For example, imagine that individuals face






Now, assume that a set of would-be criminals is indifferent between
the two choices because the high expected sanction compensates
for its high utility. The introduction of a third option that is close to
option A will induce people to pick option A.
271. See Joel Huber & Christopher Puto, Market Boundaries and Product Choice: Illus-








The government could, therefore, essentially manufacture option C
in order to induce people to pick option A. People may not pick C,
but may be more likely to pick A than before. This strategy could
enhance the law's substitution-creating role.272
The number of people who will be influenced by C will depend
on the degree of extremeness aversion and asymmetric dominance
present in the options. This analysis is very difficult to do in the
abstract, and must await empirical testing. Until now, however, no
one has tested such a proposition, in part because the whole notion
of what crimes are "close" to each other depends on a sociological
notion of grouped offenses that economists shy away from, and in
part because the economic idea that criminals choose among of-
fenses has not yet permeated the legal landscape.
D. Adaptive Preferences Revisited
We now return to analyzing the question of where preferences
originate. The previous sections have argued that the law has an
important role in shaping preferences. But, naturally, other vari-
ables influence preference as well. Adaptive preference theory
helps answer these questions by abstracting away current prefer-
ences, which inevitably will be shaped by the legal system. This
project of assessing preferences by divorcing them from the taste-
shaping effect of law has an impressive pedigree in both political
272. See supra section II.B. If the law makes legal substitutes out of less harmful activi-
ties, it may also reduce the number of crimes that are thought of as nondeterrable. Tastes are
shaped within the context of a legal system, and a system that provides people with an incen-
tive to commit the less harmful offense may inculcate a system of beliefs to value that offense
more highly than the more harmful ones. If the taste-shaping impact of the criminal law is
strong enough, it could wipe out most nondeterrable crimes.
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science and philosophy. Even works such as John Rawls's A The-
ory of Justice273 can be read as presenting a way of understanding
preferences in the absence of a legal regime.274
Adaptive preferences may provide another explanation of taste
formation, most obviously by explaining the preference differentials
between criminals and noncriminals. Because people value only ac-
cessible options, criminals tend to value drugs in a way that non-
users do not. This does not, however, answer the question, from
where does the preference to commit crimes initially come? If peo-
ple value what they have, then why would people commit crime?
The full answer to this question is beyond the scope of this article.
Accordingly, I will only set out a few preliminary thoughts about
the role of counteradaptive preferences in driving criminal behav-
ior. A counteradaptive preference refers to the tendency of
humans to want what they cannot have. In lay parlance, the grass is
always greener on the other side.275 While the economist stresses
the opportunity for profit illegality engenders, the counteradaptive
preference theorist stresses the psychological temptation prohibi-
tions create.
In the drug context, adaptive and counteradaptive preferences
provide policy experts with a new path for examining traditional
deterrence questions. The adaptive preference question examines
whether a legal penalty will have a taste-shaping effect. Such an
inquiry may proceed on several levels, and we have encountered
them throughout this Part. If, for example, the law keeps a drug
away from a group of people, will their preferences adapt in such a
way that they will not have a taste for the drug? Conversely, if the
distributional effect of a drug law is to flood a particular area with
the drug (such as inner cities or schools), will preferences adapt or
be shaped in a way that encourages consumption?
The counteradaptive question, on the other hand, asks whether
a legal penalty will exacerbate criminal activity by tempting people
to commit crimes. Here again, there are several lines of inquiry.
Does the temptation to get what one cannot easily have explain,
say, drug use among affluent teens? Does this yearning for the un-
available explain the fierce "straight-edge" teenagers in high crime
areas who do not drink, smoke, and so on? More generally, is per-
ceived availability shaped by the physical presence of the drug (as
273. JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSICE (1971).
274. See Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1146 n.63.
275. See ELSTER, supra note 180, at 111.
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the economist would see it), by the law (as the taste-shaping econo-
mist would have it), by norms (as the sociologist would put it), by
the information skew created by particular choices (as the cognitive
psychologist would say), or by some combination of these? An an-
swer to this question would fill a book by itself, and I only mean to
raise the question now.
In the case of drugs, adaptive preferences introduce another
complication. Unlike preferences for other items, a preference for
an addictive narcotic, by its very nature, may change future prefer-
ences. Because such a drug is highly addictive upon merely trying
it, a user's preferences will change because of its properties. That
is, current consumption is a complement to future consumption.
Whereas counteradaptive preferences may explain why a user first
tries a drug, the drug itself may be responsible for further consump-
tion and addiction, itself a form of adaptive preference.
Cass Sunstein has placed addiction in a category separate from
adaptive preference. In Sunstein's schema, addiction is classified as
Category 3 - where the "preferences are endogenous to the act of
consumption." 276 Category 2, on the other hand, "includes prefer-
ences that are a product of legal rules allocating entitlements and
wealth." 277 By now, my point will be obvious to the reader: addic-
tion belongs in both of these categories. One cannot fully under-
stand addiction without understanding the preferences that give rise
to addiction - preferences that the legal regime in part creates.
This article has suggested several possible ways in which legal rules
that allocate wealth may influence tastes and behavior, and how
they may encourage illegal activity.278 By emphasizing the ways in
which the legal system shapes taste, therefore, adaptive preference
theory provides a mechanism tohelp grasp the advances and limits
276. Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1139. He defines addiction as "a process in which the
subjective costs of not consuming a particular good increase dramatically over time, while the
subjective benefits decrease or remain stable." Ld. at 1158. The preference for a good is not,
in his view, static, but changes as a result of increased use. Elster similarly believed that
addiction "is much more specific than sour grapes: it is to be explained more by the nature of
the object of addiction than by the tendency of the human mind to adapt to whatever objects
are available." ELSTER, supra note 180, at 121; see also Gary Becker et al., Rational Addic-
tion and the Effect of Price on Consumption, AM. ECON. REv., May 1991, at 237; Gary S.
Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, A Theory of Rational Addiction, 96 J. POL ECON. 675 (1988).
277. Sunstein, supra note 182, at 1138.
278. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 103, 242, 257 (arguing that once the legal
regime calls certain people lawbreakers, those people are likely to value their status as law-
breakers more than they did when only "others" were the lawbreakers); supra text accompa-
nying notes 109-12 (arguing that wealth effects might mean that criminalization of drugs only
shifts consumption among certain socioeconomic groups).
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of substitution and a way to understand where preferences for ille-
gal activity are formed.
IV. SYNTHESIZING r EFFEcTs OF DETERRENCE
The above analysis paints a complicated picture and raises a
host of questions. By now, readers can see how concepts such as
substitution, taste-shaping, norms, asymmetric dominance/extreme-
ness aversion, and adaptive/counteradaptive preferences apply to a
host of activities. Does a law against embezzlement lead to an in-
crease in people taking kickbacks? Does it influence social norms,
or are such norms already entrenched? Will a doubling of the kick-
back penalty to compensate for any increase have an effect on
tastes? Would it make kickbacks look more or less attractive?
Does a market for such offenses exist? These are all pieces of one
large puzzle - a project that, though difficult, might turn out not to
be impossible.
The following box illustrates some of the possible results from
criminalization of an activity:
FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED
WHEN IMPOSING A PENALTY
PARTICULAR AcTIvny OTHER Acnvrrms
DECREASES
INCREASES
To illustrate all of these effects, let us return to the example of
crack cocaine. With respect to Box 1, a strong penalty on crack
cocaine possession and dealing could decrease dealing by decreas-
ing a criminal's opportunity set, because the "price" - legal and
perhaps social - of dealing is higher.279 Furthermore, the penalty
279. See supra Part I.
a) Opportunity set decreases a) Y-Optimality
b) Taste decreases b) Complementarity from
c) May unconsciously penalized activity and
decrease taste (lore) 1 2 escalator effects
a) Marginal deterrence 3 4 a) Substitution
& cliffs b) Shapes taste towards
b) Monopolization/true substitutes
profit c) Extremeness
c) Inverse sentencing aversion/asymmetric
d) Distributional price dominance
effects d) Monopolization/true
e) Geographic substitution profit
f) Stigma/labeling e) Complementarity from
g) Giffen goods law-breaking
h) Horizontal and f) Income effects/two
vertical tradeoffs types of deterrence
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could weaken a taste for dealing or prevent one from being formed
in a youth.280 This effect may be so even if the actor is unaware of
the law's role, as lore may develop that crack dealing is an evil ac-
tivity. 81 Within Box 2, when the crack penalty is set at a Y-optimal
point, a penalty on crack may prevent people from committing
other sorts of crimes even if it does not prevent crack dealing. This
is because the crack penalty has an income effect that makes other
crimes more costly. A simpler income effect is that a high monetary
price for crack will also mean that users will not have money to
consume other drugs.282 If crack consumption has complementary
relationships with other crimes - such as consumption of other
drugs and physical abuse - the crack penalty will also reduce these
other types of crime if it succeeds in reducing consumption.2s3
Box 3 illustrates how the crack penalty may not actually de-
crease consumption. If the penalty for crack dealing has cliffs, there
will be marginal deterrence problems - if five grams and eight
grams are both punished with five years in jail, dealers will deal in
eight-gram amounts.284 Furthermore, criminalization creates the
possibility for entrepreneurship and true profit, further increasing
the returns from illegal activity.2s5 If the crack penalty is increased
at a time when lore about crack is entrenched, an inverse sentenc-
ing effect is possible, and the expected sanction may drop.28 6 In
addition, if the law induces price-setters in affluent communities to
decrease their consumption, thereby reducing the price of the drug,
it may increase the horizontal consumption of less affluent users,
whom monetary price deters more than social price.287
Box 3 includes several other effects. For example, if the crack
penalty is lower in other jurisdictions, the penalty may simply exter-
nalize the problem as dealers pack up and move to those locations.
Such geographic substitution could mitigate much of the benefit of
a penalty.288 The penalty may also stigmatize those arrested under
it, making it harder for them to find lawful employment and easier
to find criminal employment.28 9 In other words, even if the overall
280. See supra section III.A.
281. See supra section III.B.1.
282. See supra section II.C.
283. See supra notes 35, 67, 197 and accompanying text.
284. See supra section I.A.
285. See supra text accompanying note 97.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 212-22.
287. See supra section I.D.3.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
289. See supra section III.B.3.
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number of people dealing crack (horizontal consumption) is lower,
those who deal crack will deal more of it (vertical consumption).
Finally, if crack is a Giffen good, increasing the penalty could im-
poverish users of the drug and increase the vertical consumption of
crack.290 In certain circumstances, such as with drug consumption,
the real evil may be excessive vertical consumption, in which case
the tradeoff between types of consumptions can be
counterproductive.291
Box 4 explains how the crack penalty may increase other crimes.
Dealers and consumers may substitute another drug, such as her-
oin, instead of crack. This may also increase people's taste for the
substitute and contribute to an anomie effect whereby subnorms in
a community erode the taboo against it.292 In addition, those stig-
matized by their association with the drug may act in other illegal
ways because legal employment is no longer an option and because
they encounter other persons who dabble in a variety of crimes.293
Furthermore, if the crack penalty makes crack appear to be the
worst drug, consumption of other drugs may increase as extreme-
ness aversion causes them to look better than they did before.294
To the extent the law creates the potential for monopolization, it
may encourage organized crime and further law-breaking by such
organizations.295 If the law raises the monetary price of a drug, it
may also have a straight income effect that will either lead to addi-
tional crime to earn money to buy drugs, or, perhaps, to a decrease
in consumption of other drugs to save money to buy the penalized
drug.296
Finally, the deterrent effect of the crack penalty is likely to vary
for different users. For users with high income, the monetary price
effect will not matter much, but the stigma of a possible conviction
wil. 297 The reverse may be true for users with less wealth. Accord-
ingly, those high income users that face the stigma of being caught
may find themselves thrust into an environment where crime is a
means of survival. This could increase the commission of all sorts
of crimes. And for those low-income criminals whose incomes drop
290. See supra section II.D.1.
291. See supra text accompanying note 166-70.
292. See supra text accompanying notes 224-28.
293. See supra text accompanying notes 32, 103, 242, 257.
294. See supra text accompanying notes 264-66.
295. See supra text accompanying note 107.
296. See supra text accompanying note 155.
297. See supra section I.D.3.
2472 [Vol. 95:2385
Deterrence's Difficulty
further because of a penalty - either because they are consumers
of the drug or because the penalty requires them to pay more in
bribes and thus cuts into their dealing profits - a penalty may in-
crease the commission of other crimes in order to return the crimi-
nal to her prepenalty wage.29 8
Now consider the nonmarket crime of assault. A penalty on as-
sault will increase its price and thus reduce a criminal's opportunity
set. It may also decrease the taste for assault by inculcating a norm
against it - an effect that may be either direct or indirect through
the vehicle of lore. Y-optimality is a more complicated matter - a
high penalty on assault, even if it does not reduce the commission
of assault, may prevent other crimes because the actor is not willing
to take what is now a larger aggregate risk. If the actor wants to
assault someone and rob a bank, penalizing the assault at a very
high level may deter the bank robbery.299 This result holds even if
the two crimes, assault and bank robbery, are entirely separate.
Additionally, a penalty on assault may prevent complementary
crimes. So if assault tends to lead to battery or other forms of vio-
lence, a high assault penalty may reduce the commission of those
offenses.
Conversely, a high assault penalty may - though it deters many
assaults - prompt those assaults that do occur to be very harmful,
or even encourage assaulters to assault many people at once. This
happens when the penalty does not draw a heavy distinction be-
tween very harmful and less harmful assaults, or between one as-
sault and many. That is the insight, once again, offered by marginal
deterrence. The effect might also be phrased in horizontal and ver-
tical terms: the number of people who assault could be lower, but
the assaults may be much worse. A very strong penalty may also
create an inverse sentencing effect because juries and judges will
not want to impose high sentences on those who commit assault.
For those convicted of assault, a stigmatization effect is possible,
which may increase the commission of assault. Those who have as-
saulted may find themselves separated from society, even if they
are not punished, and this phenomenon may have anomie and sub-
norm effects that could increase crime.300
298. See supra text accompanying notes 155, 167.
299. This example, as with all discussions of Y-optimality, assumes that the actor has a
high enough taste for the assault that it exceeds the expected cost.
300. TWo other ideas discussed above, monopolization and Giffen goods, are not really
applicable to this nonmarket crime.
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The application of the concepts in Box 4 is more difficult for
nonmarket crimes. Depending on an individual's taste for assault, a
high penalty may prompt substitution to a different crime. The
range of substitution will be a function of the individual's prefer-
ence in relation to the price of the competing options. Substitution
is, therefore, theoretically possible. The real question concerns the
range of crimes that may be substitutes. The penalty structure,
which might group offenses together, may influence this range. To
the extent that a high penalty for assault makes other crimes, such
as robbery, look better than they did before, cognitive bias may fur-
ther encourage substitution. Finally, high assault penalties cause
stigmatization effects that could drive people to further crime, just
as in the crack example. There is, again, no real "income effect."' 301
The above discussion highlights just how many complex effects
are at work in deterrence. Which of these results will happen in a
given situation is, of course, difficult to predict. The extent to which
they will happen is even more difficult to determine. These tasks,
naturally, demand empirical work. My only goals here have been
to defend the complexity of the question and to demonstrate just
how much work is left to do.
I began this article by promising that the deterrence hypothesis
is much more complicated than has been assumed. In the end,
scholars might decide that the questions about elasticity of substitu-
tion, norms, framing, and so on are just too difficult to figure out.302
If so, that itself would be a useful finding. If the criminal law can-
not really tell whether it is accomplishing its goal of deterrence and
cannot tell whether the deterrence it does accomplish comes at the
cost of creating crimes that may be much worse, it may be time to
rethink our deterrence-based consequentialist premises.303 If such
premises rely on intuition and guesswork - guesswork that is itself
motivated by our natural gravitation towards simplicity and ele-
301. In the abstract, I imagine that one could stretch the concept to argue that if an
assault penalty made it more difficult to satiate one's taste for an assault because assaulters
had to tone down their threats to avoid heavy punishment, it might increase the number of
assaults so that criminals could reach their target "income."
302. For one incisive example showing that elasticities of substitution can be measured,
see Ian Ayres & Steven D. Levitt, Measuring Positive Externalities from Unobservable Vic-
tim Precaution: An Empirical Analysis of Lojack (Aug. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author). Ayres's work measures, using interrupted time-series analysis, whether the
LoJack auto-theft device increases the commission of other crimes, such as robbery, through
statistical analysis.
303. See Norval Morris, Impediments to Penal Reform, 33 U. Clu. L. REv. 627, 631 (1966)
("[E]very criminal law system in the world, except one [Greenland], has deterrence as its
primary and essential postulate. It figures most prominently throughout our punishing and
sentencing decisions - legislative, judicial and administrative." (footnote omitted)).
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gance - other nondeterrent-based approaches to criminal punish-
ment should be explored.
To ThE FuTuRE
Consider the words of the New Hampshire Constitution of 1784:
All penalties ought to be proportioned to the nature of the offense.
No wise legislature will affix the same punishment to the crimes of
theft, forgery, and the like, which they do to those of murder and
treason. Where the same undistinguishing severity is exerted against
all offenses, the people are led to forget the real distinction in the
crimes themselves, and to commit the most flagrant with as little com-
punction as they do those of the lightest dye 304
My own work has emphasized this document as central to an under-
standing of our Federal Constitution.3 05 What is interesting here is
the insight it also offers into contemporary criminal law. Over two
hundred years ago, those who drafted the New Hampshire Consti-
tution realized the importance of substitution effects in criminal law
- that "theft" and "murder" could be substitutes. What's more,
the drafters also realized that the criminal law performs a taste-
shaping function; that the "people" would be "led to forget" the
distinctions and commit "the most flagrant" crimes.
Criminal lawyers have not examined whether our two-hundred-
year experience bears out the predictions of the New Hampshire
Constitution. This failure is symptomatic of more general problems
in contemporary criminal law. After all, criminal law, for much of
the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth, was at
the forefront of interdisciplinary studies in law. Criminologists bor-
rowed heavily from psychiatry and philosophy in an attempt to un-
derstand why people act the way they do and how government
should punish them. Yet recently, a movement inward has domi-
nated criminal law scholarship. This is unfortunate, and not only
because the implosion may lead to incomplete answers to age-old
questions in criminal law. The narrowness of conventional criminal
law has also prompted criminal lawyers not even to ask questions
that are now commonplace in other areas of law. Advances in the
one area of major interdisciplinary progress, economic analysis of
criminal law, have slowed because the insights gleaned from a
model with a rational, static-preference, statute-reading actor have
reached their logical stopping point.
304. N.H. CONsT. art. XVIII (amended 1793).
305. Se4 e.g., Bruce Ackerman & Neal Katyal, Our Unconventional Founding, 62 U. Cm.
L. Rav. 475, 484-86, 561-62 (1995).
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The beauty of substitution analysis - in both its economic and
noneconomic incarnations - is that it opens up criminal law to
these inquiries. What different incentives does criminalization cre-
ate? What is the role of the criminal law when actors do not have
perfect knowledge about penalties? How do degrees of risk-
aversion play out in criminal law? What are the effects of excessive
penalties? Can the criminal law shape tastes as well as imposing
opportunity constraints? Can crimes of passion be substitutes?
How does income correlate with crime? How does the psychology
of framing relate to substitution? Substitution theory raises all of
these questions, and each requires extensive individualized consid-
eration. The answers will determine the role of deterrence in our
criminal law.
